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Abstract
In this collection of essays I study individuals’ health related decision-making and the consequences of
those decisions for health and labor market productivity.
The first two essays focus on the impact of low caloric intake on economic productivity in India
and find that changes in caloricintake result in substantial and broadly generalizable changes in productivity
among malnourished adults. The first of these essays, based on a randomized controlled trial of cycle-
rickshaw drivers, finds that an additional 700 calories per day results in improved physical and cognitive
function in the laboratory as well as a 10 percent increase in labor supply and earnings by the fifth and final
week of the study. The second essay studies the impact of a decline of 700 calories per day caused by
Ramadan fasting on agricultural production. The estimated decrease in production implies a 20 to 40
percent loss in productivity per fasting individual.
In both of these studies, the estimated return on investment in calories is relatively high, with point
estimates of  75  to 200  percent  over a  few  months.  Yet,  substantial evidence  suggests  that  liquidity
constraints do not meaningfully limit caloric consumption. Hence, the low caloric intake of the majority of
Indian adults presents a puzzle. I study choices regarding caloric intake through incentivized surveys and
find evidence that inaccurate beliefs about both the returns to calories and the caloric content of foods may
play a role in the low caloric consumption observed in India.
The third essay examines the impact of individually oriented, purely altruistic, and a hybrid of
competitive and cooperative monetary incentives on older adults’ completion of cognitive exercises in the
United States. This research finds that all three incentive structures approximately double the number of
exercises completed during the six-week active experimental period relative to a no incentive controliv
condition.  However,  the  altruistic  and  cooperative/competitive  designs  led  to  different  patterns  of
participation, with significantly higher inter-partner correlations in software utilization, as well as greater
persistence  once  incentives  were  removed.  Provision of  all  incentives improved  performance  on  the
incentivized exercises but not on an independent cognitive testing battery.v
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1 The Economic Costs of Low Caloric Intake:
A Randomized Controlled Trial with Cycle-Rickshaw
Drivers*
1.1 Introduction
Many of the world’s poor consume very few calories.1 One-seventh of the world’s population remains
below the level of caloric intake recommended by health professionals (FAO 2011). Of course, the poor
consume less of any normal good. However, food differs from many goods in that it is both a consumption
good, producing utility directly, and an input into production. A long line of theory literature has modeled
intertemporal nutrition choices and their implications for labor productivity and the functioning of labor
markets (e.g., Leibenstein 1957; Bliss and Stern 1978; Stiglitz 1976; Dasgupta and Ray 1986). Although
theory in this area is extensive and well developed, given the inherent challenges posed by the endogeneity
of caloric intake and the measurement of productivity, empirical work is less well developed.2 Specifically,
despite the fact that calories are a broadly available investment good and a basic economic choice made by
all people, it remains an open question whether there is an economically significant calorie-productivity
gradient at the levels of caloric intake observed among the world’s poor today.
Theoretically, there are reasons to believe the answer is no. There is good evidence that liquidity is
unlikely to constrain investment in calories.3 Hence, a revealed preference argument suggests that despite
* I am deeply grateful to my advisors Sendhil Mullainthan, Lawrence Katz, Michael Kremer, and David Cutler for
feedback and support. For helpful discussions, I thank David Laibson, Rohini Pande, Asim Khwaja, Rick Hornbeck,
Ed Glaeser, George Loewenstein, Kevin Volpp, Shawn Cole, Max Bazerman, David Bloom, Supreet Kaur, Frank
Schilbach, Dan Bjorkegren, Ian Tomb, Joana Naritomi, Raluca Dragusanu, Laura Trucco, Anjali Adukia and seminar
participants at Harvard University. I thank Kate Strula, Luke Ravenscroft, Manasa Reddy and the research staff in
Chennai for outstanding field assistance.
1 Throughout this document I use the word “calorie” (with a lower case “c”) in the commonly used sense of 1
kilocalorie rather than the technical definition in which 1 calorie is 1/1000 of one kilocalorie or 1/1000 of one Calorie.
2 In addition, the existing empirical evidence is quite mixed. For example, Deolalikar (1988) and Immink and Viteri
(1981) find no relationship between nutrition and productivity while Kraut and Muller (1946), Strauss (1986), and
Wolgemuth et al. (1982) find evidence in favor of a such a relationship. A more detailed discussion of existing
productivity and physiology literatures are provided in Appendix 1B.
3 Even among extremely poor individuals, food rarely accounts for more than 40 to 70 percent of expenditures and
the additional calories necessary to reach recommended caloric intake could typically be purchased for less than five2
the apparently low consumption, any productivity gains from additional caloric intake are likely to be
relatively small. Specifically, with perfect markets and full information, the Euler equation implies that the
return to calories must be less than the discount rate. Yet, there are both structural and behavioral reasons
why the revealed preference argument may not hold. For example, principal-agent contracting may reduce
consumption below its optimal level if consumption is not readily observable. Or, if individuals are not
aware of the returns to calories or the nutritional content of foods, they may consume too little, potentially
leaving large economic gains on the table even in the absence of liquidity constraints.
In the first two chapters of this dissertation I study the relationship between caloric consumption
and economic output using two distinct empirical methodologies. The first, presented in Chapter 1, is a
field experiment (with laboratory components) which examines the impact of increased caloric intake on
the labor supply, earnings, and physical and cognitive performance of 211 cycle-rickshaw drivers in
Chennai, India.4 The second analysis, presented in Chapter 2, draws on the quasi-random declines in caloric
intake  caused  by  fasting  during  Ramadan,  a  month-long  Muslim  holiday. This  analysis  utilizes  a
differences-in-difference approach to assess the impact of reduced caloric intake on agricultural production
at the crop-district-year level. These two methodologies are complementary. While field experiments can
provide strong causal identification, they often lack external validity. Conversely, natural experiments
typically apply to broader populations, but may not establish causality as cleanly. In drawing on both
methodologies, I aim to establish a casual mechanism in a controlled setting and to demonstrate that the
mechanism has economically meaningful impacts on one of the largest sectors of the Indian economy.
In more detail, the 211 cycle-rickshaw drivers in the five-week randomized controlled trial (RCT)
presented  in  Chapter  1 were  randomly  assigned  to  either  a  control  group,  receiving  cash  for  their
participation, or a treatment group receiving a mixture of cash and food of the same total value. The foods
percent of daily income. Alternatively, substitution to less expensive grains could increase caloric intake 20 percent
at no additional cost (Subramanian and Deaton 1996; Banerjee and Duflo 2011). In addition, the elasticity of caloric
intake with respect to income is remarkably low in many developing countries, with estimates commonly ranging
from 0.1 to 0.5 (Subramanian and Deaton 1996; Behrman and Deolalikar 1987; Bouis and Haddad 1992).
4 Cycle-rickshaw drivers drive large human-powered tricycles similar to “bicycle taxis” in the United States. The
vehicle has a bench large enough for two passengers behind the driver.3
provided to treated participants were snacks with little nutritive value beyond 700 calories.5 In order to
minimize crowd out and generate a substantial and sustained increase in caloric intake, participants could
choose from a variety of snacks which were consumed daily between meal times in the office.6
While only treated participants received food, participants in both experimental conditions visited
the study office briefly each day to report their labor supply and earnings. The study also included a battery
of  physical  and  cognitive  laboratory-based  tasks, compensated  according  to  performance,  at  both
enrollment and in the final week of the study (“endline”). These tasks were designed to assess the underlying
physical and cognitive skills relevant to labor supply in this population in the absence of the variable
demand that is common in this labor market.7 For example, physical tasks included cycling on an exercise
bike in the office and cognitive tasks targeted skills such as persistence, motivation, and planning.
A number of features of cycle-rickshaw drivers made them an advantageous population for a study
of this type. First, as full residual claimants on their labor and with flexible labor supply, this population
faces strong incentives and has the ability to adjust labor supply and earnings over short time horizons. The
rickshaw drivers’ mobility also allowed them to provide high frequency data via the daily visit to the study
office while  minimizing  the  likelihood  of  spillovers  between  conditions.  Finally,  the  work  habits,
demographic characteristics, and low caloric intake of the cycle-rickshaw drivers studied are relatively
representative of typical informal labor market participants.
Using an intent-to-treat estimation strategy, the results from this study suggest that increasing
caloric intake increases both labor supply and earnings over time. Participants in the treatment group
increase their labor supply relative to the control group by an average of eight percent over the entire study.
Consistent with thecumulative effects found in the physiology literature, this increase follows a fairly linear
pattern across the weeks of the study, rising from no significant difference in the first week to a net gain of
5 To determine the effect of calories rather than general “nutrition,” the snacks were chosen to contain minimal iron
and few micronutrients. Specifically, snacks typically consisted of starches and fried foods like potato chips and
samosas.
6 Multiple outcomes, including weight measured at endline, confirm that despite the inframarginal amount of food
provided, caloric intake increased among treated participants. See Section 1.2 for additional details of these measures.
7 Day-to-day demand for rickshaw services varies substantially with the weather, train schedules, and other factors.4
roughly 12 percent in the final week (Keys et al. 1950). Income streams in this population are noisy and
have relatively large standard errors; however, earnings show a similar linear trend and are roughly 9
percent higher among treated individuals in the final week of the study. Finally, treated participants also
earn approximately 10 percent more on both physical and cognitive laboratory-based tasks at endline.
Although cognitive function has not traditionally been central in the economics literature on adult
nutrition, the physiology and psychology literatures suggest that improvements in cognitive function are
not only possible, but likely, with changes in caloric intake.8 If these improvements occur, the returns to
improved nutrition would not be limited to physical gains on the margin, but would also include gains from
improving inframarginal choices as well as savings and consumption decisions. Hence, changes in earnings
would provide a lower bound on the gains from higher caloric intake.9
The meaningful productivity gains found in the randomized trial of rickshaw-drivers prompts the
question of whether the economic returns to additional caloric investment are positive. Although there is
greater uncertainty inherentin estimating the return on investment (ROI),with a point estimate of 75 percent
over  6  months, the estimated  return  is  relatively  high.10 Yet,  one-third  of  the  population  remains
underweight and caloric intake in India is both low and declining, generating a puzzle (WHO 2013; Deaton
and Dreze 2009).
8 Despite accounting for only 2 percent of body weight, the brain consumes roughly 20 percent of the energy used by
the body; hence, limiting the total energy available is likely to constrain the brain’s ability to function as it would any
other organ requiring substantial energy inputs (Fonsec-Azevedo and Herculano-Houzel 2012). In addition, a number
of diverse sources have demonstrated substantial changes in cognitive function and decision-making as a function of
caloric intake (Gailliot et al. 2007; Danzinger et al. 2011; Baumeister and Vohs 2007; US Army 1987).
9 Additionally, the influence of low caloric intake could be much more broadly applicable and could remain relevant
despite the global shifts towards cognitive rather than physical labor.
10 These ROI calculations use a common staple grain, rice, to determine the cost of investment. Due to the cumulative
nature of changes in caloric intake and the corresponding linear increases in labor supply and earnings over the course
of the five week RCT, I estimate a six-month ROI for this study to better gauge the likely “long-run” impact of higher
intake. The expected gains in earnings beyond the end of the study are, however, capped at the value observed in the
final week. A wide variety of alternative assumptions about the cost of calories and productivity changes, and the
returns implied by these assumptions, are detailed in Section 1.4. Notably, although the estimated returns are high,
given the low cost of investment, the absolute value of the gains is relatively small and accounts for only a modest
fraction of income. This feature may make the high returns relatively difficult for individuals to detect in the context
of highly variable income streams. Returns to caloric intake in the study of agricultural production presented in
Chapter 2 are similarly high.5
To explore this puzzle and the forces driving decisions about caloric intake, I briefly describe and
assess possible reasons for low caloric intake in this population and conclude that incorrect beliefs about
nutritionmayplay an important rolein low intake levels. Evidence of these inaccurate beliefs was generated
via an incentivized survey about the returns to increased caloric intake and the caloric densities (calories
per unit cost) of foods. Responses to these surveys suggest strikingly wrong beliefs. For example, over
three-quarters of the respondents believe that increasing caloric intake by the equivalent of one meal per
day would either weakly decrease labor supply and earnings, or have no prior about the consequences of
increasing caloric intake. And, in pairwise comparisons between commonly consumed foods, participants
identify foods with higher caloric density at rates lower than those generated by guessing at random.11
Because the existence of incorrect beliefs in equilibrium is unusual, supporting evidence for how these
beliefs are developed and maintained is also provided.12
The remainder of this paper is divided into five parts. Section 1.2 describes the design of the
randomized controlled trial among cycle-rickshaw drivers. The changes in labor supply, earnings, and
performance on laboratory tasks resulting from increased caloric intake are presented in Section1.3.Section
1.4 provides calculations of the returns associated with the productivity changes estimated in Section 1.3.
Potential reasons for low caloric intake observed in the presence of high returns are discussed in Section
1.5. In addition, this section provides evidence that incorrect beliefs may play a role in the decision not to
invest in greater caloric intake. Section 1.6 concludes and discusses implications of incorrect beliefs
regarding caloric intake.
11 Because  calories  per  rupee  would  be  a  difficult  metric  for  semi-numerate  individuals,  these questions  are
implemented by asking participants to select which of two food items with the same economic value has more energy.
Food items were specifically selected to be commonly consumed and to have large caloric differences. The tradeoffs
were presented as life-size photographs with verbal and written descriptions of the food accompanying them. More
details on the exact implementation are provided in Section 1.5.
12 Although unusual, there are other well-documented instances in which incorrect beliefs with significant economic
consequences exist in equilibrium (e.g., Jensen 2010; Banerjee and Duflo 2011).6
1.2 Experimental Design
There are a number of clear challenges inherent in assessing the productivity consequences associated with
caloric intake. Use of a randomized controlled trial among cycle-rickshaw drivers provides solutions to two
of the most difficult: 1) the endogeneity of caloric intake and 2) measurement of individual productivity in
a context with strong incentives and minimal spillovers. The endogeneity of caloric intake was addressed
through randomization and design features intended to minimize crowd out of other food consumption and
generate substantial and sustained increases in caloric intake among treated individuals. Selection of a
participant group with a variety of advantageous features, described below, aided in the measurement of
individual productivity. In addition, the use of laboratory tasks allowed for the assessment of changes in
both physical and cognitive ability under controlled conditions with clear and consistent incentives.
1.2.1 Participants
Participants were drawn from the population of cycle-rickshaw drivers in Chennai, India. Eligibility criteria
included a BMI less than or equal to 20, age greater than 18 years, expected residence in the city for at least
two months, and cycle-rickshaw driving as a primary occupation.13 Basic demographic characteristics and
labor supply information collected at enrollment are presented in Table 1.1 (a more extensive discussion of
participants’ baseline characteristic and habits is presented in Appendix 1B). This population was chosen
because: 1) as full residual claimants on their labor, rickshaw drivers face strong incentives, 2) the work
has flexible labor supply (both days and hours) andallows for direct measurement of individual labor supply
and earnings, 3) the population is mobile allowing them to visit the study office each day while limiting the
possibility of spillovers between treated participants and control participants, and 4) members typically
13 BMI is a measure of weight for height calculated as weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared. The
WHO describes a BMI under 18.5 as “underweight,” 18.5 to 24.9 as “normal,” 25 to 29.9 as “overweight,” and over
30 as “obese” (WHO 2013). As a benchmark, an individual who is 5 foot 8 inches tall (1.73 m) would have a BMI of
20 at a weight of 131 pounds (59.4 kg).7
have low caloric intake. In addition, these individuals were selected because they are similar to many other
casual laborers in India, improving external validity.
Table 1.1: Characteristics of RCT Participants at Enrollment
(1) (2) (3)
Experimental Condition Control Treatment Difference
BMI 17.87 17.73 -0.14
[1.41] [1.39] [0.19]
Age 45.63 46.26 0.63
[10.94] [9.37] [1.40]
Number of household members 3.42 3.40 -0.02
[2.32] [2.28] [0.32]
Migrant (binary) 0.29 0.22 -0.07
[0.46] [0.42] [0.06]
Rooms in house 1.41 1.44 0.03
[0.96] [1.07] [0.14]
Number of small appliances 3.77 4.08 0.31
[2.16] [2.54] [0.33]
Ration card (binary) 0.74 0.69 -0.05
[0.44] [0.47] [0.06]
Years as rickshaw driver 20.09 20.64 0.55
[11.53] [11.84] [1.61]
Rent rickshaw (binary) 0.77 0.76 -0.01
[0.42] [0.43] [0.06]
Earned yesterday 183.28 193.53 10.25
[145.52] [160.59] [21.15]
Work yesterday 0.77 0.82 0.04
[0.42] [0.39] [0.06]
Hours, conditional on working yesterday 9.80 9.81 0.01
[3.61] [3.40] [0.56]
Observations 102 109 211
Notes:
1. In Columns (1) and (2), results are presented as mean [standard deviation]. Column (3) is
presented as mean [standard error].
2. The hours conditional on working figures are based on smaller sample sizes of N = 74 for
Control and N = 82 for Treatment.
3. Rickshaws are typically rented on a weekly or monthly basis.
4. No significant imbalances on baseline covariates were found between participants in each
experimental condition.8
1.2.2 Experimental Conditions
Participants were randomly assigned to either a control group, receiving only cash compensation with an
average value of Rs. 75 per day, or a treatment condition, receiving a mixture of cash and 700 calories
worth of food with the same total value. Treated participants were able to choose a variety of snacks from
a varied selection each day to encourage consumption. However, the food provided was of little nutritive
value beyond the caloric content.14 Food was provided during periods between meals to minimize crowd
out and treated participants consumed the food in the office to ensure that it was not given to others or
thrown away.
1.2.3 Experimental Activities and Timing
Each participant was enrolled in the study for five weeks. During this time, each participant was asked to
visit the study office each day (except Sunday) to complete a short survey about labor supply and earnings
the previous day.15 In addition, participants reported the number of meals consumed (as a measure of
potential crowd out of food consumption) and their energy level on a scale of one to five during this survey.
Participants in the treatment group were also provided with food at this time.
All participants also spent one day on the first day of the study (“enrollment”) and in the fifth week
of the study (“endline”) in the study office to complete more extensive surveys and engage in a battery of
physical  and  cognitive  tasks.  These experimental  tasks,  compensated  according  to  performance  and
conducted in a controlled setting, were designed to provide a comprehensive picture of the impact of
improved nutrition on both physical and cognitive function relevant to production. For example, cognitive
tasks targeted areas such as motivation and planning, both skills relevant to work as a rickshaw driver. The
tasks were a mixture of standardized tasks used in the economics and psychology literatures (e.g. crossing
out symbols) and original tasks specific to the context (e.g. choices between various rickshaw job offers,
14 Options typically included foods such as potato chips, “mixture” (small bits of fried dough similar to Chex mix or
Cheetos), vada (a fried spiced dough), or samosas (fried dough stuffed with potatoes, vegetables, and spices).
15 Participants reported both Saturday and Sunday labor supply and earnings on Monday.9
cycling on an exercise cycle).Finally, anthropometric measurements were taken and participants completed
a 24-hour dietary recall survey to permit calculation of changes in participants’ caloric intake. A list of tasks
in included in Appendix 1A, Table 1A.1.
1.3 Results of the Randomized Controlled Trial
1.3.1 Randomization
The baseline randomization was successful with no significant imbalances on enrollment covariates for
either demographics or labor supply and earnings (Table 1.1 above).
1.3.2 Caloric Intake
Dietary recall surveys, daily reports of meals consumed, and an increase in BMI of treated individuals all
provide evidence that the treatment was effective at increasing caloric intake. Results of these analyses are
presented in Appendix 1A, Table 1A.2 and discussed in Appendix 1B.
1.3.3   Attrition
Overall average attendance was 87 percent in the control group and 76 percent in the treatment group. These
average  figures  shroud  important  variation  in  attrition  patterns  though.  Treated  individuals  were
significantly more likely to drop out during the first few days (Figure 1.1). However, conditional on
attending more than four days in the first week, daily attendance was 93 percent among control individuals
and 91 percent among treated individuals, a difference that is statistically indistinguishable (Table 1.2 and
Figure 1.2, p = 0.51).10
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Figure 1: Daily Attendance
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Figure 2: Attendance, Conditional on High 1st Week Attendance
Figure 1.1: Daily Attendance
Figure 1.2: Attendance, Conditional on High 1st Week Attendance11
Table 1.2: Attendance Levels By Experimental Condition
(1) (2)
Experimental Condition Control Treatment
Average fraction of days attended 0.87 0.76
Fraction who ever return after enrollment 0.94 0.89
Fraction who attend > 25% of days 0.94 0.83
Fraction who attend > 50% of days 0.89 0.8
Fraction who attend >75% of days 0.82 0.69
Attend endline 0.9 0.81
Average fraction of days attended conditional on
attending more than 4 days in the first week
0.93 0.91
Notes:
1. See Figure 1.1 for a graphical representation of attendance over time
Baseline covariates gathered at enrollment are useful in understanding the factors associated with
attrition. At enrollment each individual was asked whether he had worked the day before, and if so, his
earnings and hours. Of individuals who attrited, control participants reported a mean earnings of Rs. 125
while treated participants reported a mean earnings nearly twice as high, Rs. 237. Similarly, attriters in the
control group reported lower labor supply.16 These differences are statistically significant despite the large
standard errors resulting from the small sample (Table 1.3). The direction of the selective attrition suggests
that active and high earning individuals assigned to the treatment did not find the monetary compensation
worthwhile, resulting in higher attrition rates.17 The noisy nature of the baseline productivity measures
limits the  possibility  of  fully  controlling  for  “type.”  However,  if  treatment  effects  are  relatively
homogeneous, the differential attrition is likely to bias the results of the study towards the null by lowering
the average labor provision and earnings of the treated individuals. Nonetheless, because there may also be
selection on unobservable characteristics, I also construct bounded estimates below.
16 Attending fewer than 4 days in the first week is the measure of attrition used because of its strong predictive power
for later attendance and for consistency with the figures above. However, results are similar in magnitude and direction
if different measures of “attriter” (e.g. attending fewer than 10 percent of the days over the entire study) are used.
17 Efforts were also made to contact attriters at their stand and inquire why they no longer wished to participate. It was
not possible to locate all individuals who left the study. However, among those we were able to contact, insufficient
compensation, driven by the lower value placed on the in-kind compensation, was the most commonly cited reason
for leaving the study among treated individuals.12
1.3.4   Labor Supply and Net Earnings
Evidence from the literature on nutritional deprivation demonstrates that the process of recovery from low
caloric intake is cumulative and often slow, taking weeks or even months in cases of extreme deprivation
(Keys et al 1950). Given the cumulative nature of the recovery process, the impact at later points in the
study is likely to better reflect the long-run changes associated with the increased caloric intake. Hence, I
begin by dividing the study at the midpoint and assessing the differences between the treatment and control
groups in both periods. However, both week by week effects and average treatment effects over the course
of the study are also estimated to more specifically gauge the path of the changes as well as the net impact
of the intervention during the study.
Equation  (1.1)  estimates  the  impact  of  increased  caloric  intake  on  average  labor  supply  and
earnings, including earnings on enrollment and endline days, in the first and second halves of the study. In
this equation, lin denotes a measure of average earnings or labor supply for individual i in period n, Ti is an
indicator for assignment to the treatment group, Pn is an indicator for the second half of the study, and Xi is
Table 1.3: Baseline Characteristics of Attriters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Earn Work Hours if > 0 BMI
Treatment 111.96** 0.33** 2.27 0.43
[52.48] [0.13] [1.66] [0.56]
Mean of dependent variable 138.20 0.79 9.82 17.79
Observations 38 38 30 37
R-squared 0.11 0.16 0.06 0.02
Notes:
1. Attrition is defined as attending fewer than 4 days in the first week as attendance is high (greater
than 90% in both conditions) and relatively stable for those who attend at least four days in the first
week. However, results are qualitatively similar if other definitions of attrition are used.
2. "Earn" is the total daily earnings as a rickshaw driver in Indian Rupees. "Work" is a binary variable
indicating whether the participant worked that day. "Hours if > 0" is the total number of hours worked,
conditional on working. Each of these variables was collected at enrollment referencing the day prior
to enrollment. "BMI" is body mass index, a measure of weight for height.
3. Robust standard errors are in brackets.
4. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.113
a vector of controls for baseline work habits. The regression also includes fixed effects for stand location,
θd, and enrollment month, γm, because enrollment was conducted on a rolling basis.
(1.1) lin= 0 + 1Ti+ 2Pn+ 3Ti*Pn+ Xi+ θd + γm+ in
Results of these regressions are presented in Table 1.4. The first three columns examine labor
supply outcomes. As can be seen in Column (1), there is an 8 percentage point increase in the average
fraction of days worked in the second half of the study among treated individuals relative to control
individuals. The point estimate for hours conditional on working is positive for treated individuals in the
second half of the study. However, it is only marginally significant (Column (2)). The combined metric of
total hours is presented in Column (3). Driven largely by the increase in days worked, there is an average
increase of roughly one hour per day, or about 15 percent, for treated participants in the second half of the
study. This substantial increase is particularly notable given the fairly long baseline work weeks of nearly
50 hours and the physical difficulty of the labor.
Although earnings are significantly noisier, the trends are similar. While only significant at the 10
percent level, Columns (4) and (5) show an increase in treated participants’ average daily earnings of
roughly 20 Rupees per day, or approximately 11 percent, in the second half of the study.18
18 One potential concern about the gains among treated individuals relative to control individuals is that control
participants could be decreasing labor supply because they have greater cash payments for coming to the study office
each day. However, it is possible to test for reduced labor supply among controls by comparing baseline earnings
reported at enrollment with earning during the study in this group. These measures are not significantly different,
suggesting that labor supply and earnings are not reduced among control individuals and that the estimated differences
are indeed increases among the treated individuals.14
Table 1.4: Average Labor Supply and Earnings By Study Period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable Average days
worked
Average
hours if > 0
Average
hours
Average
earnings
ln(Average
earnings)
Treatment (first half of
study)
0.02 -0.29 -0.13 -1.92 0.01
[0.03] [0.32] [0.36] [9.16] [0.06]
Second half of study 0.02 -0.35* 0.09 3.61 0.00
[0.02] [0.20] [0.23] [6.63] [0.05]
Treatment*Second half of
study
0.08*** 0.73* 1.07*** 19.61* 0.11*
[0.03] [0.28] [0.33] [10.88] [0.06]
Mean of dependent variable 0.77 8.72 6.81 179.78 5.10
Observations 370 364 370 383 383
R-squared 0.14 0.24 0.19 0.15 0.15
Notes:
1. This table provides the results of regressions testing for changes in labor supply and earnings,
including enrollment and endline day earnings, among treated participants. The unit of observation
is the participant-period (first or second half of the study). Outcome variables are averaged over all
observations the period for each participant. "Work" captures the average fraction of days worked in
that period. "Hours if >0" is the average number of hours worked, conditional on working. "Total
hours" is the number of hours worked per day where hours are zero if the participant did not work.
"Earn" is the total daily earnings as a rickshaw driver summed with enrollment or endline earnings,
as applicable to the period, in Indian Rupees. This variable takes the value zero if the participant
reported not working. The exchange rate is roughly 45 Rupees to 1 US Dollar. "ln(Average
earnings)" is the log of average earnings where earnings is defined as previously described.
2. All regressions include stand location and enrollment month fixed effects as well as controls for
baseline work habits as detailed in Appendix 1B. Results are less precisely estimated, but
qualitatively similar if these controls are omitted.
3. Robust standard errors clustered by individual are in brackets.
4. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1.3.5   Trends in Labor Supply and Earnings
In order to better understand the temporal trends and the forces driving the overall gains in earnings, I next
examine the more finely grained temporal path of the changes and decompose the effect between earnings
as a rickshaw driver and earnings in the laboratory.
To examine trends outside of the laboratory, I estimate Equation (1.2) which examines the week
by week impact of treatment on labor supply and earnings as a rickshaw driver.19 The dependent variables,
19 In addition to this non-parametric specification, I also estimate a simple linear trend by day. Results of these
regressions are included in Appendix 1A, Table 1A.3. Linear trends are significant at the 5 percent level for all
outcomes presented in Table 1.5 except hours conditional on working, which is significant at the 10 percent level.15
measures of labor supply and earnings, are denoted by lit and are measured at the level of the participant-
day beginning the day after enrollment (which was spent in the study office). Ti is an indicator for
assignment to the treatment group, W denotes the week in the study, Xi is a vector of controls for baseline
work habits, and Sand θd are calendar week and stand location fixed effects, respectively.
(1.2) lit= 0 + 1Ti+ 2wTi*W+ Xi+ θd + S+ W+ it
As can be seen in Table 1.5, Column (1), the increase in days worked among treated participants
follows a fairly smooth trend over the course of the study, with an insignificant gain of 2 percent in the first
week rising to a significant increase of 11 percent by the final week. Hours per day conditional on working
rises more rapidly in the first few weeks of the study but then levels off with a slightly lower point estimate
in the final week of the study (Column (2)). These two margins of adjustment are combined into a single
metric of total hours per day, which takes the value zero if the participant did not work that day, in Column
(3). This metric shows no significant change in the first week, but rises to a 12 percent net increase in total
hours in fifth week relative to the control group. Figure 1.3 displays the change in days and total hours
worked by treated individuals relative to control individuals by week in the study.
Earnings, once again, follow a similar pattern of increase, but begin with a slightly negative,
although insignificant, point estimate. In fact, the initial negative point estimates drive a near zero impact
on earnings over the duration of the study among treated individuals (See Appendix 1A, Table 1A.4 for
overall estimates).  However, these initial negative point estimates may be caused by the differential
attrition among high earning individuals in the treatment group during first week.20 This supposition is
supported by Table 1A.5 in Appendix 1A, limiting the sample to individuals with at least 90 percent
attendance (results are also presented graphically in Figure 1.4). Among these individuals, there is no
20 In fact, the difference in earnings for treated individuals in the first week is similar to the difference expected based
on the differential earnings between control and treated attriters and the attrition rates. While the baseline controls
would be expected to account for these differences, the baseline measures are only moderately correlated with average
outcomes during the study (r = 0.1 to r = 0.5) and hence may not adequately control for differences.16
impact of treatment in the first week and an increase by the fifth week (Rs. 20 per day) that is slightly larger
than that found in the non-restricted sample.
Table 1.5: Rickshaw Driver Labor Supply and Earnings by Week
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Work Hours if >0 Total hours Earn ln(earn+1) IHS(earn)
Treated (Week 1) 0.02 -0.54 -0.18 -4.37 0.08 0.10
[0.03] [0.33] [0.40] [9.88] [0.16] [0.18]
Treated*Week 2 0.04 0.30 0.61* -3.71 0.13 0.16
[0.03] [0.28] [0.37] [9.77] [0.17] [0.19]
Treated*Week 3 0.05 0.82** 1.05** 1.93 0.21 0.24
[0.04] [0.32] [0.41] [10.53] [0.19] [0.21]
Treated*Week 4 0.04 0.78** 0.96** 1.03 0.19 0.22
[0.03] [0.38] [0.41] [10.58] [0.18] [0.20]
Treated*Week 5 0.09** 0.41 1.08** 18.80* 0.43** 0.49**
[0.04] [0.38] [0.45] [11.11] [0.21] [0.24]
Mean of dependent
variable
0.81 8.88 7.21 163.57 4.21 4.77
Observations 5,675 4,604 5,669 5,675 5,675 5,675
R-squared 0.05 0.13 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.05
Notes:
1. This table provides the results of regressions testing for changes in labor supply and earnings as a
rickshaw driver among treated participants. The participant-day is the unit of observation. "Work" is a
binary variable indicating whether the participant worked that day. "Hours if >0" is the total number of
hours worked, conditional on working. "Total hours" is the number of hours worked per day where hours
are zero if the participant did not work. "Earn" is the total daily earnings as a rickshaw driver in Indian
Rupees. This variable takes the value zero if the participant did not work. The exchange rate is roughly
45 Rupees to 1 US Dollar. "ln(earn+1)" is the log of earnings + 1 where earnings is defined as previously
described. "IHS(earn)" is the inverse hyperbolic sine of earnings.
2. All regressions include stand location, calendar week, and study week fixed effects as well as controls
for baseline work habits which are detailed in Appendix 1B. Results are less precisely estimated, but
qualitatively similar if these controls are omitted.
3. Robust standard errors clustered by individual are in brackets.
4. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Despite the negative point estimate in early portion of the study in the full sample, and consistent
with the trend in labor supply, earnings follow an increasing and significant trend across the weeks of the
study (Table 1.5, Column (4) and Table 1A.3, Column (4)). Although earnings lag labor supply slightly in
the middle portion of the study, the 95 percent confidence intervals for estimated earnings and earnings
predicted according to labor supply changes overlap significantly (Figure1.5). Even with very noisy income17
streams, all specificationsshow an increase in earnings significantat the 10 percent level by the fifth week.21
Of note, the point estimate of a daily net gain of approximately Rs. 15 by week five corresponds to a 9
percent increase in average earnings, a figure similar to the increase in labor supply.22
21 The differences in the point estimates in the regressions by week and by period (first and second half) of the study
are driven by two effects: 1) the period regressions also include laboratory earnings while week regressions do not, 2)
a compositional effect driven by the unit of observation (person-period averages in the period regressions which
weight  individuals  equally,  and  person-day  observations  in  the  weekly  regressions  which  implicitly  weight  by
attendance). Given the higher attrition among the high-earning treated individuals, regressions using the person-day
as the unit of observation will result in lower estimated effects if baseline controls cannot fully control for “type.”
22 This estimate is less than the estimated coefficient in the log specification because that specification takes logs of
earnings + 1 to account for extensive margin changes in labor supply.
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Figure 1.3: Rickshaw Driver Labor Supply By Week
Total Hours Days Worked
Notes: This figure is drawn from the results in Table 1.5, Columns (1) and (3). “Days Worked” measures
the fraction of days worked. “Total Hours” is the number of hours worked per day. If an individual does
not work, this variable takes the value zero. Error bars measure 95 percent confidence intervals.18
-
4
0
-
2
0
0
2
0
4
0
N
e
t
 
D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
,
 
T
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
 
-
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
E
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
1 2 3 4 5
Full Sample High Attendance
Differences in Earnings by Week
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1 2 3 4 5
N
e
t
 
D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
,
 
T
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
-
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
D
a
i
l
y
 
E
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
(
R
s
.
)
Week
Figure 1.5: Predicted and Estimated Earnings by Week
Earn, estimated Earn, predicted from Hours
Figure 1.4: Rickshaw Driver Earnings By Week
Notes: This figure is drawn from the results in Table 1.5, Column (4) and Appendix 1A, Table 1A.5,
Column (2). High attendance is defined as attending at least 90 percent of the days in the study. Error
bars measure 95 percent confidence intervals.
Notes: Estimated changes in earnings are in Rupees and are based on Equation (1.2). Results of this
regression are displayed in Table 1.5, Column (4). Predicted earnings are generated by multiplying
estimated changes in total hours (Table 1.5, Column (3)) among treated individuals by average hourly
earnings in the control group. Error bars measure 95 percent confidence intervals.19
1.3.6 Enrollment and Endline Tasks
As described previously, in addition to reporting daily earnings and labor supply participants were asked to
spend a full day in the study offices at enrollment and during the last week of their participation. The tasks
completed at enrollment and endline were designed to be as directly related to potential productivity as
possible. For example, physical tasks included choosing whether or not to take actual rickshaw journeys at
different distances, weights, and payoffs. This design allows assessment of the productive ability of the
participants in the absence of demand fluctuations and other sources of variability (e.g. measurement error).
Task  payments  were  a  direct function  of  performance.  Additional information  regarding  the  tasks  is
provided in Appendix 1A, Table 1A.1.
The primary specification to examine the impact of treatment on task earnings is shown in Equation
(1.3) where eit is earnings on for individual i at time t (where t = {enrollment, endline}), Ti is a binary
variable indicating treatment status, and Endt indicates whether the measurement was taken at Endline.
(1.3) eit= 0 + 1Ti+ 2Endt + 3Ti*Endt+ it
As can be seen in Figure 1.6 and Table 1.6, Column (1), treated participants earn roughly 9 percent
(Rs. 25) more than control participants on the tasks at endline. Overall earnings are divided into cognitive
and physical tasks in Columns (2) and (3) and Figure 1.7. Cognitive tasks show a virtually immediate
benefit of the increased consumption with 12 percent higher earnings at enrollment among the treated
individuals (who received an additional 700 calories on the enrollment day as well as throughout the study)
relative to control individuals.23 This immediate change in cognitive function is consistent with evidence
from a variety of other sources.24 The improvement in cognitive outcomes is maintained at approximately
the same level at endline. In contrast, gains in physical performance associated with increased caloric intake
23 On the enrollment and endline days all participants were provided with a lunch. In addition, treated participants
received snacks amounting to 700 calories shortly after enrolling. The snacks could all be consumed immediately or
eaten incrementally throughout the day.
24 For example, in a double blind experiment, Gailliot et al. (2007) demonstrate that higher blood glucose levels
increase self-control over the course of just a few hours and Danziger et al. (2011) provide evidence that judges
produce much lighter sentences when they have eaten recently.20
accrue over time with no significant effect at enrollment but a positive and significant gain of over 10
percent at endline relative to the control group. These results correspond well with both basic physiology
and the results of experiments measuring changes in physical performance as a function of caloric intake
over longer time horizons (e.g. Keys et al. 1950).
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Figure 1.6: Earnings on Laboratory Tasks
Figure 1.7: Earnings on Laboratory Tasks, By Type
Notes: Earnings (in Rs.) are aggregated across all laboratory tasks within a category. Tasks were
compensated according to performance. This figure is based on the regressions displayed in Table 1.6,
Columns (2) and (3). Control participants earned an average of Rs. 279 at enrollment. Error bars measure
95 percent confidence intervals.
Notes: Earnings (in Rs.) are aggregated across all laboratory tasks. Tasks were compensated according
to performance. This figure is based on the regressions in Table 1.6, Column (1). Control participants
earned an average of Rs. 279 at enrollment. Error bars measure 95 percent confidence intervals.21
Table 1.6: Earnings From Enrollment and Endline Tasks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Total Pay Cognitive
pay
Physical
pay
Total Pay Cognitive
pay
Physical
pay
Treatment (Enrollment) 0.29 13.72* -13.43 21.04 21.20* -0.16
[11.62] [7.03] [8.19] [17.49] [10.97] [11.84]
Endline 12.64 30.18*** -17.45** 33.68** 31.73*** 2.15
[9.39] [4.45] [8.22] [14.60] [7.26] [12.50]
Low BMI 15.90 1.33 14.57
[17.47] [9.82] [13.18]
Treatment*Endline 24.95** -0.67 25.53** -0.74 2.76 -3.70
[11.68] [6.49] [9.90] [17.95] [9.82] [14.81]
Low BMI*Treatment -33.42 -11.75 -21.67
[23.44] [14.35] [16.28]
Low BMI*Endline -35.54* -2.62 -33.12**
[18.84] [9.20] [16.32]
Low BMI*Treatment*Endline 41.25* -5.17 46.62**
[23.46] [12.99] [19.57]
Mean of dependent variable 278.6 112.88 165.72 269 112.07 156.93
Observations 389 390 389 387 388 387
R-squared 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.03
Notes:
1. This table presents results of regressions of participant earnings on laboratory tasks as a function of
time in the study (enrollment or endline day) and treatment status. Tasks were compensated according
to performance. "Total Pay" is the total earned payment from participation in the enrollment (endline)
tasks in Indian Rupees. "Cognitive pay" is the total earned payment from participation in the subset of
tasks during enrollment (endline) which were cognitive. Similarly, "Physical pay" is the earned
payment on physical tasks. The exchange rate is roughly 45 Rupees to 1 US Dollar. The tasks and
their designation as Cognitive or Physical is included in Appendix 1A, Table 1A.1. The participant
day is the unit of observation.
2. "Low BMI" is defined as BMI < 18.5, the WHO cutoff for "underweight."
3. Robust standard errors clustered by individual are in brackets.
4. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Although  all  participants  have  a  BMI  under  20,  treatment  may  have  differential  effects  for
particularly low BMI individuals. To examine possible heterogeneity in the treatment effect, I estimate22
Equation  (1.4)  in  which  an  indicator  for  low  BMI,  denoted  by  Li,  is  interacted  with  the  previous
specification.25
(1.4) eit= 0 + 1Ti+ 2Endt+ 3Li+ 4Li*Ti + 5Li*Endt + 6Ti*Endt+ 7Li*Ti*Endt+ it
These results, presented in Table 1.6 Columns (4) thru (6) suggest that while most of the physical
benefits appear to accrue to the lower-BMI individuals, the cognitive benefits apply equally to all treated
participants.26
1.3.7 Bounded Estimates
The estimated effects are relatively large and show consistent trends across labor supply, earnings on the
job, and earnings in the laboratory. However, to address concerns that the above treatment effects may be
driven by the attrition patterns described previously, I also construct bounded estimates of labor supply and
earnings both as a rickshaw driver and in the laboratory which account for the differential attrition. The
bounding process follows the method proposed and described by Lee (2003), with minor adjustments to
account for the structure of the data. This method relies on the trimming of extreme observations in the
condition with lower attrition to bound the estimated treatment effect. Specifically, after calculating the
relative difference in attrition to determine the extent of the trimming necessary, the individuals with the
highest (lowest) average values of the outcome are removed from the dataset and the treatment effect is
estimated on the trimmed dataset. Additional details about this procedure are included in Appendix 1B.
The observed labor supply increases are relatively robust (Table1.7a, Columns (1) to (4)and Figure
1.8). Regardless of the extent or type of trimming, the fraction of days worked is higher among treated
individuals at the end of the study. Although the most extreme lower bound does not result in a statistically
25 “Low BMI” is defined as a BMI under 18.5, the WHO cutoff for “underweight,” at enrollment. Sixty-five percent
of participants are under this threshold. The distribution of participants’ BMIs is provided in Figure 1A.1.
26 Labor supply and earnings follow a pattern more closely matched to the physical tasks. Despite this similarity, the
heterogeneity by BMI does not reach statistical significance for these outcomes (See Appendix 1A, Table 1A.6).23
significant net effect in the fifth week, the point estimate is positive and still shows a marginally significant
increase from the first week. In addition, the more moderate lower bound does estimate a significant net
gain in the fifth week and at 5 to 10 percent these lower bound increases in labor supply are economically
significant.
Table 1.7a: Bounds, Rickshaw Driver Labor Supply and Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable Days Worked Earn
Bound Lower Lower Upper Upper Lower Lower Upper Upper
Trimming
percentage
15.9 5.3 5.3 15.9 15.9 5.3 5.3 15.9
Treated (Week 1) -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.04 -19.03** -10.25 -0.98 8.14
[0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [9.52] [9.65] [9.19] [9.02]
Treated*Week 2 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 -2.90 -3.72 2.48 4.65
[0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.04] [9.87] [9.67] [9.49] [9.29]
Treated*Week 3 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 4.81 3.90 6.22 7.33
[0.03] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [10.64] [10.41] [9.99] [10.32]
Treated*Week 4 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.05 -0.90 2.20 9.29 10.94
[0.03] [0.03] [0.04] [0.04] [10.75] [10.53] [9.94] [10.22]
Treated*Week 5 0.07* 0.09** 0.09** 0.10** 20.08* 20.61* 20.02* 22.41**
[0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [11.35] [10.94] [10.88] [11.17]
Mean of dependent
variable
0.80 0.81 0.82 0.84 151.01 157.32 165.36 170.96
Observations 5,291 5,602 5,501 5,199 5,294 5,602 5,523 5,196
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.07
Notes:
1. This table provides the bounded estimates of changes in labor supply and earnings for treated participants
over time. The participant-day is the unit of observation. "Work" is a binary variable indicating whether the
participant worked that day. "Earn" is the total daily earnings as a rickshaw driver in Indian Rupees.
2. Attrition was greater in the treated condition, hence observations were trimmed from the Control
condition. Trimming percentages were calculated in according with Lee (2003). Because attrition can be
measured in multiple ways given the panel nature of the data, five measures of attrition (never return after
the first day, do not attend endline, and attend less than X% of the days where X is 25, 50, or 75) were
created and the smallest and largest trimming percentages (5.3% and 15.9%) were used as outer bounds.
3. "Bound" indicates whether observations were removed from the top of the control distribution, resulting
in an upper bound on the treatment effect ("Upper"), or bottom of the control distribution, leading to a lower
bound on the treatment effect ("Lower").
4. The metric used for the distribution of outcomes was the average days worked (earnings) over all
observations for an individual. All individuals have at least one observation because all participants
provided labor supply information at enrollment.
5. All regressions include stand location, calendar week, and study week fixed effects as well as controls for
baseline work habits. Results are less precisely estimated, but qualitatively similar if controls are omitted.
6. Robust standard errors clustered by individual are in brackets.
7. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.124
Earnings estimates have much wider bounds. These regressions also show significant gains in the
fifth week relative to the first among treated individuals. However, although there are gains among treated
individuals over time, as discussed previously, the initial point estimates in week one are negative in some
specifications. Given these negative initial point estimates, I cannot not rule out the possibility that there
are no net gains in cycle-rickshaw driver earnings in week five in the bounded specifications.
Finally, Table 1.7b presents bounded estimates for laboratory task payments. Bounds on these
estimates are relatively wide and cannot rule out no net effect of treatment at endline, but are still generally
supportive of a positive impact of treatment on laboratory earnings. In Column (1), the lower bound has a
negative point estimate for treated individuals at enrollment given the censoring of high earning control
individuals. However, the interaction between treatment and endline remains positive and significant. The
upper bound estimates a significant treatment effect of Rs. 24 at enrollment and an additional, although
non-significant, gain of Rs. 9 at endline for treated individuals (Column (2)).
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Figure 1.8: Fraction of Days Worked, Bounded Estimates
Lower, Large Trim Lower, Small Trim Estimated
Upper, Small Trim Upper, Large Trim
Notes: This figure is drawn from the results in Table 1.5, Column (1), which provides the point estimates
of the changes in days worked without any corrections for attrition (“Estimated”) and Table 1.7a,
Columns  (1)  thru  (4)  which  provides  the  bounded  estimates  of  the  changes  in  days  worked  (the
“Trimmed” estimates).25
Table 1.7b: Bounds, Earnings From Enrollment and Endline Tasks
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable Total Pay
Bound Lower Upper
Treatment -19.30* 23.79**
[11.22] [10.34]
Endline 6.51 28.22***
[10.16] [8.64]
Treatment*Endline 31.09** 9.38
[12.30] [11.08]
Mean of dependent variable 298.19 255.1
Observations 363 365
R-squared 0.03 0.07
Notes:
1. This table provides the bounded estimates of changes in earnings in laboratory tasks by treatment
status and day in the study (enrollment or endline). Tasks were compensated according to
performance. "Total Pay" is the total earned payment from participation in the enrollment (endline)
tasks in Indian Rupees.
2. Attrition was greater in the treated condition, hence observations were trimmed from the Control
condition. Trimming percentages were calculated in according with Lee (2003) with attrition in each
experimental condition calculated as the percentage of individuals not attending endline.
3."Bound" indicates whether observations were removed from the top of the control distribution,
resulting in an upper bound on the treatment effect ("Upper"), or bottom of the control distribution,
leading to a lower bound on the treatment effect ("Lower").
4.  The metric used for the distribution of outcomes was the total earnings on all enrollment tasks for
an individual.
5. Robust standard errors clustered by individual are in brackets.
6. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1.3.8 Summary of RCT Results
Increased caloric intake among treated individuals resulted in gains in both laboratory tasks designed to
measure ability in domains relevant to their work as well as direct measures of labor supply. Earnings
present a somewhat more mixed picture due to high variance in daily earnings and the initial negative point
estimates early in study which may be driven by selected attrition, with high earning treated individuals
being more likely to leave the study in the first few days. However, consistent with evidence from the
physiology literature, effects of increased intake do appear to be cumulative with clear trends in both labor
supply and earnings over time that do not appear to plateau within the five week period studied. These
trends result in significant and economically meaningful net increases in labor supply and earnings (in both26
laboratory tasks and as a rickshaw driver) among treated individuals of approximately 10 percent by the
fifth and final week.
1.4 Randomized Controlled Trial Return on Investment
The estimatedchanges in productivity inthe RCT suggest that changes in caloric intake cause economically
meaningful changes in productivity. Although these changes are of interest in and of themselves given the
importance of labor productivity in development, they do raise the additional question of whether these
changes in productivity simply “subsidize” food consumption, or whether they not only pay for themselves
but also generate positive returns. Hence, I next provide calculations of the return on investment.
Seven hundred calories of a staple grain such as rice or wheat can be purchased for approximately
6.5 Rupees.27 Accounting for the initial negative point estimates in the early weeks and capping the gains
at Rs. 14.4 per day (the estimated net treatment effect on rickshaw driver earnings in the fifth week), a
rickshaw driver would expect to break even after approximately two months of increased consumption.
Over a six month horizon, the estimated return on investment is approximately 75 percent.28 Because there
is greater inherent uncertainty in these estimates than in the estimates of changes in productivity, additional
estimates of the ROI are included in Table 1.8 varying assumptions about both the cost of calories and
earnings over time. While the bounds are large, the average estimated 6-month ROI is 134 percent,
excluding any gains from improved cognitive function that are not captured in earnings or labor supply as
a rickshaw driver.
27 The food provided as a part of the study cost roughly Rs. 20 per person per day. This figure is substantially higher
than the Rs. 6.5 for staple grains because the study provided snack foods to minimize the likelihood of crowding out
other food consumption. Although it is not possible to exclude the possibility that the consumption of grains could
produce different results, neither grains nor snack foods contain substantial nutritive value beyond calories and both
consist primarily of basic starches, minimizing the chance of such a difference.
28 As described in Chapter 2, the estimated returns to increased caloric intake in agricultural production are even higher
at roughly 200% over one month. One potential concern about these calculations is that basal metabolic rates could
adjust, requiring greater caloric inputs to maintain the same benefits. However, calories are sufficiently inexpensive
that even with changes larger than would be expected given the results of the Minnesota semi-starvation experiment,
the return on investment would still be positive and relatively large (Keys et al. 1950).27
Table 1.8: Return on Investment for Increased Caloric Consumption Among Rickshaw Drivers
Sample Earnings during study Earnings after study 6-month ROI
Cost of 700 calories 3.75 6.5 8.82
(1) full average average -122 -112 -109
(2) full by period (with lab tasks) 2nd period 321 143 79
(3) full weekly 5th week 207 77 30
(4) high attendance average average 125 30 -4
(5) high attendance weekly 5th week 380 177 104
(6) full average labor supply average labor supply 320 142 78
(7) full weekly labor supply 5th week labor
supply 515 255 161
Average 250 102 49
Notes:
1) Earnings values are based on results in Tables 1.4 (by period estimates), 1.5 (weekly estimates)
and 1A.4 (average estimates). Values generated from changes in labor supply multiply changes in
total hours found in the same tables by the average hourly wage in the control group.
2) Three cost estimates are used. The least expensive, 3.75 Rs. per calorie, assumes consumption of
subsidized grains through the Public Distribution System (PDS).  The medium cost, 6.5 Rs. per
calorie, was assessed by visiting local shops and bargaining to purchase rice, a local staple grain, at
prevailing market prices. There are less expensive staple grains. However, rice was used as a baseline
because the other grains are less commonly consumed. The third estimate, 8.82 Rs. per calorie, was
obtained by calculating the average price of a calorie in the National Sample Survey (NSS) Round 64
and adjusting the price for inflation using the consumer price index.
3) Returns are calculated as the sum of the earnings during the study period and from the end of the
study period to 6 months minus the cost of 700 calories per day throughout the six month period, all
divided by the same cost. No discounting is used because of the relatively short time horizons.
4) Given the cumulative nature of the response to increased intake, the preferred specification uses
the direct earnings results as estimated each week and the intermediate cost of calories (6.5 Rs). This
specification is located in Row (3).
1.5 Why Does Caloric Intake Remain Low Despite High Returns?
Despite the greater uncertainty relative to the estimates for productivity changes, the estimated return on
investment, 75 percent over a horizon of only six months, is relatively high. In addition, at roughly four
percent of income, the cost of investment in an additional 700 calories is low. Given this low cost and high
return, it is puzzling that investment in sufficient caloric intake remains low,with over half of the population
of India consuming less than 1900 calories per day and one quarter consuming less than 1625 calories per
day (Deaton and Dreze 2009). I discuss and briefly evaluate five possible reasons for low investment below.
Evidence regarding these potential factors influencing food consumption is drawn from a variety of sources28
including relevant literature, experimental tasks, and surveys of hundreds of individuals from diverse
geographic and demographic backgrounds designed specifically for this purpose. The general design of the
surveys is described briefly below and additional details are provided in each of the relevant sections.
Reasons for Low Caloric Intake - Surveys
This survey was conducted to investigate food habits and potential reasons for low caloric intake among
individuals similar to the populations in the analyses examining the returns to increased caloric intake. To
accomplish this, participants were drawn from both urban and rural areas in India, and were screened to be
at least 18 years old, have a BMI under 20, and be an active participant in the labor market. Demographic
characteristics of the 222 survey respondents are presented in Appendix 1A, Table 1A.7. Participants were
paid a flat fee for completing the survey. However, to ensure that participants considered their responses
carefully and that the elicitation was incentive compatible, respondents were also eligible to earn additional
compensation for correct responses to a subset of factual questions regarding the caloric density of foods
and the returns to increased caloric intake.
1.5.1 Credit
In canonical  examples  of  nutrition-based  poverty  traps  income  (or  credit)  is  the  constraint  limiting
investment (e.g.,Leibenstein 1957; Bliss and Stern 1978; Dasgupta and Ray 1986). However, there is strong
evidence that neither income nor credit is likely to be a binding constraint faced by individuals in India
today when making investment decisions about caloric consumption. Even the poorest typically do not
spend more than 40 to 70 percent of their income of food, could consume approximately 20 percent more
calories at the same cost by purchasing less expensive staple grains, and have a relatively low elasticity of
calories with respect to income (Subramanian and Deaton 1996; Banerjee and Duflo 2011; Behrman and
Deolalikar 1987). Further, specific to the context of the studies presented in this paper, an increase of
roughly 700 calories per day would come at a cost of less than 5 percent of income and could be repaid29
over a short horizon. Finally, when survey respondents were asked to list all factors influencing their level
of food consumption, fewer than 10 percent included lack of money as a limiting factor. In short, liquidity
does  not  appear to  be  a  binding  constraint  restricting  investment  in  higher  caloric  intake  for  many
malnourished individuals in India.
1.5.2 Structural Features of the Economy
There are a number of structural features common to developing economies which could potentially limit
investment in calories. For example, principal-agent contracting with unobserved caloric intake or strong
complementarities in production could reduce intake below optimal levels. However, there are a number of
reasons to believe that these features are not likely to be driving the low caloric consumption. First and
foremost, while caloric intake is not directly observable, observable characteristics such as weight (BMI)
would allow individuals to clearly signal potential productivity. In addition, low caloric intake is quite
prevalent  among  individuals  who  are  the residual  claimant  on  their labor  and  for  whom  no
complementarities in production with others exist. For example, 65 percent of the cycle-rickshaw drivers
in Chennai have a BMI under 20.29 These facts suggest that the reasons for low investment are likely to lie
elsewhere.
1.5.3 Utility Returns
Although the monetary returns to additional caloric intake are high in the populations studied in this paper,
it is possible that the utility returns are not. The decision faced for each individual considering an investment
in food is between the status quo and a bundle including additional food, (potentially) additional work, and
additional income. Hence, there are two possible ways in which utility returns could be lower than monetary
returns. First, people could potentially experience disutility from consuming additional food. Although this
29 This figure is the result of randomly sampling 100 cycle-rickshaw drivers in a 2.5 square kilometer area where the
vast majority of rickshaws operate in Chennai.30
is possible, it seems quite unlikely given the low level of consumption, the positive income elasticities
found  in  other  research,  and  the  ready  acceptance  of  additional  food  by  participants  in  the  RCT
(Subramanian and Deaton 1996; Behrman and Deolalikar 1987; Bouis and Haddad 1992).
The second and more plausible concern is that higher caloric intake could increase labor supply,
which comes with a utility cost. However, there are three reasons to believe labor disutility is not a factor
limiting investment in calories. First, it is not clear that net utility costs of labor will increase given the lack
of change in labor supply in the agricultural analysis and the fact that increased consumption may improve
energy and reduce the inframarginal disutility of labor, a topic explored further below. In addition, if this
disutility were substantial, then one would expect the participants of the RCT to have maintained both their
original food consumption (by crowding out consumption outside of the lab) and their original labor supply.
Yet, this was not the observed result. Finally, in addition to the direct revealed preference argument, it is
possible to provide a rough calibration of the tradeoff observed in the RCT to assess the likelihood that
labor disutility is driving low caloric consumption among the rickshaw drivers. This calibration, detailed in
Appendix 1B, relies on four sources of data: 1) changes in earnings and labor supply in the RCT, 2) an
experimental task in the RCT which elicited willingness to accept values for marginal trips in an incentive
compatible manner, 3) additional measures of willingness to accept trips generated from 150 actual offered
rickshaw trips with randomly assigned offered fares, 4) purchases of staple grains to determine their cost
on the open market.
This calibration suggests that even ignoring any direct utility from food consumption there would
be positive utility returns to higher caloric intake for roughly 85 percent of drivers. Further, the calibration
is conservative in that it ignores the fact that increased caloric intake may decrease the disutility of
inframarginal labor by improving energy levels and making physical exertion less aversive. Although far
from conclusive, there are two pieces of suggestive evidence from the RCT that support the hypothesis that
the utility cost of inframarginal labor may decline with higher caloric intake. First, treated individuals
reported significantly higher energy levels than control participants on the daily surveys (Table 1.9, Column
(1)). Second, one of the experimental tasks during enrollment and endline days was comprised of decisions31
about whether or not to take actual rickshaw journeys. Participants were offered six different tradeoffs of
this sort and one of the choices was randomly selected and the participant’s choice carried out. In this task,
treated participants were significantly more likely to accept the offered trips (Column (2)). In addition,
treated participants increased their willingness to take journeys from 86 percent at enrollment to 93 percent
at endline. Both the higher level and the trend suggest the cost of labor provision may be decreasing with
higher caloric intake. Hence, although these facts do not provide sufficient information about the specific
shape of the cost curve for labor supply to provide conclusive evidence, they do suggest that the overall
disutility of labor could remain constant or decline rather than increase with additional caloric intake.
Table 1.9: Rickshaw Drivers' Disutility of Labor
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable Energy Number of Trips
Accepted
Treated 0.07* 0.39*
[0.04] [0.20]
Mean of dependent variable 3.24 5.18
Observations 5,945 391
R-squared 0.05 0.36
Notes:
1. This table reports the effect of treatment on participants’ self-reported energy
levels and willingness to accept offered rickshaw journeys to provide suggestive
evidence for the impact of caloric consumption on the utility cost of labor supply.
2. "Energy" is the participants’ self-reported daily energy levels on a scale of 1 (very
low) to 5 (very high). However, there was very low variability in reported energy
levels with 3 and 4 accounting for 89 percent of responses. "Number of Trips
Accepted" sums the number of cases in which a participant opted to take a trip of the
six different types of trips offered during as an experimental task at enrollment and
endline. One of the offers was randomly selected and the participants’ choices were
carried out.
3. Both regressions include controls for the week in the study. In addition, Column
(1) controls for a baseline measure of energy, the participants self-assessment of
whether low energy had been a problem for them in the week preceding enrollment.
4. Robust standard errors clustered by individual are in brackets.
5. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.132
1.5.4 High Discount Rates
Even if an individual is does not face liquidity constraints in obtaining sufficient caloric intake, he may
choose to purchase better tasting foods that provide fewer calories per rupee or other non-food items if he
has a very high discount rate or time inconsistent preferences. Although I cannot rule out these possibilities
with the evidence currently available, survey evidence suggests that time inconsistent preferences are
unlikely to be a primary reason for the low investment in calories. For example, over 70 percent of survey
respondents reported that they did not wish to make any changes, including amount, timing, or type, to their
current food consumption. In addition, the discount rates implied by the rate of return to the investment
would be extremely high. Finally, it is possible that high discount rates would increase rather than decrease
caloric intake given that many foods which are typically considered “tempting” are also high calorie per
rupee foods (e.g. oils, sugar) (Banerjee and Mullainthan 2010).
1.5.5 Lack of Knowledge
Knowledge has considerable scope to influence caloric intake. In particular, there are two critical pieces of
knowledge that individuals need to make optimal caloric intake decisions: 1) knowledge of the returns to
caloric intake, and 2) knowledge of which foods are calorically dense (i.e. provide a large number of calories
per Rupee). Despite being important, knowledge in these domains is likely to be difficult to acquire for a
number of reasons. First, income streams among the poor are typically very volatile, making it difficult to
learn about the returns to an investment. This is particularly true for investments like caloric intake in which,
despite high returns, the absolute changes are small relative to the variance in income. In addition, the
returns to increased caloric intake grow over time, so relatively long periods of experimentation may be
required to learn about the returns available. Finally, as will be discussed in greater detail below, the short
run and long-run effects of increased consumption may work in opposite directions; it is common to feel
sleepy or tired right after a large meal. But, over a longer time horizon of days or weeks, baseline energy
levels increase.33
If learning about the returns to higher caloric intake were not challenging enough by itself, learning
about the caloric density of food is also quite difficult. While the human body has developed mechanisms
to regulate intake, these mechanisms evolved during a time period when food was relativelymore expensive
such that  appetite  regulation  may  not  be  well-calibrated  to the  current environment.  In  addition,  the
mechanisms to regulate intake are imperfect because feelings of satiety are often not representative of the
caloric content of the food. For example, foods which contain large amounts of fiber or that have high water
content are quite filling, yet provide less usable energy because fiber cannot be digested and water does not
contain calories (Gerstein et al. 2004; Samra and Anderson 2007).
In short, there are many difficulties inherent in this learning process which make knowledge a
potentially important factor limiting caloric intake. I explore this possibility via the survey described
previously because, to the best of my knowledge, no pre-existing data are available on beliefs about returns
to caloric intake or the nutritive properties of foods in a relevant population.
Survey Evidence – Knowledge of Returns to Increased Caloric Intake
To gather data about respondents’ beliefs regarding the productivity consequences of increased caloric
intake, respondents were asked whether consuming additional food would increase, not change, or decrease
their productivity. Participants responded to a multiple variants of this question considering different types
of foods (an additional meal or the equivalent energy/calories in snacks) and different outcomes (labor
supply or earnings) to explore the consistency of the beliefs. To ensure that questions were considered
carefully, participants were paid Rs. 2 for each correct response to these questions.
There were two particularly striking features of these results (Table 1.10). First, nearly one-third of
respondents report being uncertain about the returns to increased caloric intake. Second, only a relatively
small fraction of individuals, typically about 20 percent, believe that increased caloric consumption leads34
to increased labor supply or earnings.30 In addition, among those individuals who responded that increasing
food consumption would increase labor supply and earnings, beliefs about the labor supply margins that
would change were highly variable and not well aligned with the results of the RCT.31 For example, despite
being asked to indicate all changes they thought would occur, only 7 percent of respondents listed an
increase in the number of days worked – the margin with the largest change in the RCT.
Table 1.10: Knowledge of Returns to Higher Caloric Intake
Question type 1: Do you think that if a person similar to you (i.e those in a similar profession, and with the
same height and weight) ate [Food type] every day for the next [Timeframe] they would [Labor outcome]
less, the same, or more [Timeframe] from now?
Timeframe Food type Labor
Outcome Less Same More Unsure
(1) "consistently" n/a work 25.5 35.6 13.4 25.5
(2) 1 month meal work 12.8 26.8 27.5 32.9
(3) 1 month snacks work 10.7 31.5 23.5 34.2
(4) 1 month meal earn 3.4 40.3 20.8 35.6
(5) 1 month snacks earn 3.4 43.0 18.1 35.6
Average 11.1 35.4 20.7 32.8
Question 2: In which, if any, of the following ways would eating more help you or others like you to work
more?
Take fewer or
shorter breaks
Work more
days
Work longer
hours
Work faster/
harder
Look more for
better jobs
Unsure or
other
(6) Percent of
participants 16.8 7.4 46.3 22.2 0.7 3.3
Notes:
1. Data are from a survey of 149 respondents with a BMI less than 20 who are active in the labor market.
Demographic information for respondents is presented in Appendix 1A, Table 1A.7, Column (2).
2. Participants were asked multiple variants of Question type 1 (provided at the top of the table) where
items in brackets were completed with options from the lists below:
Food type: "an extra meal," "the equivalent of an extra meal in another form such as snacks like biscuits
or nuts"
Time frame: "in one month," "consistently"
Labor outcome: "work," "earn"
3. Participants were paid Rs. 5 for each correct response ("more") according to the RCT results.
4. Only participants who had responded "more" to any of the variants of Question type 1 were asked
Question 2. Respondents were paid Rs. 2 each for "work more days" and "work long hours."
30 Note that although the sample for the survey was demographically diverse, respondents were selected to be similar
to the rickshaw drivers in that they were active in the labor market in a job with a substantial physical component,
some flexibility in labor supply, and had a BMI under 20.
31 The list of options for ways in which productivity might change included: fewer/shorter breaks, working more days,
working longer hours, working faster/harder, looking for better jobs, and “other.”35
Although the existence of incorrect beliefs with substantial economic consequences in equilibrium
is unusual, it is not without precedent.32 In addition, the surveys combined with data from the RCT provide
preliminary but suggestive evidence for how incorrect beliefs are developed and maintained. First, with 57
percent of survey respondents reporting a decline or no change in energy and/or desire to work immediately
after eating, survey evidence suggests that the immediate impact of increased food consumption is neutral
or even in direct opposition to the long-run impact on energy levels found among treated participants in the
RCT (Table 1.9, Column (1)).33 These higher energy levels in the long-run are, however, difficult for
individuals to link to caloric consumption given the time lag and large number of other intervening factors.
Second, changes in labor supply are difficult to track over long horizons in populations with
irregular and flexible work schedules. As evidence of this difficulty even over short time horizons, I
compare data on the number of days worked per week collected in two different ways; day by day collection
during the RCT and a single response to the question “how many days did you work last week” in the
endline survey. Limiting the sample to participants with full attendance in the week leading up to their
endline day to ensure complete data, only 40 percent of respondents provide a weekly total that matches
the daily responses and the mean difference is 1.4 days. Finally, low caloric intake itself may hamper
learning given the observed decrements in cognitive function associated with low caloric intake.
Survey Evidence - Caloric Density of Commonly Consumed Foods
Although the number of calories per unit cost provided by different foods (i.e. “caloric density”) is
important knowledge to make effective investments in caloric intake, it is a difficult concept. Hence, survey
questions were designed specifically to minimize the difficulty of the assessment and avoid confounding
the results due to low numeracy in this population. Specifically, participants’ knowledge of the caloric
density of foods was tested in two different ways. First, participants were provided with a set of ten
32 For example, Jensen (2010) provides evidence of incorrect beliefs regarding the returns to education. In addition,
widespread misperceptions about health ranging from the appropriate care of children with diarrheal disease to the
safety of vaccinations have also been documented (Banerjee and Duflo 2011).
33 Participants were asked to rate their energy on a scale of 1 to 5 during their daily visit to the study office.36
photographs of different food items of the same cost (Rs. 10, or roughly $0.25).34 Food items were
specifically chosen to be types of foods which are commonly consumed and adjustments to the tradeoffs
were made across survey locations to ensure participants would be familiar with the food items and that
costs were consistent given local prices. In addition, food items were chosen to have a wide range in caloric
density. For example, in Orissa, foods ranged from 5 calories per Rupee to 134 calories per Rupee.
Each photograph was printed to scale and labeled with a description including the name, any
relevant descriptors (e.g. “boiled rice”), and quantity of the food. The written label was also communicated
verbally. Participants were then asked to indicate which three photographed foods they believed had the
“most energy” and which three had the “least energy,” accounting for both the type and amount of food in
the photographs.35 This arrangement allowed participants to assess a relatively simple metric (e.g. “most
energy”) while still providing information about their knowledge of the more complicated concept of
calories per unit cost. Participants were paid a fee for each correct answer. If all responses to this question
were correct, the earnings would amount to over 15 percent of the daily income for the average respondent,
providing a strong incentive to consider responses carefully.
The  ten  food  items  are  listed  in  Table  1.11 with  the  corresponding  fractions  of  participants
indicating the item was among the three highest or lowest caloric density items. This data is also displayed
graphically in Figures 1.9a and 1.9b. Participants’ beliefs about the caloric density of foods are not well
correlated with the true values. In fact, on average, respondents were roughly equally likely to indicate that
any given incorrect option was correct as they were to indicate that a correct option was indeed correct. For
example, in Tamil Nadu, both the three actual highest energy foods and the remaining seven lower energy
foods were identified, on average, by roughly 30 percent of the participants as being “high energy.”
34 To determine the cost of the food, field staff visited local shops and bargained to actually purchase the food items.
The costs were averaged across a minimum of five purchases per food item. Caloric information was determined
from a publication listing the caloric content of various commonly consumed Indian foods produced by the Indian
Government (Gopalan et al. 1989). For the few food items which were not included in this publication, nutrition
information was determined from large online calorie databases such as the USDA National Nutrient Database for
Standard Reference.
35 The term “energy” was used rather than calories because respondents are unfamiliar with the concept of calories.37
Table 1.11: Knowledge of Caloric Density of Common Food Items, Selection From a List
Food Calories per
Rupee
"Most energy" "Least energy"
Panel A: Tamil Nadu (N = 147)
Beef (56g cooked, no sauce) 13 25.5 28.2
Buttermilk (400ml) 14 38.3 12.8
Chicken (76g cooked, no sauce) 17 27.5 34.2
Chips (38g) 21 12.8 47.7
Bananas (2 regular, 250 g) 26 68.5 8.1
Samosa (1 large, 83g) 27 14.1 51.0
Butter biscuits (10, 84g) 37 24.2 26.8
Sunflower oil (100ml) 84 0.0 16.1
Sugar (234g) 93 4.0 17.4
Rice (908g cooked) 121 77.2 3.4
Panel B: Orissa (N = 75)
Mutton (19g) 5 44.0 4.0
Chicken (32 g) 7 18.7 16.0
Badam biscuits (73 g) 15 14.7 54.7
Chips (43 g) 24 5.3 64.0
Bananas (274 g) 28 53.3 14.7
Milk (400 ml) 34 88.0 1.3
Samosa (134 g) 43 1.3 84.0
Sunflower oil (110ml) 92 2.7 16.0
Sugar (265 g) 105 1.3 40.0
Rice (1005 g cooked) 134 70.7 4.0
Notes:
1. Data are from a survey of 222 respondents with a BMI less than 20 who are active in the labor market.
Demographic information for respondents is presented in Appendix 1A, Table 1A.7, Column (1).
2. Participants were presented with a set of 10 photographs of the food items listed above. Each photo was
printed to scale and labeled with a description including the name and quantity of the food. The written
descriptions were also read to each participant. Each of the photographed items had the same cost (Rs. 10).
Participants were asked to indicate which three items they believed had the “most energy” and which three
items had the “least energy.” Column (2) reports the percentage of respondents including the food item
among the set of three with the "most energy" and Column (3) the percentage of respondents including the
food item among the set of three with the "least energy."
3. Participants were paid Rs. 3 for each correct response to these questions.38
Notes: All food photographs used were printed to scale for participants. In addition, the descriptive labels,
including amounts which are not displayed here, were read aloud to each participant. Participants were paid
a small fee for each correct response. Demographics of survey respondents are included in Table 1A.7,
Column (1).
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Figure 1.9a: Participants' Knowledge of Caloric Density
(Tamil Nadu)
"Most energy"  "Least energy" Calories per Rupee
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Figure 1.9b: Participants' Knowledge of Caloric Density
(Orissa)
"Most energy"  "Least energy" Calories per Rupee39
Not only are the responses frequently incorrect, the magnitude of the errors is large. As a metric of
the magnitude of the error I calculate the calories in the most (least) calorically dense foods and compare
them to the total calories selected by participants in each of these categories. There are actually 3088
calories in the three most calorically dense foods. Yet, participants, on average choose three foods totaling
only 1472 calories as those with the most energy; or, less than half of the possible calories. Similarly, the
three foods with the fewest calories contain 378 calories, but, on average, participants choose three foods
with 1052 calories as those with the least energy.36
As a second and even simpler test of knowledge, participants were also presented with ten pairwise
tradeoffs, each between two food items with the same cost, and were asked to indicate which of the two
foods provided more energy. For example, participants were asked to compare one coconut to six bananas.
These tradeoffs were again presented via photographs as well as written and verbal descriptions and
participants were compensated according to the accuracy of their responses. Two example tradeoffs are
presented in Figure 1.10. As in the first test of knowledge, foods were selected to be commonly consumed
and to have large differences in the number (and ratio) of calories in each comparison.
Table 1.12 lists these tradeoffs, the correct responses, and percentage of participants providing the
correct response to each tradeoff. On average, participants chose the correct option in 41 percent of the
comparisons, significantly fewer than the number expected based on purely random guessing (p < 0.01).
And, given that the average ratio of calories (difference in calories) in each comparison was 3.7 (283
calories), the magnitude of the errors was, once again, substantial.
36 These figures were calculated using averages weighted across locations by the number of participants in each
location.40
Figure 1.10: Examples of Pairwise Comparison to Identify High Caloric Density Foods
A. 18 Butter biscuits (Medium round, 148g) B. 1 Plate pongal (256g)
Notes: All food photographs were printed to scale for participants. In addition, the descriptive labels were
read aloud to each participant. Participants were paid a small fee for each correct response. Demographics
of survey respondents are included in Table 1A.7, Column (1).
B. Raw onion (100g) A. Raw tomato (200g)41
Table 1.12: Knowledge of Caloric Density of Common Food Items, Pairwise Comparisons
Food A Food B Correct
response
Percent of
Participants
Correct
Difference
in
Calories
Ratio of
Calories
(larger/
smaller)
Panel A: Tamil Nadu (N = 149)
1 banana (large, 168 g) one bun (medium, 36g) A 78.5 71 1.7
1 tender coconut 6 bananas (1034g) B 23.5 923 8.0
butter biscuits (18, 150g) 1 plate pongal (256g) A 48.3 308 1.9
1 cup of tea (83ml) 1 vada (medium, 42g) B 36.9 95 4.0
one bun (medium, 36g) buttermilk (200ml) A 28.9 28 1.4
tomato (100g) onion (100g) B 42.3 35 2.8
gram flour (100g) 2 eggs (boiled, 96g) A 8.1 224 2.9
chicken  (100g, no sauce) fried peanuts  (100g) B 68.5 368 2.7
curd (100ml) ghee (30ml) B 36.9 207 4.3
sambar (230ml) kurma (165ml) B 20.8 150 2.2
Average, Tamil Nadu 39.3 241 3.2
Panel B: Orissa (N = 75)
1 banana (59g) 1 bun (59g) B 45.3 104 2.7
6 bananas (385g) 1 tender coconut A 53.3 261 3.0
curd (90g) 2 buns (103g) B 34.7 233 5.3
1 cup of tea (61ml) 2 vada (medium, 88.4g) B 66.7 242 11.6
2 buns (103g) 1 glass milk (145 mL) A 16.0 163 2.3
tomato (200g) onion (100g) B 36.0 15 1.4
gram flour (165 g) 2 eggs (boiled, 86g) A 20.0 457 5.4
chicken (158g cooked) fried peanuts (340g) B 48.0 1648 5.8
curd (90g) ghee (30g) B 86.7 209 4.9
dali (260ml) mixed vegetables (303g) B 42.7 339 5.0
Average, Orissa 44.9 367 4.7
Average, Overall 41.2 283.1 3.7
Notes:
1. Data is from a survey of 222 respondents with a BMI less than 20 who are active in the labor market.
Demographic information for respondents is presented in Appendix 1A, Table 1A.7, Column (1). The
"Difference in Calories" column is the absolute value of the difference in calories between Food A and
Food B. "Ratio of Calories" divides the calories in the higher calorie item by the calories in the lower
calorie item.
2. Participants were presented with the ten pairwise tradeoffs listed above and were asked to indicate
which of the two foods in each comparison provided more energy. These tradeoffs were presented via
life-size photographs as well as written and verbal descriptions. Foods in each comparison have the
same cost.
3. Participants were paid Rs. 1 for each correct response.42
1.5.6 Summary of Reasons for Low Investment
There are a wide variety of possible reasons for low investment in the face of apparently high returns.
However, neither liquidity, structural features of the economy, nor the disutility of labor appear to be
constraints limiting caloric investment for many individuals with low caloric intake. Although it is possible
that high discount rates play a role in low investment, the implied discount rates would be exceptionally
high and the effect of discount rates could easily work in the opposite direction given that food is a
consumption good which many people enjoy. The incentivized surveys described above do, however,
provide evidence that beliefs and knowledge have the potential to play a role in low caloric intake. Only
one-fifth of the respondents have correct beliefs about the returns to caloric intake. In addition, responses
from bothsetsofincentivized survey questions provides strong evidence that respondents’ beliefs regarding
the caloric density of commonly consumed foods are frequently and substantially incorrect. Given the
demographic diversity of the respondents, this evidence also demonstrates that these incorrect beliefs are
not limited to a small sub-segment of the population. While this evidence is far from conclusive given that
there are other factors (e.g. habit formation) which may limit change even if beliefs are accurate, the
presence and extent of the incorrect beliefs does open the possibilitythat knowledge could play an important
role in the low caloric consumption observed in the presence of high returns.
1.6 Conclusion
Over 800 million people still consume fewer calories than are recommended to maintain a healthy
weight and most of these individuals are among the worlds’ poorest (FAO 2011). While proof for or against
the existence of nutrition-based poverty traps is beyond the scope of this paper, the randomized trial
presented here suggest that low levels of adult nutrition may play an important role in productivity and
economic development. Specifically, treated cycle-rickshaw drivers who were provided with an additional
700 calories per day increased in labor supply and earnings in a relatively linear fashion, leading to an
increase in labor supply and earnings of approximately 10 percent in the fifth and final week of the study.43
In addition, treated individuals improved performance on both physical and cognitive tasks in the
laboratory. Physical performance in the laboratory followed a similar pattern of increase to labor market
outcomes with no significant change at enrollment, but an increase of 7 percent among treated individuals
relative to control individuals in the final week of the study. In contrast, the gains in cognitive performance
were  immediate,  with  a  12  percent  gain  among  treated  individuals  relative  to  control  individuals at
enrollment. This gain was sustained, but not increased, by the fifth week of the study. However, the
cognitive improvements observed in the randomized controlled trial suggest that the estimated gains may
be a lower bound for the benefits associated with higher caloric consumption and that malnourishment may
remain central to productivity despite a shift toward cognitive labor rather than physical labor in many
developing countries.
These  relatively  large  changes  in  productivity  driven  by  changes  in  caloric  intake  generate
correspondingly  high  estimated  returns  on investment.  Although  there is  greater  uncertainty  in  these
estimates due to the greater number of assumptions required, the returns appear to be roughly 75 percent
over six months. The high returns to caloric intake which accrue over short time horizons in the absence of
binding liquidity constraints make the continued low caloric intake in India a puzzle.
This paper provides suggestive evidence generated via an incentivized surveys of hundreds of
participants similar to those in the studies of returns that this apparent contradiction may be related to
incorrect beliefs which limit investment in nutrition. Specifically, beliefs about the returns to increased
caloric intake were highly variable and substantially inaccurate,with only 20 percent of respondents holding
the belief that higher caloric intake will increase productivity. In addition, beliefs regarding the caloric
densities of foods are often substantially wrong; in pairwise comparisons between commonly consumed
foods with compensation for correct responses, respondents were unable to identify which foods contained
greater numbers of calories per unit cost even at the rate expected by chance.
If incorrect beliefs about the returns to increased caloric intake and the caloric density of foods are
indeed driving low investment, there would be a number of implications for both economics and for food
policy. For example, India spends nearly one percent of GDP on food subsidies (Kumar and Soumya 2010).44
Although many of these subsidies do target calorically dense foods such as grains, a variety of subsidies
also apply to foods which provide few calories per rupee, such as dairy products. With poor knowledge
about nutrition, these subsidies may actually negatively impact caloric intake (and productivity) rather than
raise it. For example, if the price of milk declines, individuals may substitute dairy products for more
calorically dense foods such as grains rather than supplement their previous consumption.
The evidence of incorrect beliefs reported here also suggests a number of new avenues of research
exploring the consequences of these beliefs. For example, nutrition-based poverty trap models make strong
predictions about who in society will be in high income/food or low income/food equilibria. Specifically,
these models predict that the landed (or more broadly those with productive assets) will be hired first and
attain the high equilibrium because their additional income allows them to consume more food and provide
more effective labor at a lower wage. However, incorrect beliefs would break this linkage; individuals
would not consume food to maximize their productivity. Instead, in a world in which individuals have
incorrect beliefs about the returns to caloric intake, individual heterogeneity in preferences for food or
features of the local diet (e.g. variety, food taboos, the caloric density of the staple grain) will drive which
individuals consume sufficient calories and which individuals do not.45
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Appendix 1A49
Table 1A.1: Experimental Tasks at Enrollment and Endline of RCT
Task
Name
Task
Type Task Description Notes
Exercise
cycle,
short
Physical Participants cycled as far as possible in 2
minutes on an exercise cycle in the office.
Payment was a function of distance
covered.
The proper use of the exercise
cycle was demonstrated to each
participant before they began.
Exercise
cycle,
long
Physical Participants were given 60 minutes to
cycle as much or little as they would like.
However, payment was a function of
distance covered.
The proper use of the exercise
cycle was demonstrated to each
participant before they began.
Participants were provided with
clean drinking water and a place
to rest when not cycling.
Trip
choices
Physical Participants were first asked to make six
choices between different sets of job
opportunities using their cycle-rickshaws.
A number was then drawn from a bowl to
determine which of the choices is actually
carried through. If a respondent selected a
response that involved taking a load on that
day, they completed that task immediately.
If he selected a task that involves taking a
load (or receiving a payment) in the future,
that decision was noted in their record and
he took the load (or was paid) on the
appropriate day.
Each choice set contained an
option to not take a trip. The
participant did not receive a
payment if he chose this option.
Crossing
out
symbols
Cognitive Participants were given a workbook in
which they were asked to locate and cross
out specific symbols in a large matrix of
randomly ordered symbols. This activity
lasted 60 minutes. Participants could take
breaks during this time but were paid as a
positive function of the number of symbols
correctly crossed out and a negative
function of the number of symbols
incorrectly crossed out.
Symbol sheets were printed in
large font to mitigate concerns
about eyesight impacting
performance.
Job
planning
Cognitive Participants were presented with a
hypothetical set of six possible jobs of
varying durations and monetary values.
They were asked to identify which jobs
they would select if they had one hour
available to complete the jobs and wanted
to maximize the amount earned. Payment
was a direct function of the value of the
jobs selected.
If the sum of the duration of the
jobs selected was greater than
one hour, only those jobs which
fit within an hour were included
(and compensated).50
Table 1A.1 (Continued): Experimental Tasks at Enrollment and Endline of RCT
Task Name
Task
Type Task Description Notes
Dietary
Recall
Survey Dietary recall surveys elicited information
on the food that the participant ate in a 24
hour period on the previous day. The
survey followed a five step procedure:
1) Ask the participant to list of the foods
and beverages consumed the previous day.
2) Collect the time at which the foods and
beverages were consumed.
3) Probe for additional foods that might
have been forgotten (e.g. snacks, side
dishes, condiments).
4) Gather a detailed description of the
amount and specific types of the foods and
beverages consumed.
5) Final review of the information and
probe for forgotten foods or details.
Step 4 is the most complex step.
Participants were provided with
a set of example containers for
each type of food to help them
estimate the amount consumed.
For example, if a participant
listed tea he was provided with a
set of cups of varying sizes and
asked to identify which was the
closest to the amount consumed
and to identify how full the cup
was filled.
The data on foods and beverages
consumed was entered into a
database which was run through
a conversion program to
translate the foods consumed
into a total nutrient intake for the
day.
Enrollment
/ Endline
Survey
Survey This survey elicited basic demographic
information (e.g. age, household size,
household assets), baseline work habits
(e.g. whether the participant had any
regular customers), risk preferences,
anthropometric measures, general health
and wellbeing, and alcohol and tobacco
consumption.
Daily
Survey
Survey The survey elicited information about labor
supply (whether the individual worked,
and if so the hours worked and the number
of trips taken) and earnings the previous
day. In addition, participants were asked to
rate their energy on a scale of 1 to 5 and to
indicate the number of meals eaten the
previous day. Because participants were
not asked to visit the study office on
Sunday, information about both Saturday
and Sunday was reported on Monday.51
Table 1A.2: Change in Caloric Intake During RCT
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Change in Calories
(Endline-Enrollment)
Meals Change in BMI
(Endline-Enrollment)
Treated 178.35 0.15*** 0.20*
[235.16] [0.04] [0.12]
Mean of dependent variable 158.48 2.73 0.05
Observations 152 5,600 168
R-squared 0.00 0.02 0.02
Notes:
1. This table provides three measures of the effectiveness of the treatment at increasing caloric intake.
2. "Change in Calories" is the number of calories consumed in the 24-hour period before endline,
excluding snacks consumed in the office, minus the number of calories consumed in the 24-hour period
before enrollment. "Meals" is the number of meals eaten per day as reported daily by participants.
"Change in BMI" is defined as a participant's BMI at endline (in the fifth week) minus their BMI at
Enrollment.
3. Columns (1) and (3) have one observation per participant while in Column (2) the participant-day is
the unit of observation. Standard errors are clustered by participant in Column (2).
4. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.152
Table 1A.3: Linear Trends in Cycle-rickshaw Driver Labor Supply and Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Work Hours
if > 0
Total
hours
Earn ln(earn+1) IHS(earn)
Treatment 0.019 -0.353* -0.086 -11.722* 0.034 0.047
[0.021] [0.206] [0.244] [6.282] [0.110] [0.124]
Treatment*Day in study 0.003*** 0.016* 0.036*** 0.611** 0.013** 0.015**
[0.001] [0.010] [0.012] [0.303] [0.005] [0.006]
Mean of dependent variable 0.81 8.88 7.21 163.57 4.21 4.77
Observations 5,675 4,604 5,669 5,675 5,675 5,675
R-squared 0.081 0.144 0.119 0.112 0.086 0.086
Notes:
1. This table provides the results of regressions examining changes in labor supply and earnings among
treated participants across time. "Work" is a binary variable indicating whether the participant worked that
day. "Hours if >0" is the total number of hours worked, conditional on working. "Total hours" is the number
of hours worked per day where hours are zero if the participant did not work. "Earn" is the total daily earnings
as a rickshaw driver in Indian Rupees. This variable takes the value zero if the participant did not work.
"ln(earn+1)" is the log of earnings + 1 where earnings is defined as previously described. "IHS(earn)" is the
inverse hyperbolic sine of earnings. "Day in study" indicates the number of days from enrollment for that
participant. The participant-day is the unit of observation.
2. Regressions include stand location, calendar week, and study day fixed effects as well as controls for
baseline work habits which are detailed in Appendix 1B. Results are less precisely estimated, but qualitatively
similar if these controls are omitted.
3. Robust standard errors clustered by individual are in brackets.
4. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.153
Table 1A.4: Cycle-rickshaw Driver Labor Supply and Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Work Hours if >0 Total hours Earn ln(earn+1) IHS(earn)
Treatment 0.07*** -0.07 0.57* -0.81 0.27** 0.32**
[0.02] [0.29] [0.34] [8.92] [0.12] [0.13]
Mean of dependent variable 0.81 8.88 7.21 163.57 4.21 4.77
Observations 5,675 4,604 5,669 5,675 5,675 5,675
R-squared 0.05 0.13 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.05
Notes:
1. This table provides the results of regressions testing for changes in labor supply and earnings among
treated participants aggregating across the five weeks of the study. "Work" is a binary variable indicating
whether the participant worked that day. "Hours if >0" is the total number of hours worked, conditional on
working. "Total hours" is the number of hours worked per day where hours are zero if the participant did not
work. "Earn" is the total daily earnings as a rickshaw driver in Indian Rupees. This variable takes the value
zero if the participant did not work. "ln(earn+1)" is the log of earnings + 1 where earnings is defined as
previously described. "IHS(earn)" is the inverse hyperbolic sine of earnings. The participant-day is the unit of
observation.
2. Regressions include stand location, calendar week, and study week fixed effects as well as controls for
baseline work habits which are detailed in Appendix 1B. Results are less precisely estimated, but qualitatively
similar, if these controls are omitted.
3. Robust standard errors clustered by individual are in brackets.
4. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.154
Table 1A.5: Cycle-rickshaw Driver Daily Earnings (High Attendance)
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable Work Earn
Treated (Week 1) 0.02 -0.26
[0.03] [11.25]
Treated*Week 2 0.06* 8.16
[0.03] [10.26]
Treated*Week 3 0.06 10.06
[0.04] [11.42]
Treated*Week 4 0.05 5.06
[0.03] [12.00]
Treated*Week 5 0.09* 20.53
[0.05] [13.33]
Mean of dependent variable 0.83 170.58
Observations 3,883 3,883
R-squared 0.05 0.11
Notes:
1. "Work" is a binary variable indicating whether the participant worked that day. "Earn" is the
total daily earnings as a rickshaw driver in Indian Rupees. This variable takes the value zero if
the participant did not work. The participant-day is the unit of observation.
2. The sample is limited to participants who had at least 90 percent attendance.
3. Regressions include stand location, calendar week, and study week fixed effects as well as
controls for baseline work habits. Results are less precisely estimated, but qualitatively similar
if these controls are omitted.
4. Robust standard errors clustered by individual are in brackets.
5. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.155
Table 1A.6: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by BMI
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable Work Earn
Treatment 0.03 -5.65
[0.03] [15.30]
Low BMI -0.07** -26.76*
[0.03] [15.67]
Low BMI*Treatment 0.07 9.20
[0.04] [19.14]
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.81 163.34
Observations 5,648 5,648
R-squared 0.05 0.09
Notes:
1. This table presents results of regressions of participants' labor supply and
earnings as a function of treatment status and BMI.
2. "Work" is a binary variable indicating whether the participant worked that day.
"Earn" is the total daily earnings as a rickshaw driver in Indian Rupees. This
variable takes the value zero if the participant did not work. "Low BMI" is
defined as a BMI under 18.5, the World Health Organization cutoff for being
"underweight," at enrollment.
3. Regressions include stand location, calendar week, and study week fixed
effects as well as controls for baseline work habits. Results are less precisely
estimated, but qualitatively similar if these controls are omitted.
4. Robust standard errors clustered by individual are in brackets.
5. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.156
Table 1A.7: Demographics of Survey Respondents
(1) (2)
Question types Caloric Density, Food
Habits and Preferences
Returns
Age 41.37 39.88
[12.48] [12.46]
People in household 4.72 4.16
[2.04] [1.74]
Monthly household expenditures (Rs) 5430.77 5552.74
[2808.23] [3135.65]
Body Mass Index (BMI) 18.13 18.21
[1.51] [1.63]
Male 0.68 0.55
[0.47] [0.5]
Married 0.89 0.89
[0.32] [0.32]
Years of education 4.52 4.72
[3.96] [4.16]
Urban 0.44 0.66
[0.5] [0.47]
Meals per day 2.78 2.77
[0.47] [0.47]
Hungry in typical day
"No"
"< 1 hour/day"
"1-2 hours/day"
"2-5 hours/day"
">5 hours/day"
4.02 %
38.84 %
20.09 %
33.93 %
3.13 %
6.04 %
38.93 %
10.74 %
43.62 %
0.67 %
Religion
Hindu
Muslim
Other
85.71 %
12.05 %
1.79 %
93.29 %
4.03 %
2.68 %
Years in current profession 15.74 12.59
[11.92] [11.01]
N 222 149
Notes:
1. Statistics are presented mean [standard deviation].
2. Common professions of respondents include: agricultural labor, construction, casual laborer,
load carrier/porter, auto driver, housekeeper/sweeper, textile workers, food services, and vendors.
3."Urban," “Male,” and "Married" are binary variables.57
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Appendix 1B59
Literature – The Impact of Caloric Intake on Economic Productivity
There has been significant interest in the effect of caloric intake on productivity and labor market outcomes
for many years. Yet, despite many and varied approaches to studying the changes in productivity associated
with caloric intake, the conflicting results and difficulties inherent in isolating the casual effect of increased
caloric consumption on production have made it difficult to draw firm conclusions about the existence of
this relationship and its strength.
The earliest of these studies, relying on quasi-exogenous changes in caloric intake among men
working at various tasks (e.g. coal mining, embankment construction) during war time, found that caloric
availability was positively correlated with output (Kraut and Muller 1946). Strauss (1986) improved on
these correlational studies by utilizing a vector of food prices, farm assets, and household demographic
characteristics to instrument for average caloric intake per adult equivalent to estimate a farm production
function in Sierra Leone. The estimated production function showed a strong positive relationship between
caloric consumption and farm production, with higher returns at lower levels of consumption. Yet, given
the  relatively  high price  of  calories  and  the levels  of  caloric  intake  in  Sierra  Leone, the  increased
productivity did not account fully for the cost of the additional calories for the median individual. Using
panel data from southern India to estimate both wage equations and farm production functions with
individual fixed effects, Deolalikar (1988) found no significant impact of caloric intake on wages or farm
output once stature (weight for height) was accounted for.
Two studies have also examined the impact of adult caloric supplementation on productivity through
experimental methods in an effort to address the endogeniety of caloric consumption. Immink and Viteri
(1981) find no significant change in production when treated participants were provided with an additional
350  calories  per  day.  However,  due  to  logistical  constraints,  this  experiment  relied  on  two  villages
randomized at the level of the village. In addition, laborers in this study worked in groups of four and were
paid one quarter of the group’s total production, potentially weakening individual incentives. Wolgemuth
et al. (1982) were able to randomize at the level of the individual and provided the treated individuals with
an additional 800 calories per day relative to the control group. However, because participants in this study60
were construction workers, productivity was estimated by visual inspection of the quantity of earth moved
and required adjustments of productivity measures to account of differences in output across types of
tasks.37 Although production per day showed a small marginally significant increase in the intention to treat
estimate, the number of days worked on the roads project declined significantly among treated individuals
making an overall assessment of economic productivity changes difficult.
Literature – The Impact of Caloric Intake on Physical and Cognitive Function
In  contrast  to  the  generally  inconclusive  results  regarding  the  impact  of  caloric  intake  on  economic
productivity, there is substantial evidence from the physiology literature that low caloric intake, even over
short durations such as a week, is associated with declines in a variety of indicators of physical performance.
Of note, declines appear to become more pronounced as body weight drops further (Bender and Martin
1986; Taylor et al. 1956; Friedlander et al. 2005; Committee on Military Nutrition 1986). For clear reasons,
there are a limited number of controlled trials studying low caloric intake over extended time periods.
However, one well designed within-subjects trial, the Minnesota Semi-Starvation Study, does exist.
Participants, all young males, were volunteers drawn from a pool of conscientious objectors. The study
lasted 56 weeks with a 12 week baseline, a 24 week “starvation” period restricted to 1,560 calories per day,
and 20 weeks of varying “recovery” diets. Participants lived at the study site and underwent regular and
extensive physiological testing in addition to maintaining a fairly extensive exercise regimen. The study
provides strong evidence of substantial declines in physical performance including maximal performance
capacity as measured by a treadmill test (50-70 percent decrease in time to exhaustion and overall fitness
score) and strength (30-40 percent decrease on each measure) during the starvation period (Keys et al.
1950).38 Although this study differs from the context of long-run deprivation that many of the worlds’
37 The specific compensation method for workers is not explicitly stated in the paper. Wages are mentioned, however,
the structure of the wages is not. Given that the labor provided was for a public works project, it is likely that there
was simply a flat days wage for work on the project such that workers most likely faced relatively weak incentives.
38 Participants were not monetarily incentivized during these physical tests. However, given that the study population
consisted of conscientious objectors willing to live at the study site for an extended period, it is likely that participants
were highly internally motivated to provide maximal effort. Study administrators also reported high levels of effort61
malnourished suffer from childhood, the continued decline throughout the starvation period suggests that
the participants were unable to fully compensate for low caloric intake and maintain performance over
fairly long horizons.39
In addition to declines in physical performance, participants in the Minnesota study complained of
decreased alertness, lack of self-control, and general apathy. A number of other studies in psychology and
other disciplines have found similar cognitive changes related to nutrition even over just a few hours (e.g.
Baumeister and Vohs 2007; Danziger et al. 2011; Gailliot et al. 2007). Although many studies find that
cognitive ability (maximal performance) is maintained, persistence and motivation for cognitive work and
thought decline substantially. For example, the US Army found that soldiers consuming 2,000 calories per
day maintained their tested cognitive ability but completed just over half as many cognitive exercises as
soldiers  consuming  2,700  calories/day  (US  Army  1987).  Although  perhaps  initially  surprising,  these
changes likely reflect the fact that despite accounting for only 2 percent of body weight the brain consumes
roughly 20 percent of the energy used by the body; hence, as with any organ requiring substantial energy
inputs, limiting the total energy available is likely to constrain the brain’s ability to function (Fonsec-
Azevedo and Herculano-Houzel 2012).
Characteristics of Cycle-Rickshaw Drivers in the Randomized Controlled Trial in Chennai, India
Chennai is a city of approximately 4.7 million people in the state of Tamil Nadu, located on the eastern
coast in the south of India (Census of India 2011). Participants for the RCT were drawn from the population
of cycle-rickshaw drivers, an all-male profession. Members of this profession drive large three wheeled
vehicles to transport passengers, and occasionally, luggage or goods. The vehicles are large enough to
by participants during these tests, reporting that “runs were terminated at a state of actual or near collapse” in the later
periods of the study.
39 Participants did experience a decline in their basal metabolic rate (the energy used in basic bodily processes such as
respiration, excluding energy for digestion) from 1570 calories per day to 960 calories per day throughout the
starvation period. This increased “efficiency” is one mechanism the body can use to limit weight loss despite low
caloric intake. However, this decline had tapered substantially by week 24 due to basic physiological limits (Keys et
al. 1950).62
comfortably fit two adults in addition to the driver, although can be used for loads up to a few hundred
kilos. In Chennai, cycle-rickshaws are primarily used in a 2.5 square kilometer area in the center city due
to the narrow streets which make travel by larger vehicles difficult there.
Although Tamil Nadu is a relatively wealthy state, rickshaw drivers are in lower socio-economic
brackets. The median participant has 3 years of education and can write numbers but cannot write the letters
of the alphabet. In addition, 90 percent of the participants are in historically disadvantaged castes and 70
percent have ration cards which entitle them to subsidized foods and cooking gas.40 The median participant
has a family size of 4, lives in a one room house with electricity but without a bathroom, and has four small
appliances (e.g., rice cooker or fan). However, 25 percent of the participants are migrants who typically
sleep in their rickshaw while they are working in the city. The average weekly household income of Rs.
1,523 results in a per capita income of $1.10 per day for study participants and their families.41 Although
not much information is available on consumption, of the average daily earnings of Rs. 165 (Rs. 200
conditional on working) rickshaw drivers report spending an average of Rs. 14 per day on tobacco and Rs.
68 per day on alcohol.42 Among households with similar per capita daily expenditure in the greater Chennai
area, 34 percent of overall household expenditures were dedicated to food.43
Participants are typically in their 40s and 50s (mean age 46) and have a small physical stature with
an average height of 161cm (5 feet, 3 inches) and an average weight of 46 kilos (101 pounds) (the BMI
distribution of participants is presented in Figure 1A.1. Based on a random sample of drivers in the city,
roughly two-thirds of rickshaw drivers have a BMI under 20). While only 14 percent of participants rate
40“Historically disadvantaged castes” are defined as belonging to a schedule caste, scheduled tribe, or “other backward
class.”
41 The average exchange rate during the study was roughly 45Rs to 1 USD.
42 Most rickshaw drivers spend money on food, alcohol, and tobacco during the day as they see fit and then give the
remainder of their earnings to their wives to allocate to other needs. Because wives are typically responsible for the
decisions on how to spend that money, very few men are able to provide information on the allocation of those funds.
43 This figure was calculated from the 64th round of the NSS (2007-2008). The sample is limited to households in the
greater Chennai region to match the RCT population as closely as possible while still maintaining a reasonable sample
size. In addition, I restrict the sample to households with a per capita daily expenditure of Rs. 23 to Rs 43 (The average
per capita earnings for the RCT participants was Rs 49 in 2012 rupees, which corresponds to Rs. 33 in 2008 rupees.
The sample is based on a Rs. 10 per day band around this figure.) Using the NSS sampling weights, the average daily
expenditure on food in these households is Rs. 10.7 per person while the average total expenditure is Rs. 31.63
their general health as being “somewhat unhealthy” or “unhealthy,” the average participant also reports
missing 1 day of work every two weeks due to ill health.
With an average experience of 20 years, participants had generally worked in the profession for most
or all of their working lives. A typical work week is 5.7 days per week and 9 hours per day, conditional on
working. Three-quarters of the population rents their rickshaw, typically on a weekly or monthly basis for
roughly Rs. 190 per week.
Caloric Intake in the Randomized Controlled Trial
A number of steps were taken to maximize the increase in caloric intake among treated individuals. First,
participants were asked to visit the office during non-meal hours (i.e. between 10am and 12:30pm and from
3pm to 6:30pm). In addition, participants were provided with “snack” foods (e.g. potato chips, biscuits,
fried dough) rather than foods that typically constitute a meal. Finally, participants were provided with an
additional 700 calories per day such that even if some crowd out did occur, there was likely to be a net
increase. It is also worth noting that if some crowd out did occur, the expected ROI would be higher in that
the  changes  in  labor  supply  and  earnings  would  then  have  occurred  with  less  than  700  calorie
supplementation of the treatment participants’ daily caloric intake.
Three different measures were taken to proxy changes in caloric intake between treated and control
individuals during the study: 1) caloric intake as reported in a 24-hour dietary recall survey at enrollment
and  endline,  2)  number  of  meals  consumed  reported  daily,  and  3)  BMI  (or  weight)  as  measured  at
enrollment and endline.
All three measures suggest an increase in caloric intake in the treatment group. Although the standard
errors are quite large, such that it is difficult to calibrate the exact magnitude of the difference, the estimated
coefficient on treatment is positive when comparing changes in caloric intake in the dietary recall surveys
despite excluding caloric intake in the lab. In addition, the coefficient on the number of meals consumed
each day is positive and significant, suggesting that the treatment did not crowd out consumption of other64
food.44 Finally,  while  control  participants  do  not  change  BMI  over  time,  treated  participants  have  a
marginally statistically significant (p = 0.09) increase of 0.2 in BMI, corresponding to a weight gain of
roughly 0.5 kg (or approximately 1.1 pounds) (Appendix 1A, Table 1A.2).45
Controls Used in Labor Supply and Earnings Regressions
At enrollment, participants reported the number of days worked, the average number of hours per day
conditional on working, and earnings conditional on working for the previous week. These variables are
included as baseline controls in all regressions of labor supply and earnings.
Bounding Treatment Effects in the Randomized Controlled Trial
The bounding process follows the method proposed and described by Lee (2003), with minor adjustments
to account for the structure of the data. This method relies on the trimming of extreme observations in the
condition with lower attrition to bound the estimated treatment effect. Specifically, the process begins by
calculating the fraction of observations that must be censored from the data by differencing the fraction of
non-attriters between the groups and dividing by the fraction of non-attriters in the group with lower
attrition.46 Due to the panel nature of the data in this study, there are many possible measures of attrition.
Hence, I generate five different measures of attrition and use the smallest and the largest to create a liberal
and a conservative bound on the estimated treatment effect. The measures of attrition used are: 1) never
return after enrollment, 2) do not attend endline, and 3) thru 5) attendance less than 25 percent, 50 percent,
and 75 percent, respectively. The smallest trimming fraction, 5.3%, is a result attrition measure (1), while
the largest, 15.9 percent is a result of measure (5). After calculating the trimming fraction, the individuals
44 Snacking is relatively uncommon and meals purchased at street stalls are of fairly uniform size, such that the
number of meals per day is likely to correlate highly with caloric intake in this population.
45 One pound of weight corresponds to 3500 calories. Hence, 700 calories per day over five weeks with no changes in
behavior of basal metabolic rate would increase weight roughly 5 pounds. However, given that treated participants
increase labor supply substantially and may experience some increase in BMR, this smaller gain is not surprising.
46 Although attrition is generally greater in control groups, the results of Lee (2003) hold regardless of whether attrition
is higher in the treatment or control. This analysis calls for trimming from the control group (because attrition is lower
in that condition). Hence, I use the fraction of non-attriters in the control as the denominator in calculating the trimming
fraction.65
with the highest (lowest) values of the outcome, where the outcome is the average value of the dependent
variable over all observations, are removed from the dataset and the treatment effect is estimated on the
trimmed dataset. The results of this bounding procedure for labor supply and earnings outcomes are
reported in Table 1.7a and Figure 1.8.
A similar procedure was used to bound the estimated treatment effect on the enrollment and endline
payments. However, in this case, the trimming fraction was calculated using the fraction of individuals in
each condition who did not attend endline and payment on the enrollment tasks were used to determine
which observations to censor. The results of this bounding procedure for earnings on laboratory tasks are
reported in Table 1.7b.
Calibrating the Disutility of Labor
By the end of the five-week RCT, these individuals face a choice between their current activities and a
bundle that includes spending an additional Rs. 6 for food, working 12 percent more, and earning Rs. 19
more each day (Table 1.5). Hence, participants must be willing to increase labor supply 12 percent for an
additional Rs. 13 per day. The median number of trips per day reported by participants is 6. Hence a 12
percent increase in labor supply would be roughly 0.7 trips per day.47 Because fractional trips are not
possible, I scale both the earnings and trips by 1.4, resulting in a tradeoff of one trip for Rs. 21.
I use two sources data to assess willingness to accept at this rate. The first source is one of the
experimental tasks in which RCT participants were offered additional paid fares. Specifically, participants
were asked to make a series of choices between taking or not taking paid trips with varied rates, loads, and
time horizons and one of their choices was randomly selected and carried out to ensure the choices were
incentive compatible. One of the choices offered to participants was between not taking a trip and not
earning any additional money, taking a 1 km journey with a 100 kg load (in addition to the cycle and driver)
47 This approach abstracts from disutility from simply waiting for fares. This is done because it is impractical to offer
entire days of work that can be monitored by research staff to ensure compliance. However, given the physical
difficulty of the task, waiting is likely to be significantly less taxing than actual labor. In addition, this calibration also
ignores the positive utility from additional food consumption which would work in the opposite direction.66
for Rs. 20, or taking a 1 km journey with a 150 kg load for Rs. 30.48 The 1 km journey with a 100 kg load
is representative of a fairly typical journey given that most rickshaws will carry 1 to 2 passengers (each
weighing roughly 50 kgs) and typically travel short distances.
The second dataset was generated from 150 actual offered rickshaw trips around the city. Research
staff were randomly assigned a commonly traveled route (e.g. the bus station to the train station) and a price
and were told to offer no more than that price and determine whether the driver would accept. If the driver
accepted, the trip was taken and the fare paid. If the driver declined, the staff member moved to the next
route and price combination.
In the RCT task, 85 percent of participants opted to take one of the two trips offered. This isconsistent
with the willingness to accept found in the 150 additional offered rickshaw trips in which 83 percent of
participants were willing to accept a trip for Rs. 21.
In short, roughly 85 percent rickshaw drivers are willing to take fares at the rate implied by the labor
supply and net earnings changes observed in the RCT. Hence, even if there is no utility provided by the
consumption of additional food, there appear to be positive utility returns to increased consumption for the
vast majority of rickshaw drivers.
48 A staff member would accompany the driver on the trip to ensure that the driver completed the full distance required.67
2 The Economic Costs of Low Caloric Intake:
Evidence from Agricultural Production in India*
2.1 Introduction
The randomized trial detailed in Chapter 1provides internally validevidencethat the labor supply, earnings,
and physical and cognitive function of cycle-rickshaw drivers improve with increased caloric intake.
Although cycle-rickshaw drivers were selected as a study population in part due to their similarity to many
individuals in the informal labor market (e.g. flexible labor supply, low caloric intake), this group is still
specific. In order to address potential concerns about the external validity of the RCT as well as to examine
the impact of changes in caloric intake at lower levels of intake, I conducteda second analysis. This analysis
examines the impact of the reduced caloric intake on agricultural production, an industry which accounts
for 52 percent of employment in India (National Academy of Agricultural Sciences 2012; World Bank
2012).
Tostudy therelationship between caloricconsumptionand economic output in agriculture, I exploit
a natural experiment drawing on the quasi-random declines in caloric intake caused by fasting during
Ramadan, a month-long Muslim holiday. Following background information about the holiday and the
context of the study, the analysis begins by estimating the caloric decline among Muslims during Ramadan
in India via the consumer expenditure portion of the National Sample Survey (NSS). The estimated decline
in caloric intake is roughly 700 calories per person per day for rural agricultural Muslim households.1
* I am deeply grateful to Sendhil Mullainthan, Lawrence Katz, Michael Kremer, and David Cutler for feedback and
encouragement. For helpful discussions, I thank David Laibson, Rohini Pande, Asim Khwaja, Rick Hornbeck, Ed
Glaeser, George  Loewenstein, Kevin  Volpp, Shawn  Cole, Max  Bazerman, David  Bloom, Supreet  Kaur,  Frank
Schilbach, Dan Bjorkegren, Ian Tomb, Joana Naritomi, Raluca Dragusanu, Laura Trucco, Anjali Adukia and seminar
participants at Harvard University. I thank Dave Donaldson for sharing data.
1 Although this study examines a decline in consumption, the observed levels of consumption are ones which are
relevant to consider. Specifically, the declines during Ramadan result in an overall average consumption of roughly
1,500 to 1,600 calories per person per day (See Section 2.3 for details of this analysis). Yet, one-quarter of the Indian
population consumes less than 1,625 calories per day on a regular basis (Deaton and Dreze 2009).68
I then utilize a differences-in-difference approach to assess the impact of reduced caloric intake on
agricultural production at the crop-district-year level. Specifically, to estimate the impact of this decline in
calories on agricultural production, I exploit three sources of variation in the overlap between fasting and
the labor intensive portions of cropping cycles (sowing and harvesting). The first, generated by the fact that
Ramadan cycles throughout the calendar year, is variation for a given crop-district combination over time.
The second, variation among crops within a district-year, is the result of natural variation in cropping cycles
for different plants. Finally, different climatic patterns across space generate variation in cropping cycles
between districts, resulting in spatial variation for a given crop within a year.
The results of this analysis suggest that overlap between Ramadan and sowing/harvesting leads to
economically  meaningful declines  in  total  agricultural  production,  both  in  weight  and  in  value. The
estimated decreases in output imply a decline in productivity of approximately 20 to 40 percent per Muslim
individual. Building on these baseline results, I also examine heterogeneity in the production declines
arising from the uneven spatial distribution of Muslims in India.2 Reassuringly, in districts with very few
Muslims there is no decline in production. However, districts with many Muslims experience substantial
production declines when sowing or harvesting overlaps the fasting period. This heterogeneous effect
supports the conclusion that Ramadan, rather than other factors, drives the production declines.
Finally, I turn to an analysis of behavioral changes during the holiday to assess whether features of
the holidaybeyondto the decline in caloric intake underlie the declines in production.Specifically,I discuss
and assess three other potential behavioral changes during the holiday as possible channels: changes in
labor supply due to religious or social obligations, sleep deprivation, and dehydration. As an omnibus test,
I examine whether overlap between sowing/harvesting and the period following Ramadan also generates
declines in production. Given the slow recovery from reduced caloric intake but rapid recovery from
dehydration and sleep deprivation, the persistence of the effects observed in this test simultaneously
provides evidence in favor of nutrition driving the declines and against these three other forces playing key
2The fraction of the population which is Muslim varies substantially across districts, ranging from less than 0.1 percent
to over 40 percent (Census of India 1961).69
roles.3 Drawing on evidence from relevant literatures and additional direct empirical tests utilizing both
agricultural production data and additional data sources, I also assess each of these potential channels
individually. These empirical tests draw on both the agricultural data and additional data sources such as
the employment portion of the National Sample Survey and the ICRISAT village level studies survey. Each
of these sources of evidence and the data analyses are consistent with an effect on production driven
primarily by changes in caloric consumption rather than other behavioral shifts. So, while it is difficult to
fully rule out all possible alternative channels in any natural experiment, these analyses suggest that these
three channels are unlikely to be significant drivers of the changes in production during Ramadan in India.
As in the previous analysis of cycle-rickshaw drivers, the substantial impact of low caloric intake
on productivity suggests a high return on investment: the estimated 1-month return to a 700 calorie per day
increase in consumption is over 200 percent. These positive returns are robust to a wide variety of different
assumptions about the cost of calories and the return on investment.4
The remainder of this paper is divided into six parts. Section 2.2 provides background about
agriculture and caloric intake in India as well as the Ramadan holiday. Section 2.3 estimates the change in
caloric intake for rural Muslim agricultural households during Ramadan. The differences-in-differences
approach examining the impact of decreased caloric intake during Ramadan on agricultural production is
presented in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 examines three alternative changes in behavior during Ramadan which
have the potential to drive production declines and provides evidence suggesting these channels are not
primary contributors to the observed declines. Calculations of the returns associated with the estimated
productivity changes are detailed in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 concludes.
3 While recovery from dehydration and sleep deprivation occurs in hours or days, recovery from low caloric intake
often takes weeks (Drummond et al. 2006; Dinges et al. 1997; Sawka et al. 2007). Details of this test are provided in
Section 2.5.
4 A wide variety of alternative assumptions about the cost of calories and productivity changes, and the returns implied
by these assumptions, are detailed in Section 2.6.70
2.2 Background
Ramadan
Ramadan is a month-long Muslim holiday observed primarily through fasting during daylight hours.
Fasting includes abstinence from both food and liquids and is obligatory for practicing Muslims with the
exception of children, the elderly, individuals who are ill, infirm, or traveling, and women who are pregnant
or breast feeding. Muslims are also expected to abstain from smoking, sexual relations, and swearing during
daylight hours throughout the holiday. In addition, there is an added emphasis on prayer, reading the Koran,
and charity during this time (Blackwell 2009; Ahmad et al. 2012).
The holiday is lunar, shifting by roughly eleven days per year, and cycling through the calendar
year approximately once every 30 years. Ramadan is followed by Eid, a holiday marking the end of
Ramadan.5 During Eid, Muslims are not allowed to fast, and typically engage in a special prayer in a
communal area and visit family and friends. Eid is a minimum of one day but can last up to three days
(Blackwell 2009).
Caloric Intake and Body Mass Index in India
The Indian Planning Commission’s recommended caloric intake has typically been 2,100 calories per adult
in urban areas and 2,400 calories per adult in rural areas (Sharma 1999). Caloric intake in India has,
however, remained significantly below these levels for many years and, of note, has been declining over
time despite strong economic growth (Deaton and Dreze 2009). In addition, the distribution of calories in
India is quite skewed such that mean caloric intakes are substantially higher than median caloric intakes.
The low caloric intakes lead to correspondingly low body mass indices (BMI), with over half of the
population below the WHO cutoff for underweight (BMI < 18.5) in 1971, the median year in this study.6
Roughly one-third of the population remains underweight at present (Deaton and Dreze 2009; WHO 2013).
5 There are two holidays in the Muslim calendar referred to as Eid: Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha. However, this paper
will always reference Eid al-Fitr, which follows Ramadan, when referring to Eid.
6 As a benchmark, a person who is 5 foot 8 inches tall (1.73 m) would have a BMI of 18.5 at 122 pounds (55.3 kg).71
Agriculture in India
Agriculture is a critical sector in the Indian economy. Although the share of GDP generated from agriculture
has declined from 43 percent in 1960 to 17 percent at present, agriculture still accounts for 52 percent of
employment (National Academy of Agricultural Sciences 2012; World Bank 2012). Driven in part by
technology improvements during the Green Revolution, growth in this sector has been relatively rapid with
a four-fold increase in real value over the same period (FAO 2013; Evenson and Gollin 2003). India’s
primary crops are food grains such as rice, wheat, and millet as well as cash crops such as sugarcane,
oilseeds, and peanuts. Section 2.4.1 provides additional details about the agricultural data used in this
analysis.
2.3 Caloric Consumption During Ramadan
Although Muslims fast during daylight hours during Ramadan, it is possible that there could be substitution
of food consumption across time to the evenings and mornings, limiting or eliminating declines in caloric
intake. Hence, I directly estimate the change in caloric intake in order to confirm that caloric consumption
does indeed decline as well as to estimate the magnitude of the change.
2.3.1 Data
This analysis utilizes the consumer expenditure portion of the 60th, 62nd, and 64th rounds of India’s National
Sample Survey (NSS, Schedule 1).7 The dataset provides monthly household level consumption data for
nearly 150 food items allowing the calculation of each of the 36,000 households’ per capita caloric intake.
7 Additional  information  about  the  NSS  can  be  found  on  the  Indian  Ministry  of  Statistics  and Progamme
Implementation (MOPSI) website: http://mospi.nic.in. While it would be preferable to include NSS rounds during the
period covered by the agricultural production data, earlier rounds of the NSS do not include the survey date and hence
do not permit a calculation of the extent of the overlap between the survey period and Ramadan. The 60th round was
conducted in 2004, the 62nd in 2005 and 2006, and the 64th in 2007 and 2008.72
2.3.2 Results - Changes in Caloric Intake
I estimate caloric declines among Muslim households duringRamadanaccording to the following equation:
(2.1) Cidt = 0 + 1rRi + 2Fit + 3rRi*Fit+ 2Eit + αrRi*Eit + ϴdt + λm + idt
Cidt is calories per capita per day in household i, in district d, in year t. Ri is a vector of binary
variables for the household’s religion. Fit is an indicator variable denoting full overlap of the survey period
and Ramadan. Eit is an indicator for overlap between the survey period and Eid, and ϴdt and λm are district-
year and month of survey fixed effects, respectively. The primary sample is limited to rural households
whose primary occupation is agricultural work and which have either no overlap or complete (29 day)
overlap between the survey period and Ramadan.
The results demonstrate a fairly substantial and significant decline in caloric intake among rural
Muslim households during Ramadan (See Table 2.1). Although standard errors are large, the decline
appears to be approximately 700 calories per person per day, an estimate consistent with not eating a midday
meal.8This decline is substantial relative to total caloric consumption, which is approximately 2200 calories
per capita per day despite the fact that most individuals in this population engage in heavy physical labor.
Results are robust to a variety of methods of topcoding used to address implausibly high consumption levels
(See Appendix 2A, Table 2A.1).
8 The marginal increase in caloric intake during Ramadan for non-Muslims may be due to the fact that during these
rounds of the NSS Ramadan fell between September and November, the season when the many of holidays and
festivals  for  other  religions  occur  (e.g.  Diwali,  Dussehra,  Navaratri,  Ganesh Chaturhi,  Krishna  Janmashtami).
However, as noted in the previous footnote, it is not possible to use earlier NSS rounds due to omission of the survey
dates in those rounds. Of note, the decline in intake among Muslim households does not appear to substantially alter
the proportional macronutrient (i.e. carbohydrate, fat, protein) content of the consumption.73
Table 2.1: Daily Calories per Capita in Rural Agricultural Households
(1) (2)
Dependent variable Daily Per Capita Calorie Availability
Topcoding Method No topcoding At 99th percentile
Muslim -107.5*** -92.46***
[41.54] [28.86]
Full survey period overlaps Ramadan 455.1* 427.2
[259.1] [271.5]
Muslim*Full survey period overlaps Ramandan -612.6 -725.5**
[384.8] [368.9]
Mean of Dependent Variable 2263.49 2200.51
Observations 36,618 36,618
R-squared 0.1 0.21
Notes:
1. This table tests for changes in caloric consumption during Ramadan in Muslim households. The
dependent variable is per capita daily caloric availability. Column (1) makes no adjustments to reported
values. Column (2) reassigns values above the 99th percentile, conditional on having positive consumption
of the food item, to the 99th percentile of consumption conditional on having positive consumption.
Topcoding is done by food item before aggregating across the food items.
2. The sample is drawn from the Indian National Sample Survey, Schedule 1 (consumption), rounds 60, 62,
and 64 and is limited to households with survey periods with no overlap or full (29 day) overlap between
the survey period and Ramadan. These rounds are included because they contain survey dates while earlier
rounds do not.
3. All regressions include district-year fixed effects and month of interview fixed effects. In addition,
indicator variables for other major religions and their interaction terms with overlap between the survey
period and Ramadan as well as overlap between the survey period and Eid (to address the fact that food
purchases are lumpy and made in advance) and the interaction between this variable and the religion
indicators are included in the regressions but omitted from the table for simplicity.
4. NSS sampling weights are used and are reweighted to weight each round of the survey equally.
5. Results are similar using other methods of topcoding and winsorizing. See Appendix 2A, Table 2A.1 for
additional robustness checks.
6. Robust standard errors clustered by district-year are in brackets.
7. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
2.4 Changes in Agricultural Production
2.4.1 Data and Estimation Strategy
In order to examine the impact of Ramadan fasting on agricultural production this analysis draws on four
main sources of data. First, data on agricultural production was obtained from the World Bank India
Agriculture and Climate dataset complied by Apurva Sanghi, Kavi Kumar, and James McKinsey. This
dataset contains production and price information for 20 crops between 1956 and 1987 in 271 Indian74
districts covering 85 percent of the land area of India and all of the major agricultural areas with the
exception of Kerala and Assam.9 Second, data on agricultural production cycles was generously provided
by  Dave  Donaldson  who  compiled it from  the  1967  Indian  Crop  Calendar  published  by  the  Indian
Directorate of Economics and Statistics (Donaldson 2013). This dataset includes the typical sowing and
harvesting periods for 18 of the crops included in the agricultural production data at the district level. Table
2A.2 in Appendix 2A provides additional information about the 18 crops and their cropping cycles. Third,
data on the fraction of individuals in each district who are Muslim was gathered from the 1961 Indian
census. Finally, rainfall and temperature data were obtained from the University of Delaware monthly
rainfall and temperature series.
2.4.2 Overview of Sources of Variation and Estimation Strategy
As demonstrated previously, Ramadan generates a month-long quasi-exogenous shift in caloric intake of
roughly 700 calories per day among Muslims. However, in order to assess the impact of this change in
calories on economic productivity it is also necessary to measure output as related to “exposure” to fasting
that is independent of spatial or temporal confounds. In addition, in order to increase external validity, this
variation should occur in an economically important industry in which production is well measured at the
same “level” as the variation in the exposure to fasting.
Agricultural production offers a number of advantages in this respect. Although many industries
are relatively stable across the year (i.e. manufacturing), agricultural production has significant seasonality,
both for given crops and in different locations. Specifically, crops are produced at different times of the
year in different locations. For example, rice may be grown in February in one district and in June in
another. This variation is significant in India, with an average standard deviation of approximately 1.5
months in the timing of agricultural cycles for any given crop(See Table2A.2in Appendix 2A). In addition,
9 A district in India, similar to a county in the United States, is the administrative unit immediately below the state.
The average district in this sample had roughly three million people, of which over 80 percent lived in rural areas in
1961.75
different crops are produced at different times in the same location. For example, a district may grow rice
in May and wheat in September. A typical district has a standard deviation of approximately 2.5 months
and a range of roughly 9 months for the timing of crop cycles within the district (See Table 2A.3 in
Appendix 2A). This seasonality provides useful variation in “exposure” to Ramadan fasting both within
and between districts. In addition to the variation related to heterogeneous cropping cycles, the fact that
Ramadan is a lunar holiday and cycles throughout the calendar year can be exploited to provide temporal
variation in exposure to Ramadan fasting for each crop-district combination.
In short, because the same crop is planted following different cycles in different climatic zones,
various crops are planted at different times within a district, and the holiday cycles throughout the year, the
overlap between the period of low caloric intake and the labor intensive portions of the crop cycle varies
acrossdistricts, crops, and years. These sources of variation allow a triple-difference approach to identifying
the impact of Ramadan at the district (N = 271), crop (N = 18), year (N = 32) level.
2.4.3 Results - Agricultural Production During Ramadan
Ibegin by estimating Equation (2.2) regressing the production of crop c produced in year t in district
d (qcdt), on the fraction of Ramadan covered by each of the labor intensive portions of the agricultural cycle
for that crop-district-year (Scdtto indicate overlap with sowing and Hcdt to indicate overlap with harvest), as
well as district-crop (θcd), district-year (πdt), and crop-year (αct) fixed effects and a vector of time varying
controls for rainfall and temperature relative to the cropping cycle (Xcdt).10 Details of the calculation of the
fraction  of  Ramadan  covered  by  sowing  and  harvesting  are  included  in  Appendix 2B and  example
calculations are provided in Figure 2A.1. The extent of the “overlap” between Ramadan and the sowing
(harvesting) seasons is measured as a fraction of Ramadan to provide a constant denominator and clearer
interpretation of the coefficients of interest.11 Specifically, 1 (2) multiplied by 100 corresponds to the
10 See Appendix 2B for a more detailed description of the rainfall and temperature controls.
11 Results are qualitatively similar, although more difficult to interpret in terms of magnitude, when measuring overlap
as a fraction of the season rather than as a fraction of Ramadan. See Appendix 2A, Table 2A.5 for regressions using
the fraction of the season rather than the fraction of Ramadan as the measure of overlap.76
percentage decline in total production for complete overlap between Ramadan and sowing (harvesting).12
Table 2A.4 in  Appendix 2A displays  the  distribution  of  overlap  between  Ramadan  and sowing  and
harvesting.
(2.2) qcdt = 0 + 1Scdt + 2Hcdt + θcd + πdt + αct + λXcdt + cdt
As can be seen in Table 2.2, Column (1) total agricultural production in log metric tons declines
significantly with increased overlap between Ramadan and sowing or harvesting. Although the estimated
coefficients  are  relatively  small,  they  do  correspond  to  meaningful  production declines.  Specifically,
complete overlap between Ramadan and a sowing (harvest) period would result in an overall decline in
production of 1.7 (2.5) percent. However, because only 10 percent of the population is Muslim, these overall
declines in output correspond to a decline in productivity of roughly 17 (25) percent per fasting individual
when the sowing (harvesting) season fully overlaps the holiday.13
In addition to examining the impact of overlap on net production by weight across all crops, Table
2.2 displays estimates of changes in the value of production in Column (2) and the production of rice (the
primary staple grain and the crop of greatest total economic value in India) in Column (3) as a function of
the fraction of Ramadan covered by sowing and harvest seasons. These estimates are similar although
somewhat larger than the percentage declines in production for all crops, indicating that the declines are
observed among economically meaningful crops and are not simply driven by marginal ones.
12 This continuous measure of overlap with Ramadan is in contrast to the binary measure used in the analysis of caloric
intake. The difference in the choice of right hand side variables is driven primarily by technical details about survey
administration in the NSS in which some respondents were surveyed about consumption in the previous month and
others  about  consumption  the  previous  week,  which  would  artificially  censor  the  extent  of  overlap  for  these
households. In addition, food purchases are likely to be lumpy. Hence, continuous measures of overlap are likely to
have significant noise, biasing estimates down. Thus, a discrete measure of overlap is used in the analysis of caloric
changes while a continuous measure is used here to improve precision.
13 The percent of the population that is Muslim is calculated as a population weighted average across the rural portions
of the 271 districts included in the agricultural data. Data are drawn from the 1961 Indian Census. It is possible that
Muslims are more or less likely than the average rural resident to be involved in agriculture, resulting in biased
productivity estimates. However, in the employment/unemployment portion (Schedule 10) of the National Sample
Survey, Muslims are marginally less likely to be primarily employed in agriculture than the average rural resident,
suggesting that this estimate is likely to be a lower bound.77
Although the net declines are relatively small, making it unlikely that farmers would substitute
between crops, I confirm that declines are robust to aggregation at the district-year level. These results are
presented in Table 2.3. The point estimates for aggregate declines are generally somewhat larger, but
statistically indistinguishable from, the declines estimated using the crop level data. These results suggest
that substitution between crops is unlikely to be driving these effects and biasing the crop level estimates.
Table 2.2: Effect of Overlap Between Ramadan and Cropping Cycles on Output
(1) (2) (3)
Crop(s) All All Rice only
Dependent Variable ln(q) ln(value) ln(q)
Fraction of Ramadan covered by sowing -0.017* -0.028*** -0.058***
[0.01] [0.01] [0.016]
Fraction of Ramadan covered by harvest -0.025*** -0.044*** -0.041***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.015]
Mean of dependent variable 1.517 1.837 3.91
Observations 103,104 103,088 7,741
Notes:
1. This table tests for changes in agricultural output in each district-crop-year as a function of overlap
between Ramadan and the sowing and harvesting season for that crop-district-year. Overlap is defined as
the fraction of Ramadan covered by the sowing (harvesting) season such that multiplying coefficients by
100 produces the decline associated with complete overlap between Ramadan and the season. A more
detailed description of calculation of the overlap variables is included in Appendix 2B.
2. The dependent variables are: Columns (1) and (3), log production in thousands of tons, and Column (2),
log value of production (in 1,000,000 Rs deflated to 1973). Columns (1) and (2) include all 18 crops while
Column (3) is limited to rice only. Rice is both the most commonly consumed staple grain and the most
economically important crop in India.
3. Columns (1) and (2) include district-crop, district-year, and crop-year fixed effects. Column (3) includes
fixed effects for district and year. In addition, all regressions include time varying controls for average
rainfall and temperature during the sowing and harvesting seasons, two month leads to each season, and a
two month lag following the sowing season are included.
4. The agricultural data are from the India Agriculture and Climate data set. Crop cycles are from
Donaldson (2013). Weather data are from the University of Delaware monthly rainfall and temperature
series taken for the centroid of each district.
5. Robust standard errors clustered by district-year are in brackets.
6. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.78
Table 2.3: Effect of Overlap Between Ramadan and Cropping Cycles on Output, District-Year
Aggregation
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable ln(q) ln(value)
Fraction of Ramadan covered by sowing -0.060*** -0.035**
[0.013] [0.014]
Fraction of Ramadan covered by harvest -0.039*** -0.066***
[0.014] [0.016]
Mean of dependent variable 5.807 5.96
Observations 8,636 8,636
Notes:
1. This table tests for changes in agricultural output in each district-year as a function of overlap between
Ramadan and the sowing and harvesting seasons for that district-year. Overlap at the district-year level is
defined as weighted sum of the overlap between Ramadan and each of the 18 crops where the weights are
the average fraction of production that crop accounts for in all years excluding the current year. A more
detailed description of calculation of the overlap variables for each crop is included in Appendix 2B.
2. The dependent variables are log production in thousands of tons in Column (1) and log value of
production (in 1,000,000 Rs deflated to 1973) in Column (2).
3. Regressions include district and year fixed effects as well as vector of time-varying controls for monthly
rainfall and temperature during both the current and leading agricultural year (to account for long crop
cycles).
4. The agricultural data are from the India Agriculture and Climate data set. Crop cycles are from
Donaldson (2013). Weather data are from the University of Delaware monthly rainfall and temperature
series taken for the centroid of each district.
5. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
2.4.4 Heterogeneity in Production Declines
Despite the relatively low overall fraction of Muslims in the population, there is substantial heterogeneity
in the fraction of Muslims in each district, ranging from less than 0.1 percent Muslim to over 40 percent
Muslim (Figures 2.1a and 2.1b and Table 2A.6 provide distributional information on the fraction of the
rural population that is Muslim.14 The sample is restricted to those districts included in the agricultural
dataset).
14 The religious affiliation of individuals in a district is often substantially different between urban and rural areas.
Hence, I rely on the fraction of Muslims in rural areas rather than in the overall population of a district.79
This heterogeneity provides an additional test to confirm that the decline in production is driven by
Ramadan rather than other unobserved factors. If the declines are indeed driven by Ramadan, then they
should only be observed in areas in which individuals observe the holiday, or in other words, areas in which
a reasonably large portion of the population is Muslim. Equation (2.3) tests this prediction by augmenting
the previous regression with an interaction terms between the overlap variables and variable(s) for the
fraction of Muslims in a district ( ).
(2.3) qcdt = 0 + 1Scdt+ 2Hcdt +  Scdt* +  Hcdt* + θcd + πdt + αct + λXcdt + cdt
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Figure 2.1a: Geographic Distribution of Muslims in India80
In accordance with this prediction,in below median fraction Muslim districts there is no measurable
impact of overlap on production. But, there is a strongly negative and statistically significant impact of
overlap in above median fraction Muslim districts (Table 2.4, Columns (1) and (3)). In Columns (2) and
(4), I also estimate the net decline in production as a function of the percentage of Muslims in the district
using both linear and quadratic interaction terms. These regression results are presented graphically in
Figure 2.2.
This heterogeneity provides additional evidence that the observed productivity declines are driven
by Ramadan rather than other unobserved causes. In addition, these estimates suggest that these declines
may be somewhat larger than those estimated in the non-interacted specification in Table 2.2. Taking a
population weighted sum of the average decline at each fraction Muslim and averaging over the four
measures (sowing and harvesting for both production by weight and by value), the average decline in
Figure 2.1b: Geographic Distribution of Muslims in India
Note: Includes only the
270 districts included in
the Indian Agriculture
and Climate Dataset81
productivity  per Muslim  with  full  overlap  is  39.1  percent.  Figure 2.3 plots  the  average  decline  in
productivity by the fraction of Muslims in the district.
Table 2.4: Heterogeneity in Production Declines by Fraction Muslim
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable ln(q) ln(q) ln(value) ln(value)
Fraction of Ramadan covered by sowing 0.023 0.034** 0.009 0.017
[0.029] [0.015] [0.029] [0.015]
Fraction of Ramadan covered by
sowing*Above 50th percentile Muslim
-0.078** -0.072**
[0.034] [0.036]
Fraction of Ramadan covered by
sowing*Fraction Muslim
-1.155*** -1.078***
[0.203] [0.207]
Fraction of Ramadan covered by
sowing*Fraction Muslim squared
2.65*** 2.651***
[0.429] [0.439]
Fraction of Ramadan covered by harvest 0.002 0.019 -0.012 0.002
[0.018] [0.013] [0.019] [0.013]
Fraction of Ramadan covered by
harvest*Above 50th percentage Muslim
-0.052** -0.062**
[0.025] [0.026]
Fraction of Ramadan covered by
harvest*Fraction Muslim
-1.082*** -1.121***
[0.192] [0.198]
Fraction of Ramadan covered by
harvest*Fraction Muslim squared
2.889*** 2.893***
[0.432] [0.46]
Mean of dependent variable 1.517 1.517 1.837 1.837
Observations 103,104 103,104 103,088 103,088
Notes:
1. This table tests for changes in agricultural production in each district-crop-year as a function of the
fraction of Ramadan covered by the sowing (harvesting) season and the interaction of that variable with
various indicators for the fraction of Muslims in the district. Columns (1) and (3) interact the overlap
variable with an indicator for the district having an above median fraction of Muslims. Columns (2) and (4)
interact the overlap variable with a continuous variable for the fraction Muslim as well as the square of this
variable. A more detailed description of calculation of the overlap variables is included in Appendix 2B.
2. Quantities (Columns (1) and (2)) are in log thousands of tons and values (Columns (3) and (4)) are in log
1,000,000 Rs deflated to 1973.
3. The net decline in production and in productivity per Muslim at each fraction Muslim based in the
estimates in Columns (2) and (4) are plotted in Figures 2.2 and 2.3, respectively.
4. All fraction Muslim variables are based on the fraction of Muslims in rural portions of each district in
1961. The median district is roughly 5 percent Muslim. Further distributional information is provided in
Figures 2.1a and 2.1b and Appendix 2A, Table 2A.6.
5. All regressions include district-crop, district-year, and crop-year fixed effects. In addition, time varying
controls for average rainfall and temperature during the sowing and harvesting seasons, two month leads to
each season, and a two month lag following the sowing season are included.
6. Robust standard errors clustered by district-year are in brackets.
7. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.82
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Although this decline is substantial, the magnitude is consistent with a back of the envelope
calibration of the “expected decline” given basal metabolic rates (BMR), the estimated declines in caloric
intake, and the energy requirements of farm labor (see Appendix 2B for details of this calculation). This
calibration of “available labor energy” predicts productivity declines of roughly 50 percent as a result of
the reduced in caloric intake if no energy were mobilized from fat stores. This rough calibration does not
provide evidence for or against alternative explanations for the decline. However, it does suggest the
observed magnitudes are consistent with expectations for productivity changes driven by fasting.
2.4.5 Summary of Results - Production Declines
These results demonstrate that: 1) overlap between Ramadan and sowing/harvesting has a substantial
negative impact on total agricultural production both in terms of quantity and value, 2) consistent with
Ramadan driving the declines, the impact is larger for districts with a greater percentage of Muslims, and
3) the magnitude of the productivity decline is consistent with the estimated change in caloric intake.
However, it is possible that features of the holiday other than the caloric decline associated with fasting are
also influencing production. As described previously, there are three main behavioral changes beyond
reduced caloric intake which could potentially decrease production: time spent on religious or social
activities  leading  to  reduced  labor  supply, changing  sleep  patterns  or  reduced  time  sleeping,  and
dehydration. Section 2.5 below examines each of these possibilities, and concludes that they are unlikely
to be key channels for the documented productivity declines.
2.5 Evidence Regarding the Forces Driving Production Declines
This section examines whether caloric intake or other behavioral changes are driving the observed declines
in productivity during Ramadan. The empirical tests are broken into two portions. First, an omnibus test
provides evidence which supports the role of caloric decline in reduced production during Ramadan while
simultaneously providing evidence that the declines are unlikely to be driven by the three other notable84
behavioral changes during the holiday. Following this analysis, I also individually examine whether the
declines could be driven by the impact of religious or social obligations on labor supply, by sleep changes,
or by dehydration via both relevant literature and additional direct empirical tests.15
2.5.1 Omnibus Test - Persistence of Production Declines Following Ramadan
A distinctive feature of low caloric intake is that recovery from this state takes time, often requiring weeks
or even months to fully regain physical performance in extreme cases of deprivation (e.g.,Keys et al. 1950).
This lag between increased caloric intake and improved physical performance suggests that the reduced
caloric intake during the holiday would be expected to have an impact beyond Ramadan itself.
In contrast, recovery from sleep deficits and dehydration is rapid. As discussed in greater detail
below, sleep deficits primarily influence cognitive rather than physical function.16 However, a number of
researchers have documented that a single night of greater than eight hours of sleep reverses cognitive
deficits from extended (24-48 hours) periods of total sleep deprivation (Drummond et al. 2006; Kendall et
al. 2006; Brendel et al. 1990). Similarly, Belenky et al. (2003) cannot distinguish measures of attention and
reaction time between groups which had either five, seven, or nine hours of sleep per night for one week
after a three day recovery period with eight hours of sleep per night. Dinges et al. (1997) also demonstrate
that two nights of ten hours of sleep is sufficient to overcome deficits accumulated over seven nights with
five or fewer hours of sleep. Similarly, for recovery from dehydration, Sawka et al. (2007) survey a variety
of sources and note that normal body water and performance can typically be restored within 8 to 24 hours
even after fairly extensive dehydration.
15 One additional concern beyond these behavioral changes is that the timing of caloric intake throughout the day may
also influence productivity. For clear reasons, it is not possible to disentangle the effect of timing of intake and of
levels of intake in this analysis. However, the RCT presented in Chapter 1 does not have this concern and provides
similar results. In addition, given the fixed costs of preparing food, many individuals who consume very few calories
will do so by consuming fewer meals, generating a similar temporal pattern of consumption to that observed during
Ramadan.
16 To the best of my knowledge, there are no studies examining physical recovery after extended sleep deprivation.
This is likely driven by the fact that except in cases of fairly extreme sleep deprivation, studies do not often find
physical declines associated with sleep deprivation. Hence, there is no recovery period to measure.85
These rapid recovery periods from sleep deprivation and dehydration suggest that if reduced
production during Ramadan were due to sleep deprivation, dehydration, or changes in labor supply related
to religious obligations that these deficits should disappear within a few days after the conclusion of the
holiday. In contrast, if the reduced production is the result of lower caloric intake during the month, there
should continue to be residual effects which reduce production following the holiday. Hence, examining
the impact of overlap between the sowing and harvesting seasons and the weeks following Eid (a short
holiday immediately following Ramadan) serves as a useful test to distinguish between nutritional deficits
and other behavioral changes during the holiday as likely causes of the reduced production.
This test is conducted using an empirical approach similar to the previous analyses, in which the
fraction of Ramadan covered by the sowing and harvesting seasons is replaced with the fraction of the
weeks following the holiday covered by the sowing and harvesting seasons. However, because the Eid
holiday could potentially confound the results and there is a short recovery period for dehydration and sleep
deprivation,  I  calculate  overlap  with  the  first  and  second  week  following  Eid  rather  than  following
Ramadan.17 The estimating equation, Equation (2.4), is displayed below. denotes the overlap between
season X (where X = {S for sowing, H for harvesting}) and week N (where N = {1,2}). All other variables
are as defined previously.
(2.4) qcdt = 0 + XN + θcd + πdt + αct + λXcdt + cdt
Although the standard errors are larger, the results of overlap for the first week post-Eid are quite
similar to the results during the holiday itself for both sowing and harvest (Table 2.5). This effect is
relatively robust to longer (4 day) specifications for Eid (Columns (2) and (4)). While the point estimates
remain similar for the second week post-Eid for sowing, the effects begin to attenuate by the second week
following Eid for harvest, as might be expected given the relatively short period of deprivation. In short,
17 The holiday is lunar so the exact day of Eid will depend on the sighting of the crescent moon, which varies across
locations. I build in a one day buffer to account for the uncertainty in sighting the moon. In addition, while the official
holiday is only one day, some individuals continue to celebrate for up to three days. Hence, to span the possible
durations of the holiday, I examine periods following both a two-day and a four-day lag for the Eid holiday.86
these results are consistent with recovery from a short period of reduced caloric intake but inconsistent with
dehydration, sleep deficits, or time spent on religious activities driving the reduced production.
Table 2.5: Persistence of Declines in Output Following Ramadan (and Eid)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Eid length Short (2 day) Eid Long (4 day) Eid Short (2 day) Eid Long (4 day) Eid
Dependent Variable ln(q) ln(q) ln(v) ln(v)
Fraction 1st week post Eid
covered by sowing
-0.016 -0.014 -0.022 -0.023
[0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017]
Fraction 2nd week post Eid
covered by sowing
-0.016 -0.018 -0.026 -0.025
[0.017] [0.017] [0.018] [0.017]
Fraction 1st week post Eid
covered by harvest
-0.023* -0.004 -0.043*** -0.027**
[0.014] [0.013] [0.014] [0.014]
Fraction 2nd week post Eid
covered by harvest
0.011 -0.006 0.024* 0.011
[0.014] [0.013] [0.014] [0.013]
Mean of dependent variable 1.517 1.517 1.837 1.837
Observations 103,104 103,104 103,088 103,088
Notes:
1. This table provides a test of whether declines in production during Ramadan are due to low caloric intake,
which causes longer lasting decreases in productivity, or other potential confounds including dehydration or
sleep deprivation, from which recovery is rapid, or time spent on religious activities during the holiday. To
accomplish this, this table examines changes in agricultural production (in log thousands of tons) in each
district-crop-year as a function of the overlap between the first and second week following Eid (the holiday
following Ramadan) and the sowing (harvesting) season for that crop-district-year.
2. Eid is defined as a two day period in Columns (1) and (3) a four day period in Columns (2) and (4). These
formulations are used because the holiday is lunar so the exact day of Eid will depend on the sighting of the
crescent moon, which varies across locations. I build in a one day buffer to account for the uncertainty in
sighting the moon. In addition, while the official holiday is only one day, some individuals continue to
celebrate for up to three days. Hence, to span the possible durations of the holiday, I examine periods
following both a two day and a four day lag for the Eid holiday.
3. All regressions include district-crop, district-year, and crop-year fixed effects. In addition, time varying
controls for average rainfall and temperature during the sowing and harvesting seasons, two month leads to
each season, and a two month lag following the sowing season are included.
4. Robust standard errors clustered by district-year are in brackets.
5. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
2.5.2 Time Spent on Religious and Social Activities
Literature - Time Spent on Religious and Social Activities
Time spent on religious and social activities during the Ramadan holiday is likely to vary substantially
across both individuals and locations, and little information specific to India is available given the relatively87
low concentration of Muslims in the country. However, the literature does provide general information
about the types of behavior changes that Muslim individuals are likely to engage in during the holiday. The
primary religious behavioral changes expected during Ramadan are an increase the number of prayers
offered, abstinence from smoking, sexual relations, and swearing during the day, and an increase in charity.
While a general guideline to increase prayers and reading and recitation of the Koran exists, no specific
rules are provided regarding the amount or timing of the prayer that should be completed beyond the
standard prayers observed throughout the year five times daily. Similarly, there are no specific guidelines
for the amount of charity to be provided during this time.
In addition to these changes in religious practice, Muslims often spend time in social gatherings in
the evenings during Ramadan. The most common set of activities following sunset is to break the fast with
a small snack, to complete the fourth set of daily prayers, and then to gather with friends or family for a
large evening meal (Blackwell 2009; Ahmad et al. 2012). So, although there is an increase in religious and
social activity during this time, much of the increase occurs in the evenings when individuals would not
typically be working. In addition, because the prescribed changes in behavior are general and flexible, these
behavior changes are less likely to interfere with work requirements than observance of many other
holidays. Finally, although some heavily Muslim counties see shifts in working hours during Ramadan, the
low fraction of Muslims in India make these types of labor market changes unlikely to occur in this context.
Empirical Evidence - No Change in Labor Supply or Earnings During Ramadan
I also examine labor supply changes among Muslims in India during Ramadan directly using two sources
of data; the second-generation ICRISAT village level studies survey and the National Sample Survey
(NSS).
Data
ICRISAT is a panel dataset containing monthly measures of employment and earnings. The sample is drawn
from six villages chosen to be representative of the major agro-climatic zones in the semi-arid tropics of88
India.18 Households were sampled across four categories of landholdings (landless, small farmers, medium
farmers, and large farmers).
In addition to the consumer expenditure survey described previously, the National Sample Survey
Organization fields a large, nationally representative, repeated cross-sectional survey about employment.
The employment/unemployment rounds (Schedule 10) provide information on respondents’ labor supply
and wages during the seven days preceding the interview as well as their religious affiliation.19 Households
are sampled on a rolling basis such that the sample is temporally spaced within each district.
Empirical Strategy and Results
In the ICRISAT data, labor supply (or earnings) of individual i, in survey round s, and year-month t are
regressed on the number of days of overlap between survey period and Ramadan (Rist), an interaction
between that variable and an indicator for whether the individual is Muslim (Mi), a variable for the number
of days between interviews (Dist), and fixed effects for individuals (θi) and the year-month in which the
survey occurred (Equation 2.5).20 “Labor days” is defined as the number of days of labor, including both
paid and unpaid labor but excluding domestic work, in the past month. The wages variable is calculated as
the sum of cash and in-kind wages during the month. The number of hours worked is only reported for paid
labor. If the participant reports more than one paid job during the survey period, the average hours worked
per day is calculated as a weighted average across all jobs reported.
(2.5) list = 0 + 1Rist+ 2Rist*Mi + 3Dist + θi + t + ist
18 The villages are located in Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra. These states are major agricultural producers, and are
included in the agricultural production data used in the primary analysis presented above.
19 Although it would be ideal to utilize data overlapping the time period covered by the agricultural production data,
only rounds 60 (conducted in 2004) onward contain survey dates, permitting calculation of overlap between the survey
period and Ramadan. Hence, I rely on rounds 60, 61, 62, 64, and 66.
20 In order to maximize the sample size given the smaller number of individuals surveyed in the ICRISAT data, the
number of days of overlap is used rather than restricting the sample to complete or no overlap and using a binary
indicator of overlap, as was done in the analysis of changes in caloric intake.89
A similar specification is used in the NSS data. However, I adjust for the fact that the data consists
of multiple cross sections rather than a panel. As can be seen in Equation (2.6), labor supply (or earnings)
of individual I, in district d, at time t (lidt), is regressed on the days of overlap between the survey period
and Ramadan (Ridt), whether the individual is Muslim (Mi), the interaction of these two variables, district-
year fixed effects (θdt), and month fixed effects (m). “Labor days” is the combination of days engaged in
labor for wages and own-labor (e.g. working on one’s own farm) excluding domestic work. Earnings are
the total (cash plus in-kind) earnings received during the survey period. Earnings are considered in both
levels and logs to account for unemployment and unpaid labor.
(2.6) lidt = 0 + 1Ridt+ 2Mi +3Ridt*Mi + θdt + m + idt
Tables 2.6a and 2.6b provides the results of these regressions. In both datasets, Muslims’ labor
supply and earnings during the holiday are fairly precisely estimated (a change in labor supply of less than
one percent per day of overlap can be detected). Earnings remain unchanged for Muslims during Ramadan.
However, interestingly, labor supply appears to either remain constant or increase slightly. The increased
labor supply could be caused by an attempt to compensate for reduced productivity and/or to accrue funds
for charity, which Muslims are expected to provide during Ramadan.21
These results suggest that changes in labor supply driven by religious or social obligations are
unlikely to cause the observed declines in production when Ramadan overlaps with important parts of the
agricultural cycle and may actually work against such declines.22
21 Although employers are likely to be less willing to hire a less productive employee, many workers do have long-
term relationships with employees which may mitigate this effect. Further, as is discussed in greater detail below,
many individuals appear to be unaware of the relationship between caloric intake and productivity.
22As an additional robustness check, I estimate the same equations in samples limited to the high labor demand seasons
and in alternative samples (e.g. rural casual laborers) (See Appendix 2A, Tables 2A.7a and 2A.7b). The smaller sample
sizes result in less precise estimates; however, the patterns are very similar and neither wages nor labor supply shows
any significant change for Muslims during Ramadan.90
Table 2.6a: Labor Supply and Earnings as a Test of Religious Obligations Driving Production
Declines
(1) (2) (3)
Sample ICRISAT Agricultural Laborers
Dependent variable Labor days Average work
hours
ln(Total
earnings)
Days overlap between survey period and Ramadan -0.039 -0.002 -0.004***
[0.035] [0.001] [0.001]
Muslim*Days overlap between survey period and
Ramadan
0.155* -0.003 0.002
[0.089] [0.011] [0.006]
Mean of dependent variable 21.752 21.874 17.921
Number of individuals in sample 1,146 910 914
Observations 31,432 19,417 19,287
R-squared 0.699 0.775 0.659
Notes:
1. This table provides the first test of whether time spent on religious or social activities causes reduced
production during Ramadan by reducing the labor supply of Muslim individuals.
2. Data is drawn from the second generation ICRISAT village level studies survey. The sample includes
only individuals who indicate that agricultural work is their primary occupation.
3. ICRISAT surveys participants approximately once per month and elicits information on labor supply,
hours, and wages of the respondent during the month preceding the survey date. The number of days of
overlap between Ramadan and the survey period is calculated as the number of days of Ramadan falling
within the 30 days preceding the survey date. Labor supply is defined as the number of days of labor
including both paid and unpaid labor but excluding domestic work in the past month. Wages are calculated
as the sum of cash and in-kind wages during the month. Average hours worked is only reported for paid
labor. If the participant reports more than one paid job, average hours worked is calculated as a weighted
average across jobs. Religion is captured via the caste variable, which contains a category for Muslim
individuals, because it is not directly reported.
4. Regressions include individual fixed effects, a control for the number of days between surveys, and year-
month of interview fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by individual are in brackets.
5. Results are similar in samples restricted to high labor demand periods, defined as responses for which
the interview period had at least 15 days of overlap with a "high labor demand" period defined as the
sowing or harvesting seasons for the crop with the greatest acreage by state, and for the full (including non-
agricultural worker) sample. Results of these regressions are included in Appendix 2A, Table 2A.7a.
6. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.91
Table 2.6b: Labor Supply and Earnings as a Test of Religious Obligations Driving Production
Declines
(1) (2) (3)
Sample NSS Agricultural Laborers
Dependent variable Labor days Total
Earnings
ln(Total
earnings)
Days overlap between survey period and Ramadan -0.004 -0.689 0.039***
[0.047] [2.798] [0.015]
Muslim -0.025 -1.775 0.013
[0.051] [4.551] [0.025]
Muslim*Days overlap between survey period and
Ramadan
0.077*** -1.775 0.01
[0.024] [1.730] [0.017]
Mean of dependent variable 5.852 103.391 5.521
Observations 121,400 121,408 35,721
R-squared 0.127 0.062 0.314
Notes:
1. This table provides the second test of whether time spent on religious or social activities causes reduced
production during Ramadan by reducing the labor supply of Muslim individuals. Given the somewhat
coarse nature of the labor supply variable in the NSS, the table also examines wages.
2. The regressions utilize data from the Indian National Sample Survey (NSS), Schedule 10 (Employment),
rounds 60, 61, 62, 64, and 66. These rounds are selected because they contain survey dates while earlier
rounds do not. The sample includes individuals for whom agricultural work is their primary or secondary
occupation.
3. The NSS Schedule 10 provides data on labor supply (to the half day) and wages of the respondent during
the week preceding the survey date. Labor supply is calculated as the number of days of labor excluding
domestic work in the past week.
4. Regressions include district-year fixed effects and month fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered
by district-year are in brackets.
5. Results are similar in samples restricting the survey periods to high labor demand periods, defined by the
sowing or harvesting seasons for the crop with the greatest acreage by state. Results are also similar in
samples of rural casual laborers. See Appendix 2A, Table 2A.7b for these additional results.
6. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.92
2.5.3 Sleep
Literature -The Impact of Sleep on Cognitive and Physical Function
A limited literature on the impact of Ramadan on sleep habits does exist. However, it focuses on countries
such as Saudi Arabia which are nearly exclusively Muslim (Bahamman 2006 provides a review). Because
the holiday is celebrated so widely in these countries, the habits of the country as a whole often shift during
the month of Ramadan. For example, stores often both open and close later than usual. However, because
the median district in this study is only seven percent Muslim, these equilibrium shifts are unlikely to occur
in India. In addition, within this literature, changes in sleep patterns appear to vary widely across countries
(Bahamman 2006). Hence, the direct literature on changes in sleep patterns during Ramadan is unlikely to
aid in understanding the likely impact of possible changes in sleep patterns on agricultural production in
India.  Instead,  I  focus  on  the  more  extensive  and  relevant  literature  surrounding  the  physiological
relationship between chronic partial sleep deprivation, defined as 2 to 7 hours of sleep per night for periods
of days to months, and physical and cognitive performance to understand the likely effect of changes in
sleep patterns during the holiday.23
The effects of sleep deprivation on performance appear to be heavily cognitive and occur primarily
when sleep drops below six to seven hours per night (Goel et al. 2009; Durmer and Dinges 2005). When
sleep drops below this level, the largest and most consistent effects of sleep deprivation center on changes
in mood with increased sleepiness and negative affect (Alhola and Polo-Kantola 2007; Durmer and Dinges
2005). In addition, chronic sleep deprivation of less than 6 hours per night is likely to lead to reduced
vigilance, poorer memory consolidation, and slowed reaction time and learning (Blagrove et al. 1995;
Rogers et al. 2003; Ferrara and De Gennaro 2001; Van Dongen et al. 2003). These effects on mood and
cognitive function typically tend to have a relatively linear relationship with the cumulative deprivation in
23 The majority of the sleep deprivation literature focuses on total sleep deprivation (i.e. no sleep at all for at least 24
to 72 hours). However, I focus more heavily on the subset of the literature on “partial sleep deprivation” because this
pattern of sleep deprivation is more likely to reflect changes that Muslims experience during Ramadan. Results from
both literatures show similar patterns, with more extreme outcomes under total sleep deprivation.93
the early stages and then often level off over a longer time horizon (multiple weeks) as individuals
acclimatize to the new regimen (Ferrara and De Gennaro 2001).
Despite cognitive declines associated with less than six hours of sleep per night, reduced sleep has
little if any impact on physical performance until the deprivation becomes relativelyextreme (e.g. Sinnerton
and Reilly 1992; Guezennec et al. 1994). As VanHelder and Radomski note, “Sleep deprivation of 30 to 72
hours does not affect cardiovascular and respiratory response to exercise of varying intensity, or the aerobic
and anaerobic performance capability of individuals” (1989). Some studies do show declines in time to
exhaustion after extended periods of sleep deprivation (Reilly and Piercy 1994; VanHelder and Radomski
1989; Vardar et al. 2007). However, results in this domain are mixed and the conditions of deprivation
much greater than those likely to be experienced during Ramadan.
In short, the literature relating sleep to cognitive and physical outcomes suggests that changes in
sleep patterns during Ramadan are unlikely to be a significant driver of changes in production in this
context. Physical capabilities are quite resistant to decreased sleep, even when the physical requirements
are substantial as in military combat training. And while extended sleep deprivation is clearly associated
with declines in specific areas of cognitive function, the sleep deprivation in these studies tends to be both
more extreme than is likely to be experienced during Ramadan and to be limited to specific domains of
cognitive function (e.g. memory, reaction time) that are unlikely to be strongly related to agricultural
production.
Empirical Evidence – No Change in Hours Worked
In addition to the evidence from the weeks following Eid suggesting that sleep deprivation does not drive
productivity declines during Ramadan, it is possible to examine whether changes to sleep patterns crowd
out labor supply through naps or returning to sleep after rising early in the morning for prayers. This test is
conducted with the ICRISAT data described previously. Respondents who work in paid agricultural labor
report the number of hours worked per day for each job. If the participant reports more than one paid job,94
average hours worked per day is calculated as a weighted average across jobs. As shown in Table 2.6a,
average hours worked by Muslims during Ramadan do not change and the lack of change is precisely
estimated. While this finding does not rule out changes in the quality of work, it does suggest that naps or
other changes to sleep patterns which could influence labor supply on the intensive margin are unlikely to
be a significant factor in production declines.
2.5.4 Dehydration
Literature - The Impact of Dehydration on Cognitive and Physical Function
Dehydration typically begins to negatively impact measures of aerobic performance once two percent of
body weight has been lost.24 These declines become more consistent around three to four percent loss in
body weight; however, even at these levels results are mixed (Sawka et al. 2007; Casa et al. 2005). There
is generally no detectable impact of dehydration on strength and anaerobic performance until at least five
percent of body weight is lost from water loss (Sawka et al. 2007; Casa 1999a; Greiwe et al. 1998). There
is also more limited evidence that dehydration beyond two percent of body weight may cause declines in
cognitive function in areas such as short term memory consolidation (Grandjean and Grandjean 2007).
Given these findings, it is necessary to estimate the expected body weight losses due to dehydration
for fasting farmers in India to determine whether dehydration is likely to impact agricultural production
during Ramadan. While, to the best of my knowledge, no direct evidence on body water loss rates among
farmers in India exists, it is possible to benchmark expected losses relative to sports activities in which
sweat rates have been measured based on caloric requirements and environmental factors. This calibration,
outlined in Appendix 2B, finds that expected water losses by the end of the day are around the two percent
threshold at which aerobic effects become detectable. Given that these losses are cumulative throughout
24 The technical definitions of aerobic and anaerobic exercise rely on the types of muscular contractions and the energy
generating process used. But, a simple delineation based on whether the activity requires breathing hard (i.e. jogging
and cycling at a moderate pace are aerobic exercises) or not (e.g. weight lifting and sprinting very short distances are
anaerobic exercises) serves as a useful heuristic for differentiating between the types of exercise.95
the day, even if this threshold is reached by the end of the day, the majority of the labor supply is likely to
be unaffected and the overall impact is likely to be correspondingly small.
Empirical Evidence – No Decrease in Production with Higher Perspiration Rates
I also examine the impact of dehydration empirically via an additional test utilizing data on evaporative
potential (PET), a measure of the propensity of water to evaporate into the atmosphere.25 If dehydration
were a significant factor in production, then as evaporative potential increased, body water loss would also
increase,  and  production  would  decline.  However,  evaporative  potential  is  also  likely  to  influence
agricultural production directly. Hence, this test augments the previous specification not only with a main
effect for the average PET over the sowing and harvesting seasons, but also with interactions between PET
and overlap between the seasons and Ramadan (Equation 2.7).
(2.7) qcdt = 0 + 1Scdt+ 2 + 3Scdt* + 4Hcdt+ 5 + 6Hcdt* + θcd + πdt + αct
+ λXcdt + cdt
The results of these regressions provide further evidence that dehydration is not driving production
declines (Table 2.7). In contrast to what would be expected if dehydration were reducing output, the
interaction between mean evaporative potential and sowing (harvesting) overlap are positive. Further, the
addition of these terms does not eliminate the negative effect of overlap between sowing/harvesting and
Ramadan observed in the earlier regressions as would be expected if dehydration were the key factor in
production declines. Rather, these terms remain negative and significant.
25 The measure used is technically referred to as “Potential evapotranspiration” (PET). PET reflects the potential for
evaporation from the surface into the atmosphere and is calculated based on three measures of temperature (min, max,
mean), vapor pressure, and cloud cover. The calculation to generate the PET from these variables is done by the British
Atmospheric Data Center, the source of the data, following a method recommended by the FAO. More information
about this measure is available at the BADC website (http://badc.nerc.ac.uk). Because PET data were not available
for all districts, missing values were imputed when possible. The imputation procedure is described in Appendix 2B.96
Table 2.7: Test of Dehydration Driving Production Declines
(1) (2)
Dependent variable ln(q) ln(v)
Fraction of Ramadan covered by sowing -0.257*** -0.216**
[0.085] [0.087]
Average evaporative potential during sowing 0.001 0.003
[0.016] [0.017]
Fraction of Ramadan covered by sowing*Average evaporative potential
during sowing
0.016*** 0.013**
[0.006] [0.006]
Fraction of Ramadan covered by harvest -0.242*** -0.203***
[0.059] [0.061]
Average evaporative potential during harvest -0.006 0.002
[0.013] [0.013]
Fraction of Ramadan covered by harvest*Average evaporative potential
during harvest
0.012*** 0.009**
[0.004] [0.004]
Mean of dependent variable 1.474 1.786
Observations 58,443 58,443
Notes:
1. This table provides a test of whether declines in production during Ramadan are due dehydration. To
accomplish this, this table examines changes in agricultural production (in log thousands of tons) in each
district-crop-year as a function of the fraction of Ramadan covered by the sowing (harvesting) season for
that crop-district-year fully interacted with a measure of weather features which impact dehydration
(evaporative potential).
2. Evaporative potential (technically referred to as "Potential evapotranspiration" or PET) is a measure of
the propensity of water to evaporate into the atmosphere. It is calculated based on three measures of
temperature (min, max, mean), vapor pressure, and cloud cover following a method recommended by the
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations (UN). Because PET measures are not
available for all districts in all years, PET is imputed for missing observations in states with at least one
observation. The imputation procedure is described in Appendix 2B. If dehydration plays an important role
in production declines the interaction between mean evaporative potential and overlap is expected to be
significantly negative because greater evaporation should increase dehydration and decrease production.
3. The regression includes district-crop, district-year, and crop-year fixed effects. In addition, time varying
controls for average rainfall and temperature during the sowing and harvesting seasons, two month leads to
each season, and a two month lag following the sowing season are included.
4.  Robust standard errors clustered by district-year are in brackets.
5. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.97
2.6 Returns to Caloric Intake in Agricultural Production
As in the randomized trial presented in Chapter 1, this analysis also suggests that changes in caloric intake
cause substantial  and widespread  changes  in  productivity.  Hence,  I  next  provide the  corresponding
calculations of the return on investment for higher caloric intake in agricultural production.
Given the estimated changes in caloric consumption in the NSS and in agricultural production for
Muslims during Ramadan, it is possible to calculate the estimated returns on investment for caloric intake
in the analysis of Ramadan fasting as well. Again, the exact returns depend on a variety of assumptions
regarding the foods consumed and the consistency of the returns to higher caloric intake. Yet, all of the
estimated returns are positive and even with relatively conservative assumptions, the one month return on
investment to greater caloric intake appears likely to be over 200 percent. Details of these calculations are
provided in Table 2.8.  However, one sample calculation based on data from the Indian Agriculture and
Climate data used in the analysis is described below.
One kilo of rice contains approximately 3300 calories (Gopalan et al. 1989; NSS calorie conversion
database). The average cost of a kilo of rice in 1971 (the median year in the analysis) was Rs. 1.28 per kilo.
Hence, an increase of 700 calories (Table 2.1, Column (2)) would require 210g of rice at a total cost of Rs.
0.27 per day. The average daily agricultural wage in 1971 was Rs. 4.45. Using the estimates of a 20 percent
change in productivity per fasting individual during harvest (Table 2.2, Column (1), averaged over sowing
and harvesting and scaled by 0.10, the overall fraction of Muslims in the districts in the analysis), the
associated increase in earnings would be Rs. 0.89 per day, implying a return over 228 percent in a single
month. This high ROI is relatively robust to purchasing foods which are much more expensive per calorie
or to high consumption throughout the year even if some periods have much lower returns to caloric intake.98
Table 2.8: Return on Investment to Caloric Intake in Agricultural Production
Year Grain Cost for 700
calories
Daily wage Productivity
gain
One Month
ROI
Minimum
ROI
1956 bajra 0.18 4.09 0.2 348 47
1971 bajra 0.17 4.45 0.2 418 70
1986 bajra 0.14 6.03 0.2 761 183
1956 bajra 0.18 4.09 0.4 797 195
1971 bajra 0.17 4.45 0.4 936 241
1986 bajra 0.14 6.03 0.4 1623 466
1956 rice 0.25 4.09 0.2 232 9
1971 rice 0.27 4.45 0.2 228 8
1986 rice 0.18 6.03 0.2 577 123
1956 rice 0.25 4.09 0.4 565 119
1971 rice 0.27 4.45 0.4 556 116
1986 rice 0.18 6.03 0.4 1254 345
Notes:
1) This table calculates the expected return on investment to caloric intake based on the triple-
difference estimates of changes in agricultural output.
2) Prices are obtained from the Indian Agricultural and Climate data and are deflated to 1973
Rupees.
3) Estimates of the caloric content of rice and bajra range from 3000 to 3600 calories per kilo
depending on the specific variety of the grain and the source used (Gopalan et al 1989; NSS calorie
conversion database). An average value of 3300 calories per kilo of grain is used in all
calculations.
4) Rice is the commonly consumed grain and also the most expensive. Bajra (pearl millet) is a
lower priced grain with similar nutritive properties commonly consumed by lower income
individuals.
5) The lower productivity gain, 20 percent, is the expected change in productivity per Muslim
individual based on overall changes in log output averaged across the point estimates for sowing
and harvesting seasons in Table 2.2. The upper bound productivity gain is based on the
specification examining heterogeneity in Table 2.4. Calculations for these changes in productivity
are described in the text of the paper.
6) The Minimum ROI is calculated assuming that the individual consumes an additional 700
calories of grain per day throughout the year, but only experiences gains in productivity during the
sowing and harvesting seasons. Sowing and harvesting seasons typically last approximately two
months each, resulting in a total of 120 days. The "One Month ROI" is calculated assuming that the
individual consumes an additional 700 calories per day and is more productive only during the
sowing and harvesting seasons (or correspondingly, that he consumes more and earns more
throughout the year). No discounting is used given the relatively short time horizons.99
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter examines the impact of low caloric intake on agricultural production, a sector which employs
over half of the labor force of India. Variation in caloric intake is generated via Ramadan, a month-long
Muslim holiday during which individuals in rural agricultural household decrease their caloric intake by
roughly  700  calories  per  day.  Using  a differences-in-differences  approach, I  find declines  in  total
agricultural production between 2 and 4 percent, both in weight and in value, when Ramadan and labor
intensive  parts  of  the  agricultural  cycle  fully  coincide. The  extent  of  the  decline  shows  significant
heterogeneity, with larger declines in areas with a higher fraction of Muslims in the population.
Because the proportion of Muslims in the population in India is relatively low overall, these
declines  in  production  imply  substantially  larger  declines  in  productivity  per  Muslim  individual.
Specifically, because Muslims account for less than 10 percent of the population of India, these estimates
suggest a decline in productivity of approximately 20 to 40 percent per fasting individual.26
Although it is also possible that factors other than changes in caloric intake influence production
during Ramadan, the evidence from the literature as well as direct empirical tests suggests that three of the
leading potential causes of decline -- reduced labor supply due to religious or social obligations, sleep
deprivation, and dehydration -- do not appear to play a significant role in productivity in this context. In
addition, the omnibus test examining the persistence of declines is consistent with the effect being driven
by declines in caloric intake rather than these other potential causes.
It is of note that the magnitude of the productivity declines in agriculture are larger than those
observed in the randomized trial presented in Chapter 1. Given that the RCT increases caloric intake, while
fasting during Ramadan decreases caloric intake, this may be a function of decreasing marginal returns to
caloric intake over this range of intake.27 However, given the differences in the production functions in
26 These calculations assume that all Muslims in the labor force observe the holiday. If not all individuals observe the
holiday, these estimates would be a lower bound.
27 A production function with decreasing marginal returns over this range of caloric intake is consistent with estimates
by Strauss (1986).100
these sectors, it is difficult to determine whether or how much of the difference in productivity is accounted
for by the varied levels of caloric intake.
Despite the varied magnitudes of the impact of increased caloric consumption between these two
studies, in both studies higher caloric consumption results in greater economic production. The consistency
of these results across studies designed to be complementary suggests that the observed relationship is
causal, economically meaningful, and widespread and that low levels of adult nutrition may play an
important role in productivity and economic development.101
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Table 2A.1: Changes in Caloric Intake During Ramadan – Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent
variable
Daily Per Capita Calorie Availability
Topcoding Method No
topcoding
Above
p99 to
mean
Above
p99 to
p99
Above p99
to mean,
conditional
on positive
consumption
Above p99
to p99,
conditional
on positive
consumption
Winsorized
at p1 and
p99
Muslim -107.5*** -96.84*** -89.49*** -106.7*** -92.46*** -82.57***
[41.54] [28.13] [27.49] [28.88] [28.86] [27.34]
Full survey period
overlaps Ramadan
455.1* 279.8 395.8 405.6 427.2 432.07*
[259.1] [274.7] [274.7] [303.0] [271.5] [256.77]
Muslim*Full survey
period overlaps
Ramandan
-612.6 -601.3* -620.2* -880.2** -725.5** -545.35
[384.8] [340.3] [336.9] [400.6] [368.9] [356.5]
Mean of dependent
variable
2263.49 2026.52 2138.46 2148.34 2200.51 2203.35
Observations 36,618 36,618 36,618 36,618 36,618 36,618
R-squared 0.095 0.188 0.213 0.174 0.211 0.236
Notes:
1. This table tests for changes in caloric consumption during Ramadan in Muslim households. The
dependent variables are per capita daily caloric intake with six different methods of topcoding. All
topcoding is done by food item before aggregating across the food items. Column (1) makes no
adjustments to reported values. Column (2) reassigns values above the 99th percentile to the mean.
Column (3) reassigns values above the 99th percentile to the 99th percentile. Column (4) reassigns values
above the 99th percentile, conditional on having positive consumption of the food item, to the mean
consumption conditional on having positive consumption. Column (5) is the same as Column (4) except
the reassignment is to the 99th percentile, conditional on positive consumption. Column (6) is winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
2. The sample is drawn from the Indian National Sample Survey, Schedule 1 (consumption), rounds 60,
62, and 64 and is limited to households with survey periods with no overlap or full (29 day) overlap
between the survey period and Ramadan. These rounds are included because they contain survey dates
while earlier rounds do not.
3. All regressions include district-year fixed effects and month of interview fixed effects. In addition,
indicator variables for other major religions and their interaction terms with overlap between the survey
period and Ramadan as well as overlap between the survey period and Eid and the interaction between
this variable and the religion indicators are included in the regressions but omitted from the table for
simplicity.
4. NSS sampling weights are used and are reweighted to weight each round of the survey equally.
5. Robust standard errors clustered by district-year are in brackets.
6. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.107
Table 2A.2: Summary Statistics for Crops in the Agricultural Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Crop Name Mean
production
by district
Mean
value by
district
Percent of
districts with
positive
production
Sowing
start, SD
Sowing
end, SD
Harvest
start, SD
Harvest
end, SD
Bajra (pearl millet) 17.29 15.37 79.70 24.26 35.34 28.47 30.76
Barley 9.02 8.00 69.74 15.27 19.26 18.83 17.57
Cotton 3.74 9.38 73.06 41.95 45.38 57.05 59.64
Groundnut (peanut) 20.06 36.86 92.99 32.54 38.20 31.64 35.49
Gram (lentils, chickpeas) 18.19 23.62 99.26 13.73 18.93 22.44 21.54
Jowar (sorghum) 35.15 32.05 87.45 50.28 57.05 52.80 54.62
Jute 2.93 5.06 32.47 60.58 49.09 50.49 43.00
Maize 17.80 15.04 98.52 31.46 33.32 34.96 33.70
Other pulses 8.40 12.40 78.97 41.56 48.28 45.57 53.12
Potato 20.14 11.33 85.98 62.43 62.22 58.49 58.56
Ragi (finger millet) 0.88 0.78 11.07 41.87 50.75 40.67 56.26
Rice 134.61 162.93 97.79 99.86 88.17 81.54 82.70
Rapeseed and Mustard (oils) 2.72 6.04 87.08 17.80 19.73 24.71 23.47
Sesamum (sesame) 1.21 3.33 93.73 50.95 54.10 46.92 52.71
Sugar 46.87 62.98 98.52 88.36 102.80 65.04 67.13
Tobacco 1.31 6.16 90.77 60.04 76.01 60.00 69.12
Tur (pigeon pea) 8.68 12.75 89.30 27.29 25.45 48.01 39.47
Wheat 82.94 84.93 95.94 10.57 16.05 19.95 21.34
Average 24.00 28.28 81.24 42.82 46.67 43.75 45.57
Notes:
1) Production, Column (1), is in metric tons. Value, Column (2), is in 1,000,000 Rs deflated to 1973.
2) Columns (4) thru (7) provide the standard deviation of sowing and harvesting start and end dates to
demonstrate the variation in the timing of cropping seasons.
Table 2A.3: Within District Variation in Cropping Cycles
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sowing start Sowing end Harvest start Harvest end
Average Standard Deviation 74 73 74 75
Average Range 261 258 233 245
Notes:
1. This table displays measures of the variation of timing of cropping cycles for different crops within a district.
2. The "Average Standard Deviation" is calculated as the standard deviation of the element of the cropping cycle
listed at the top of the column within each district averaged across all districts. Similarly, the "Average Range" is
the range in the timing of that element of the cropping cycle within a district, averaged across districts.
3. Roughly 7 percent of crop-district combinations have more than one cropping cycle per year. All cycles are
included in these figures (as well as all analyses).108
Table 2A.4: Distribution of Fraction of Ramadan Covered by Sowing and Harvesting Seasons
Percentile Fraction of Ramadan covered by Sowing Fraction of Ramadan covered by Harvest
50 0 0
75 0 0.03
90 0.86 0.93
95 1 1
99 1 1
mean 0.17 0.17
N 103,104 103,104
Notes:
1) This table provides distributional information for the primary independent variable of interest; the
fraction of Ramadan covered by the labor intensive portions of the cropping season, sowing and
harvesting.
2) The sample utilized for this table matches that of the primary specification listed in Table 2.2,
Column (1).109
Table 2A.5: Effect of Overlap Between Ramadan and Cropping Cycles (As a Fraction of the Season)
on Output
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable ln(q) ln(value) ln(q) ln(value)
Fraction of sowing covered by Ramadan 0.000 -0.024 0.061*** 0.034
[0.019] [0.02] [0.023] [0.024]
Fraction of sowing covered by
Ramadan*Above median fraction Muslim
-0.13*** -0.125***
[0.029] [0.03]
Fraction of harvest covered by Ramadan -0.041** -0.069*** -0.002 -0.016
[0.016] [0.017] [0.02] [0.02]
Fraction of harvest covered by
Ramadan*Above median fraction Muslim
-0.083*** -0.113***
[0.026] [0.026]
Mean of dependent variable 1.517 1.837 1.517 1.837
Observations 103,104 103,088 103,104 103,088
Notes:
1. This table tests for changes in agricultural output in each district-crop-year as a function of overlap
between Ramadan and the sowing and harvesting seasons for that district-crop-year. Overlap is measured as
the fraction of the total season(s) covered by Ramadan rather than the fraction of Ramadan covered by the
season as in the primary specification. The dependent variables are: Columns (1) and (3), log production in
thousands of tons; and Columns (2) and (4), log value of production (in 1,000,000 Rs deflated to 1973).
2. Regressions include district-crop, district-year, and crop-year fixed effects. In addition, time varying
controls for average rainfall and temperature during the sowing and harvesting seasons, two month leads to
each season, and a two month lag following the sowing season are included.
3. The agricultural data are from the India Agriculture and Climate data set. Crop cycles are from Donaldson
(2013). Weather data are from the University of Delaware monthly rainfall and temperature series taken for
the centroid of each district.
4. Robust standard errors clustered by district-year are in brackets.
5. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.110
Table 2A.6: Distribution of Muslims in Rural Areas
Percentile Percent of the population that is Muslim
1 0.1
5 0.2
10 0.5
25 1.8
50 4.8
75 9.9
90 18.6
95 28.2
99 42.1
mean (district weighted) 0.076
mean (population weighted) 0.099
Notes:
1) Data in the table are drawn from the 1961 Indian Census and based on
the 270 districts in the Indian Agricultural and Climate Dataset.
2) The census disaggregates the district into rural and urban areas. Given
that the analysis examines agricultural production, the data here are drawn
from rural areas only.111
Table 2A.7a: Labor Supply and Earnings as a Test of Religious Obligations Driving Production Declines (ICRISAT)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent Variable Labor
Days
Average
work hours
ln(Total
earnings)
Labor
Days
Average
work hours
ln(total
earnings)
Labor
Days
Average
work hours
ln(Total
earnings)
Sample Agricultural Laborers Agricultural Laborers, High
Season
Full
Days overlap between survey
period and Ramadan
-0.039 -0.002 -0.004*** -0.024 -0.002 -0.006*** -0.016 0.001 -0.002**
[0.035] [0.001] [0.001] [0.038] [0.002] [0.001] [0.022] [0.001] [0.001]
Muslim*Days overlap between
survey period and Ramadan
0.155* -0.003 0.002 0.142 -0.008 -0.007 0.180*** -0.001 0.002
[0.089] [0.011] [0.006] [0.142] [0.019] [0.008] [0.068] [0.006] [0.003]
Mean of dependent variable 21.752 7.131 6.816 21.874 7.212 6.778 17.921 7.182 7.014
Number of individuals 1,146 910 914 1,139 890 891 2,953 1,753 1,747
Observations 31,432 19,417 19,287 19,481 12,641 12,520 72,048 34,267 33,977
R-squared 0.699 0.775 0.659 0.754 0.820 0.670 0.631 0.780 0.760
Notes:
1. This table provides a test of whether time spent on religious activities causes reduced production during Ramadan by reducing the labor supply
of Muslims during that period.
2. Samples are drawn from the second generation ICRISAT village level studies survey. "Agricultural Laborers" samples include only individuals
who indicate that agricultural work is their primary occupation. "Agricultural Laborers, High Season" samples include observations from
individuals in the "Agricultural Laborers" sample for which the interview period had at least 15 days of overlap with a "high labor demand"
period defined as the sowing or harvesting seasons for the crop with the greatest acreage by state. The "Full" sample includes all individuals in
the sample.
3. ICRISAT surveys participants approximately once per month and elicits information on labor supply, hours, and wages of the respondent
during the month preceding the survey date. The number of days of overlap between Ramadan and the survey period is calculatedas the number
of days of Ramadan falling within the 30 days preceding the survey date. Labor supply is defined as the number of days of labor including both
paid and unpaid labor but excluding domestic work in the past month. The wages variable is calculated asthe sum of cash and in-kind wages
during the month. Average hours worked is only reported for paid labor. If the participant reports more than one paid job, average hours worked
is calculated as a weighted average across jobs. Religion is captured via thecaste variable, which contains a category for Muslim individuals,
because it is not directly reported.
4. All regressions include individual fixed effects, a control for the number of days between surveys, and year-month of interview fixed effects.
5. Robust standard errors clustered by individual are in brackets.
6. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
1
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Table 2A.7b: Labor Supply and Earnings as a Test of Religious Obligations Driving Production Declines (NSS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent variable Labor
days
Total
earnings
Ln(Total
Earnings)
Labor
days
Total
earnings
Ln(Total
Earnings)
Labor
days
Total
earnings
ln(Total
earnings)
Labor
days
Total
earnings
ln(Total
earnings)
Sample Agricultural Laborers Agricultural Laborers Rural Casual Laborers Rural Casual Laborers
Timing Full Year High Labor Demand Seasons Full Year High Labor Demand Seasons
Days overlap between
survey period and
Ramadan
-0.004 -0.689 0.039*** -0.035 4.168 0.040* -0.022 -1.175 -0.003 -0.006 0.293 0.005
[0.047] [2.798] [0.015] [0.043] [3.751] [0.022] [0.015] [1.267] [0.004] [0.026] [2.075] [0.007]
Muslim -0.025 -1.775 0.013 0.044 2.143 0.005 -0.039 2.436 0.032* 0.095 -6.211 0.018
[0.051] [4.551] [0.025] [0.08] [8.176] [0.045] [0.067] [6.845] [0.018] [0.101] [16.354] [0.027]
Muslim*Overlap
between survey period
and Ramadan
0.077*** -1.775 0.01 0.05 -4.375 -0.006 0.021 -0.597 0.002 -0.018 -1.726 -0.007
[0.024] [1.730] [0.017] [0.04] [2.787] [0.021] [0.038] [2.965] [0.009] [0.032] [3.958] [0.010]
Mean of dependent
variable
5.852 103.391 5.521 5.808 105.968 5.397 4.811 278.428 5.657 4.895 266.677 5.581
Observations 121400 121408 35721 37882 37885 13825 105397 105397 83930 41593 41593 34625
R-squared 0.127 0.062 0.314 0.141 0.094 0.297 0.171 0.145 0.363 0.182 0.174 0.324
Notes:
1. This table provides a test of whether time spent on religious or social activities causes reduced production during Ramadan by reducing the labor supply
of Muslims during this time. Given the somewhat coarse nature of the labor supply variable, the table also examines wages.
2. Samples are drawn from the Indian National Sample Survey, Schedule 10 (Employment), Rounds 60, 61, 62, 64, and 66. These rounds are selected
because they contain survey dates while earlier rounds do not. "Agricultural laborer" samples include only individuals who indicate that agricultural work
is their primary or secondary occupation. The "Rural casual laborers" sample includes individuals living in rural areas who indicate that they participate in
the casual labor market. "Full year" samples include the full survey periods. "High Labor Demand" additionally restricts the samples to surveys conducted
during the sowing or harvesting seasons for the crop with the greatest acreage by state.
3. The NSS Schedule 10 provides data on labor supply (to the half day) and wages of the respondent during the week preceding the survey date. Labor
supply is calculated as the number of days of labor excluding domestic work in the past week. The wages variable is calculated as the sum of cash and in-
kind wages during the week.
4. All regressions include district-year fixed effects and month fixed effects.
5. Robust standard errors clustered by district-year are in brackets.
6. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
1
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Figure 2A.1: Overlap Between Ramadan and Cropping Cycles, Calculation Examples
Example 1
Overlap fraction Sowing, Year X = 0.4
Overlap fraction Harvest, Year X = 0
Example 2
Overlap fraction Sowing, Year X = 0
Overlap fraction Harvest, Year X = 1
Example 3
Overlap fraction Sowing, Year X = 0
Overlap fraction Harvest, Year X = 0
Notes: Agricultural years run from July 1 to June 30. A description of the overlap calculation procedure is
provided in Appendix 2B.
Sowing2x-1 Harvest2x-1 Harvest1x-1 Harvest1x Harvest2x Sowing2x Sowing1x
Ramadan July 1, X July 1, X+1 July 1, X-1
Sowingx Harvestx
Ramadan
Sowingx+1 Harvestx-1
Sowing1x-1
Ramadan Ramadan
July 1, X July 1, X+1 July 1, X-1
Ramadan July 1, X July 1, X+1 July 1, X-1
Sowingx Harvestx Sowingx+1 Harvestx+1 Harvestx-1
Ramadan114
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Calculating the Fraction of Ramadan Covered by Agricultural Seasons
Data in the India Agricultural and Climate dataset is organized by the agricultural year running from July
1 of year X to June 30 of year X+1. To calculate the overlap with between the sowing and harvesting
seasons and Ramadan, I first organize the crop calendar relative to the agricultural year such that an
agricultural cycle  for agricultural year X is defined by the seasons leading up to a harvest which occurs in
agricultural year X.28 This calendar is then overlaid with the Ramadan dates during the agricultural year
of interest as well as the preceding year to account for extended agricultural cycles and harvests which
occur early in the agricultural year. For example, the cropping cycle for sugar cane is typically between
one and two years such that for a harvest occurring in agricultural year X, the sowing season typically
occurs in year X-1. Similarly, if a harvest were to occur in July of agricultural year X, the sowing season
would typically occur in year X-1. However, the overlap between these sowing seasons and the previous
year’s Ramadan would be assigned to the year in which the harvest occurred to coincide with the
production data in the India Agricultural and Climate data.
In addition, because certain crops (e.g. rice, potatoes) frequently have more than one agricultural
cycle per year, I calculate the days of overlap between each season (i.e. sowing, harvesting) and Ramadan
for each cycle and then sum across the cycles ending in the same agricultural year. Finally, this total
number of days of overlap is divided by 29, the number of days in Ramadan.29 Figure 2A.1 provides
example overlap calculations and Table 2A.4 provides the distribution of overlap between Ramadan and
each of the agricultural seasons.
28 For harvest seasons which overlap two agricultural years I assign the crop cycle to the year in which the majority
of the harvest falls. Because some crops such as sugar cane have very long growing cycles, production accrued in year
X can begin with a sowing season up to roughly 1.5 years earlier.
29 The exact dates of Ramadan depend on the sighting of the crescent moon. However, data is not available on when
the moon is sighted in each district. Hence, I use a consistent start date for the holiday across all of India for each year
and limit the duration of the holiday to 29 days (rather than the possible 30) to generate conservative estimates and
ensure that I do not measure overlap with Eid, the holiday following Ramadan.116
Calculating Rainfall and Average Temperature Controls
Although the Indian Agricultural and Climate dataset contains information on rainfall and temperature,
the values are averages across all years. Hence, I use the University of Delaware data to provide time
varying controls for rainfall and temperature. Because each crop is likely to be impacted differently by
rainfall and temperature in a given month, instead of using weather controls by calendar month I create
rainfall and temperature relative to the sowing and harvesting seasons for each crop. Specifically, the
regressions control for the total rainfall and average temperature over the two months preceding each
season, during the season itself, and for the two months following the sowing season at the centroid of
each district. Because the rainfall and temperature data is provided as a monthly series, these variable are
calculated as weighted averages created by summing of the number of days in each month for the relevant
period (e.g. sowing season) multiplied by the monthly value and dividing the total by the total number of
days. Missing values are replaced with imputed values generated from a regression of existing values on
district-crop and year fixed effects.
Calibrating Declines in Agricultural Productivity: “Free Energy” Available for Work
Adjustments to basal metabolic rates and energy use outside of work limit the precision of “free energy”
calibrations. However, it is possible to calculate a measure of expected “possible” production based on
caloric availability in order to determine whether the observed declines in productivity are roughly
congruent with expectations based on energy availability. Rural residents in India were consuming
roughly 2240 calories per day in 1983 (Deaton and Dreze 2009). Researchers have measured the basal
metabolic rates (BMR) of rural populations in southern India and have determined that typical basal
metabolic rates for low BMI individuals require approximately 1,100 and 1,400 calories per day
depending on size and gender (Ferro-Luzzi et al. 1997).
Taking the lowest BMR estimates, the strong assumption that all calories not used in basal
metabolism are used productively, and the estimated decline in caloric intake for Muslims during117
Ramadan, individuals have 1140 calories available for work when not fasting and 440 available calories
for work when fasting.
Passmore and Durnin (1955) review a variety of sources across five countries detailing energy
expenditures in different agricultural activities and find that sowing season activities such as clearing
brush, digging ridges, and ploughing typically require 4 to 9 calories per minute while harvesting
activities such as bundling and threshing typically require 3 to 7 calories per minute. Hence, farm work is
likely to burn roughly 180 to 540 calories per hour. Taking an estimate from the middle of this range of
roughly 350 calories per hours, a typical farmer would be able to complete roughly 4 hours of active labor
when not fasting and 2 hours of active labor when fasting. Accounting for the fact that some energy can
be mobilized from fat reserves, these estimates suggest the observed 20 to 40 percent decline in
productivity per Muslim individual is consistent with the free energy available.
Calibrating Expected Water Losses During Ramadan
Perspiration rates depend on a number of factors, key among which are the intensity of the physical
activity and factors which influence evaporation rates (i.e., temperature, vapor pressure). The intensity of
physical activity can be approximated via the rate at which calories are burned in the activity and the
weather variables can be measured directly.
A 50 kg individual would be expected to burn approximately 1200 calories in a day of hard farm
work during the active labor seasons (Fluck 1992; Nag et al. 1980). In order to benchmark the expected
perspiration rates, I compare this energy usage to the energy consumed by running, one of the most
commonly studied activities in which perspiration rates are measured, in similar weather conditions.
Rehrer (1996) reviews the literature and finds that accounting for water intake, running a marathon
typically results in a loss of approximately three percent of body weight. Although predicted rather than
measured, Sawka et al. (2007) estimate that in temperatures similar to those likely to be experienced by118
farmers in India running a marathon would result in a loss of four to five percent of body weight.30
However, running a marathon requires roughly 2500 calories for a 50 kg individual, twice the energy
required for a day of intensive farm labor. Hence, one would expect roughly half the water losses for
farming as well, suggesting an overall loss of roughly 1.5 to 2.5 percent in body weight.
However, two additional factors are likely to reduce sweat rates relative to this benchmark. First,
the lower rate of caloric burn for farming will reduce sweat production due to greater passive cooling and
less “wasted” sweat lost to dripping (Candas 1979; Shapiro et al. 1982). Second, a higher surface area to
mass ratio (negatively correlated with BMI), lower overall weight, low body fat percentage, and
acclimatization to heat all improve core body temperature management and substantially reduce sweat
rates in hot humid climates (Havenith, Luttikholot, and Vrijkotte 1995; Havenith 2001; Casa 1999b). This
suggests that Indian farmers are likely to have relatively low sweat rates relative to many individuals in
the studies cited previously due to their small size, very low body fat percentage, and acclimatization to
hot temperatures. Hence, it is unlikely that the two percent of body weight threshold at which decrements
in performance begin to be observed is likely to be surpassed for a significant number of farmers during
Ramadan.
Evaporative Potential (PET) and Maximum Temperature Calculations
To calculate the average evaporative potential and maximum temperature during the sowing and
harvesting seasons I draw on data from the Climatic Unit Research Database at the British Atmospheric
Data Center (BADC). BADC calculates a daily PET based on three measures of temperature (min, max,
mean), vapor pressure, and cloud cover following a method recommended by the FAO. More information
about the details of this measure are available on the BADC website: http://badc.nerc.ac.uk.
30 This prediction is based on an ambient temperature of 28C, or approximately 82F. The overall mean temperature in
the districts included in this study during sowing and harvesting periods was 27 and 24 degrees Celsius respectively
(University of Delaware Air Temperature and Precipitation data, authors calculations). Although based on a more
limited sample, the mean daily maximum temperature over the sowing and harvesting periods was 31 and 29 degrees
C, respectively (Climatic Unit Research Database at the British Atmospheric Data Center, author’s calculations).119
Although the data are detailed, there is a significant amount of missing data. Hence, in order to
calculate the average weather measure for a season, I begin by averaging the weather measure for all
points within a district-month. That average is then assigned to the centroid so that, contingent on any
readings being taken within a district-month, each district has one value. The average value at the centroid
for each district month is regressed on district-month fixed effects and year fixed effects and missing
values are assigned the predicted values from this regression. However, because some states do not have
any data over the relevant time period and fitted values are unlikely to be representative in those areas, I
limit the sample to states in which some data are available. This limitation drives the lower sample size in
these regressions. Average evaporative potential over a season is calculated from the district-month
values as the sum of the number of days in each month within the relevant season multiplied by the
average evaporative potential in that month divided by the total length of the season.120
3 Comparing the Effectiveness of Individualistic, Altruistic, and
Competitive Incentives in Motivating Completion of Mental
Exercises
3.1 Introduction
Faced with a variety of challenges to public health arising from unhealthy behaviors, such as smoking,
poor diet, sedentary lifestyles, and low rates of medication adherence, employers, health insurers, and
government  agencies  have  been dramatically expanding  the  use  of  monetary  incentives  to  motivate
healthy behavior change. Most of the programs that have been implemented in the field as well as most of
the incentives tested by researchers (e.g., Cawley and Price 2009; Charness and Gneezy 2009; Perez et al.
2009) employ individual incentives. There are many reasons, however, to suspect that socially oriented
incentives that play on motives such as competition and reciprocity, might have beneficial effects.
First, social motives can sometimes provide motivation that is disproportionate to the underlying
magnitude of objective incentives. People will, for example, often reciprocate small gifts, such as the
address labels provided by charities, or the flowers handed out by Harre Krishnas, with much larger return
favors (Cialdini 2006; Fehr and Gächter 2000). Likewise, even in the absence of differential material
incentives, pure completion and the feelings of “winning” or “losing” can substantially alter behavior and
generate significant levels of effort (Delgado et al 2008). The social forces generated by teams or groups
can also significantly increase effort and reduce the cost to produce a given amount of output (Nalbantian
and Schotter 1997; Babcock et al 2012). By playing on such non-pecuniary motives, social incentives
have, at least in theory, the potential to produce more substantial behavioral changes at lower cost than
individualistic incentives.
 This chapter is coauthored with George Loewenstein, Jessica Kopsic, and Kevin G. Volpp. We gratefully
acknowledge financial support from the Pennsylvania Department of Health’s Commonwealth Universal Research
Enhancement Program and the NIA-funded joint Penn/CMU Roybal P30 Center on Behavioral Economics and
Health. We also thank Lumosity and Neurotrax for the generous use of their software, Matt Thompson for his
outstanding website development, and Ben Cowan and ASHEcon conference participants for helpful comments. All
errors are our own.121
Second, by associating the desired behaviors with social cues rather than purely financial or
economic cues, socially oriented incentives are less likely to be subject to the crowding out of intrinsic
motivation that are a potential concern with the provision of financial incentives (Gneezy and Rustichini
2000; Benabou and Tirole 2003; Heyman and Ariely, 2004). Further, despite the predominant focus on
individual-level incentives, social incentive schemes may be of particular interest in this domain because
many health behaviors (e.g. eating, and some forms of exercise) have strong social elements, suggesting
that the use of social forces may substantially augment the effectiveness of such programs both directly
and indirectly.
Finally,  the  importance  of  peer  effects  and  social  motivations  in altering  behavior has  been
documented in a number of domains such as labor supply and financial decision making (Kaur, Kremer,
and Mullainathan 2010, 2011; Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul 2010; Duflo and Saez 2003). Although
evidence within the health domain is limited, two recent studies coauthored by two of the authors of this
paper  found  beneficial  effects  of  social  incentive programs. In  the  first study,  veterans  with  poorly
managed diabetes were either paid direct incentives for controlling their diabetes, or were paired with a
peer-mentor whose diabetes had been, but no longer was, poorly controlled. Although both interventions
led to improvement, the peer mentoring program was significantly more successful at lower cost (Long et
al 2012). In the second study, employees were paid either individualistic rewards or organized into small
groups  in  which  joint  rewards  were  allocated  to group-members  who  lost  weight. While  the group
incentive scheme was significantly more effective in motivating weight loss, it also provided higher
rewards ex post, so it failed to provide a clean comparison of social and non-social incentives of similar
value (Kullgren et  al  2012). No  studies  that  we  are  aware  of,  including  the  two  just  noted, have
systematically compared the impact of social and non-social incentives of similar magnitude on desired
health behaviors.
This paper provides a test of the comparative effectiveness of individualistic and socially oriented
monetary incentives in motivating health-promoting behaviors via a randomized controlled trial among
312 elderly  individuals  who  receive  no  monetary  incentives,  individualistic incentives,  altruistic122
incentives, or team-based cooperative/competitive incentives for daily completion of cognitive training
exercises. In all conditions, including the Control, individuals were randomly paired and provided with
daily information about the number of exercises completed (and, if relevant, the earnings) by themselves
and by their partner. While participants in the Control condition did not receive monetary incentives for
completing cognitive training exercises, the magnitude of the incentives provided in the three treatment
conditions were designed to be as similar to one-another as possible, so as to provide a clean test of their
relative effectiveness in motivating engagement.
The use of online cognitive training exercises as an outcome serves a variety of purposes. First,
given the rapidly aging United States population, cognitive decline is a substantial concern both in terms
of  population  health  and  healthcare  costs. In  recent  years  Alzheimer’s  has  become  the sixth most
prevalent  cause  of  death in  the  United  States, and accounts for  an estimated direct  costs  of care of
approximately $150 billion per year (Mebane-Sims 2009). Further, much of the cost of overall age-related
cognitive decline is a result of milder forms of decline. By the sixth decade of life, losses in domains
including reaction time, working memory, and attention are widespread (Bäckman, Small, and Wahlin
2006; Park and Payer 2006; Rogers and Fisk 2006). These declines are associated with decrements in
functional performance on instrumental activities of daily living, such as problem solving and financial
management (Marsiske and Margrett 2006; Finucane et al. 2005; Owsley et al. 2002).
Research examining the effectiveness of cognitive exercises in producing functional improvement
on  daily  tasks  or  capabilities  beyond  performance  on  the  exercises  has  generally  been  discouraging
(Jaeggi et al. 2008). However, disappointing effects may stem in part from low rates of adherence to
training programs and the lack of cost-effective approaches to improving adherence to these regimens.
For example, the most comprehensive test of cognitive exercises, the ACTIVE study, had an overall
budget of $15 million for 2,802 enrolled participants, or approximately $5,000 per participant over 24
months (Ball et al. 2002).
In addition to examining an important domain of health, use of a web-based cognitive training
task also facilitates accurate, high frequency data collection as well as high frequency feedback and123
incentive provision, features which are often difficult to achieve in research of this type. For example,
studies examining the impact of incentives on gym usage have generally focused on attendance, measured
by sign-ins; it is much more difficult to monitor how much exercise participants complete after signing in.
The use of an on-line platform also provides the potential for scalability, since replicating a web-based
intervention  is  much  easier  than  one  which  involves  physical  facilities  and/or  personnel. These
technologies have the potential to reach individuals and promote healthy habits on a daily basis at low
cost and in an automated fashion.
Finally, the online platform also provides an opportunity to examine the long run impacts of the
provision of incentives with minimal experimental demand effects. In this study, the active study period
in which incentives are provided lasted six weeks. However participants were given one year of continued
access to the cognitive training exercises following the completion of the study, which made it possible to
track continued engagement with the exercises after the removal of incentives.
During the six-week active study period, individuals in all experimental groups, including the
Control, were paired with another participant in the study and received free access to the training software
and information about their own and their partner’s completion of exercises. Participants in the incentive
groups, but not the Control group, were additionally eligible to receive financial compensation during this
period. In the individual incentives condition, referred to as the Atomistic treatment, participants were
provided with a flat payment of approximately $0.17 per exercise up to 30 exercises per day. In the
Altruistic treatment, the level of compensation was the same; however individuals were paid as a function
of the number of exercises completed by their partner rather than as a function of their own exercise
completion. In the Cooperative/Competitive treatment, teams, each consisting of a pair of individuals,
were randomly paired to form quads, and each of the teams was compensated as a positive function of the
fraction of the exercises completed by that team and negative function of the total exercises completed by
the opposing team. Further details regarding the exact payment structures are given below.
We  find  that  the  use  of  any  monetary  incentives,  whether  direct  or  socially  motivated,
approximately  doubled engagement  with  the  cognitive  training  exercises.    Surprisingly, Altruistic124
treatment  and  Cooperative/Competitive treatments (both  of which  had much  lower  average  marginal
benefit per exercise to the individual engaging in the exercise) generated gains in the number of exercises
completed that are statistically indistinguishable from those in the atomistic condition. Despite similar
gains in exercises completion across incentivized treatments, we did observe very different patterns of
engagement in pairs  of participants across  the experimental treatments. We  also  found  that  while
utilization of the software led to substantial improvements on scores in the majority of the incentivized
exercises, the gains did not typically generalize to improvements in measures cognitive function more
broadly. Finally,  examining  utilization of the  software  following  the completion  of  the experimental
period, despite dramatic declines across all experimental groups, there were significant differences in the
rate  of  decline  across  conditions. During  the  five month  follow  up  period,  roughly  twice  as  many
exercises were completed by participants in the socially oriented treatments than by participants in the
Atomistic and Control conditions.
3.2 Experimental Design
3.2.1 Participants
Three hundred and twelve participants between the ages of fifty-five and eighty were recruited
from adult education classes, churches, prior unrelated studies, Craig’s List, and community centers in
Pittsburgh PA. All participants were screened either in person or by phone prior to entering the study.
Individuals  were  excluded  from  the  study  if  they  had a  history  of  stroke,  dementia,  Parkinson’s  or
Huntington’s  Disease,  Multiple  Sclerosis,  major  psychiatric  disorders,  or were using medications to
enhance  cognitive  ability. To  participate  in  the  study,  individuals  had  to  score at  least 26  on the
Telephone Interview for Cognitive Status-40 (TICS-40) (roughly equivalent to scoring 27 or above on the
Mini-Mental  State  Exam (MMSE) (Fong  et  al.  2009)), to  have fluent  written  and  spoken  English,
proficiency with a computer, internet access, and ability to attend a training session and testing sessions at
the beginning and end of the active experimental period in the office in Pittsburgh, PA.125
Table 3.1: Baseline Participant Characteristics
All Control Atomistic Altruistic Cooperative/
Competitive
Age 64.76 65.11 64.85 64.88 64.48
[6.40] [6.74] [6.98] [6.16] [6.10]
Female 0.70 0.68 0.73 0.75 0.68
[0.46] [0.47] [0.45] [0.44] [0.47]
Married 0.61 0.61 0.56 0.52 0.69
[0.49] [0.49] [0.50] [0.50] [0.47]
Left handed 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.20** 0.10
[0.33] [0.25] [0.34] [0.41] [0.31]
Not born in US 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.06
[0.21] [0.22] [0.18] [0.18] [0.25]
Retired 0.61 0.61 0.63 0.66 0.58
[0.49] [0.49] [0.49] [0.48] [0.50]
White/Caucasian 0.93 0.89 0.92 0.92 0.95
[0.26] [0.32] [0.27] [0.27] [0.22]
Family member
has/had dementia
0.62 0.58 0.65 0.67 0.60
[0.70] [0.74] [0.70] [0.71] [0.67]
Normalized cognitive
test score at enrollment
107.32 106.81 107.49 107.47 107.41
[7.03] [7.45] [6.30] [7.48] [7.00]
Education
Less than BA 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.17 0.10
BA 0.32 0.35 0.26 0.30 0.35
More than BA 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.45 0.51
Other 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.05
Median Household
Income Range (USD)
50,000-
74,999
50,000-
74,999
35,000-
49,999
50,000-
74,999
50,000-
74,999
Observations 312 62 62 64 124
Notes:
1. This table contains the mean and standard deviation of participant characteristics as
reported at enrollment.
2. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant
at the 10 percent level.
Baseline participant characteristics are presented in Table 3.1. With fewer than one in twenty significant
differences between conditions, this table suggests that the randomization was successful in producing
comparable samples in each of the four conditions.126
3.2.2 Experimental Timeline and Online Platform
After being screened and completing the informed consent process, participants visited the lab
and completed an enrollment survey and a 45 minute baseline battery of computer based cognitive tests
utilizing  the  Mindstreams  software  developed  by  Neurotrax.1 Following  the  cognitive  testing,
participants were randomly paired and/or grouped and assigned to an experimental condition. Participants
also completed an in-person training session to familiarize them with the cognitive exercise software,
including the exercises themselves, the website’s messaging features which allowed them to communicate
directly with their partner(s), and the information available through the website (their performance, their
partner’s performance, and, when relevant, each person’s earnings). Participants in the treatment groups
were also given extensive instruction, in verbal, mathematical, and graphical form, about the monetary
incentive structure to which they were randomized. During the six-week study period all participants
received free access to the cognitive training software and daily emails regarding their own and their
partner’s/group’s engagement (and earnings, when relevant). In addition, all participants, including those
in the Control group, could access, via the website at any time, information regarding their own use of the
software as well as their partner’s use of the software. This information was updated in real time. At the
completion of the study period, participants completed an alternate version of the cognitive testing battery
they had completed at intake, and an exit survey.2 After the active study period all participants were given
continued free access to the cognitive training software, and usage was monitored; however no further
emails were sent, no information about the partner’s utilization of the software was available, and no
further payments were made for use of the software. Figure 3.1 details the participant timeline.
1 The testing battery has also been used in over 50 published peer reviewed studies and allows for measurement of
cognitive function in a variety of domains such as reaction time, attention, and memory. Over 17,000 patients have
completed this testing battery. More information is available at http://www.neurotrax.com.
2 The cognitive tests taken at enrollment and the completion of the active experimental period are identical in nature
and design, however the stimuli vary between versions to minimize test-retest effects. Correlation in performance
across versions is very high (see the Neurotrax website for more details).127
Figure 3.1
Participant Timeline
3.2.3 Cognitive Training Software
The cognitive training software consisted of eleven exercises targeting five cognitive domains,
including  spatial  orientation,  problem  solving,  memory,  executive  function,  and  reaction  time.  The
exercises used in the training software were provided by Lumosity,3 a firm that provides online cognitive
training exercises. The average exercise took approximately two to three minutes to complete, however
the  range  in  duration  was  approximately one to ten minutes  depending  on  the  exercise  and  the
individual’s skill level. To ensure that participants were exposed to the full range of exercises, the eleven
exercises were presented in a quasi-random order which was changed daily.
3 Lumosity is a commercial developer of cognitive training exercises. The firm collaborates with cognitive science
researchers from a variety of institutions such as Stanford and UCSF in developing their training exercises. More
information is available at www.lumosity.com.
Screening
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and to experimental
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training administered.
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payment updates
(when applicable).
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payment.
One year
uncompensated
access to software.
No email
communication.128
3.2.4 Experimental Treatments
Payment  formulas  for  all  experimental  conditions  are  presented  in  Table 3.2. As  noted,
individuals in all conditions, including the Control, were paired and provided with access to information
about their partner’s participation (and payments, if relevant), and could also communicate with their
partner via a messaging feature of the website.
Table 3.2: Experimental Conditions and Payments
Experimental
Condition
Description Payment formula
Control No payment P1 = 0
P2 = 0
Atomistic Flat rate of $0.17 per
exercise completed P1 =
E1
6
P2 =
E2
6
Altruistic Flat rate of $0.17 paid
to partner for each
exercise completed
P1 =
E2
6
P2 =
E1
6
Cooperative/
Competitive
Marginal payments
vary as a function of
exercises by both
teams. Team members
earn the same amount.
P1 = P2 =
Max[(E1+ E2),(E3 + E4)] (E1+E2)
6 (E1+ E2 + E3 + E4)
P3 = P4 =
Max[(E1+ E2),(E3 + E4)] (E3+ E4)
6 (E1+ E2 + E3 + E4)
Notes:
1. Ex = Exercises completed by partner x, Px = Payment to partner x.
Individuals assigned to the Control group were provided with free access to the cognitive training
software,  messaging  service,  and  emails,  but  were  not  given  any  monetary  incentives  to  utilize  the
software. Participants in the Atomistic treatment were provided with a flat rate monetary incentive of129
approximately $0.17 per exercise up to 30 exercises for their own participation, resulting in maximum
daily earnings of $5. Participants in the Altruistic treatment were compensated at the same rate of $0.17
per exercise. However, their compensation depended on the number of exercises completed by their
partner rather than of their own level of participation. Hence, while participants in this treatment could
potentially improve their cognitive health via the training, they received no direct financial benefit from
completing additional exercises.
Finally, participants in the Cooperative/Competitive treatment were paired with a partner to form
a team, and two pairs/teams were matched to form a group of four. The incentives in this treatment were
designed to encourage cooperation between members of the teams and competition between the teams. To
accomplish this, individuals in this treatment were compensated as a function of both the relative level of
participation between the two teams and the total number of exercises completed by the team with the
highest level of participation. Specifically, the total amount of money available to be distributed among
the group of four was the maximum number of exercises completed by either team multiplied by $0.34.
The money was then allocated between the two teams in direct proportion to the number of exercises
completed by each team. Each member of a team/pair received the same compensation for a given day.
This design provides a strictly positive marginal payment for the individual completing the activity and
also for their partner (up to the 30 exercise per participant limit, consistent with the other treatments).
However, the marginal payment for one exercise by one member of the team varies significantly and
ranges from less than $0.01 to $0.17 per partner4 based on the performance of both teams. Due to the fact
that  the  payment  from  each  exercise  is  split  between  members  of  the  team, individuals in  the
Cooperative/Competitive treatment receive a weakly lower payment per exercise for themselves than
4 Note that a marginal payment of $0.34 for the team as a whole is a marginal payment of $0.17 for each member of
the team. Marginal payments are high when one team has not completed any exercises but the other team has not yet
reached the 30 exercise per participant limit so the total amount available is growing but is only allocated to one
team. On the other hand, marginal payments are low when one team has completed the maximum incentivized
number of exercises and the other has completed very few because the total amount to be distributed does not grow
when the low playing team engages, but the fraction reallocated towards the low engagement team is small. Despite
the variability in the marginal payments, the median payment per exercise in this condition was $0.17 and the
average payment per exercise was $0.23.130
individuals in the Atomistic treatment. But, to keep the total possible payments the same, this difference
is compensated for by the fact that when an individual’s partner completes an exercise, that individual
receives  a  payment  without  having  completed  any  exercises. This  structure  encouraged  cooperation
among team members (each team member’s work benefits the other; both had to participate to get the
maximum possible earnings), but competition between the two teams (once the maximum number of
exercises was reached by either team the payments became zero-sum across the group).
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Completion of Exercises
There is a large main effect of treatment on engagement with the cognitive exercises. Individuals
in the no payment Control completed an average of 11.7 exercises per day (roughly 30 minutes of daily
engagement with the software). Individuals in each of the treatment groups completed approximately
twice that number, a large and statistically significant increase (See Table 3.3 and Figure 3.2)5. The
increase in engagement in the treatment groups is statistically indistinguishable across the three treatment
arms,  with  an  average  of  22.4,  23.1,  and  25.5  exercises  per  day  for  the  Altruistic,  Atomistic,  and
Cooperative/Competitive groups respectively. This result is particularly striking given that participants in
the  Altruistic  condition  receive  no  direct  monetary  benefit  from  completing  exercises and  that  the
marginal payment for completing an exercise in the Atomistic treatment weakly dominates the payment
for  completing  an  exercise  in  the  Cooperative/Competitive  condition.  Further,  while  the  marginal
payment in the Cooperative/Competitive condition was variable, and depended on the level of utilization
of both teams, the mean payment per exercise ($0.23) was quite similar and the median payment per
exercise ($0.17) was nearly identical to the other compensated treatments.
5 As expected given the well balanced randomization, results were qualitatively similar with and without controlling
for baseline characteristics. Hence, additional covariates are omitted to simplify regression results. All regressions
were clustered at the level of the pair for the Control, Atomistic, and Altruistic conditions and at the level of the
group (two teams each consisting of a pair) for the Competitive/Cooperative condition.131
Table 3.3: Exercises Per Day
Atomistic 11.39***
[2.15]
Altruistic 10.70***
[2.55]
Cooperative/Competitive 13.76***
[1.68]
Constant 11.72***
[1.32]
Observations 13,104
R-squared 0.11
Notes:
1. This table reports the OLS regression of the number of exercises
completed on indicator variables for each experimental condition.
2. The unit of observation is the participant-day.
3. Standard errors clustered at the level of the pair for all
experimental groups except Cooperative/Competitive which is
clustered at the level of the group.
4.*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5
percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Figure 3.2
Mean Number of Cognitive Exercises Per Day
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This dramatic increase in engagement with the exercises in the treatment groups is the combined
effect of both extensive margin changes (i.e. more regular use of the software) and intensive margin
changes (i.e. greater participation conditional on logging into the website) (distributional information for
the number of exercises completed is presented in Table 3.4). Individuals in the control group logged in
65.8 percent of the days while participants in the Altruistic, Atomistic, and Cooperative/Competitive
groups logged on 81.0 percent, 80.3 percent, and 87.5 percent of the days, respectively. Conditional on
logging in and completing any exercises, the mean number of exercises completed in each group was 17.8
(Control), 27.7 (Altruistic), 28.8 (Atomistic), and 29.1 (Cooperative/Competitive). Hence, in addition to
the large  impact  on  daily  use  of the  software,  the  treatments  dramatically  increased  the  number  of
exercises completed once logged in.
Table 3.4: Summary Statistics Of Daily Completion of Exercises
Percentile Control Atomistic Altruistic Cooperative/
Competitive
10th 0 0 0 0
25th 0 10 10 21
50th 9 30 30 30
75th 20 30 30 31
90th 30 32 32 33
95th 35 35 37 37
99th 50 56 94 60
Mean 11.72 23.12 22.43 25.48
SD 12.67 15.03 17.65 12.86
Correlation with partner 0.15 0.12 0.36 0.22
Mean percent of days logging on 65.78 80.30 80.92 87.5
Mean exercises if exercises > 0 17.82 28.79 27.72 29.14
As shown in Figures 3.3a-3.3d and Figure 3.4, the higher average completion of exercises in the
treatment groups is driven in large part by the substantial fraction of individuals completing exactly the
maximum number of incentivized exercises, 30. While the most immediately striking feature of these
figures is the large mass of individuals completing exactly 30 exercises in the treatment groups, the133
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Altruistic
treatments also lead significantly more individuals to complete more than the monetarily incentivized
number of activities. Specifically, averaging across participant-days, 19.2 percent, 21.4 percent, and 28.7
percent of  the  Altruistic,  Atomistic,  and  Cooperative/Competitive  groups  engaged  in  more  than  30
activities per day.
Figure 3.3
Cognitive Exercises Per Day By Experimental Condition134
Figure 3.4
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Although the incentives offered in the three treatment groups had similarly large main effects on
the average number of exercises completed per day, treatment assignments had differential impacts on the
within-pair patterns of engagement with the exercises. Individuals assigned to the Control group have no
financial interaction or interdependency; however play between partners is still correlated (r = 0.15, p =
0.09), providing evidence for peer effects resulting purely from the daily emails regarding how many
exercises  that  individual  and  their  partner  completed. In  the  Atomistic  treatment in  which financial
rewards are again unrelated to the partner’s engagement, the correlation between partner’s daily use of the
software is very similar (r = 0.12, p = 0.25). In the Altruistic and Cooperative/Competitive treatments, in
which financial rewards are contingent on one’s partner’s play, the correlation between partners increases
to 0.36 (p<0.01) and 0.22 (p=0.01), respectively.135
The simple correlations, while informative, hide other differences in patterns of concordance
across treatments. Column (1) of Table 3.5 displays results from a linear probability regression examining
the probability that an individual completes zero exercises as a function of their treatment group, binary
variables indicating whether their partner completed zero exercises that day or the previous day, and
treatment interacted with the binary variables. Column (2) presents similar results with binary variables
for  completing  at  least  30  exercises.  Both the  current  day  and lagged  interaction  terms are strongly
positive and significant for the Altruistic condition indicating that individuals in this condition were more
likely than individuals in the Control group to complete zero (30 or more exercises) if their partner did the
same on either the current day or the previous day. Of further interest is the fact that, for the altruistic
treatment, the  point  estimate  for positive  reciprocity  is  substantially larger,  although  not  statistically
distinguishable from, negative reciprocity. Negative reciprocity may be mitigated in these circumstances
by  the  fact  that  the  exercises  are  intended  to  promote  health, so  even  if  the  absence  of  financial
remuneration for engagement individuals are likely to engage for the health benefits.
To examine this potential avenue of influence between partners and the evolution of the spillovers
over time we regress the number of exercises completed by the individual on their partner’s exercise
completion that day and the previous three days and treatment assignment in a fully interacted model (see
Appendix 3A for Table 3A.1. Figure 3.5 summarizes the results from this regression). From the figure it
can be seen that point estimates of all contemporaneous and lagged effects are positive and most are
significantly different from zero. Initially (contemporaneous effects and one lag), reciprocity effects are
greatest in the altruistic condition and second greatest in the cooperative/competitive condition. By two
periods (days) back,  however,  the  effects,  while  positive, are  small  and  indistinguishable  across
conditions.136
Table 3.5: Probability Of Completing Zero/More Than Thirty Exercises
Column 1
0 exercises
Column 2
≥30 exercises
Atomistic -0.17* Atomistic 0.46***
[0.07] [0.11]
Altruistic -0.24*** Altruistic 0.04
[0.07] [0.05]
Cooperative/
Competitive
-0.26*** Cooperative/
Competitive
0.34***
[0.06] [0.09]
Partnert = 0  (binary) -0.06 Partnert ≥ 30 (binary) 0.08
[0.05] [0.04]
Atomistic*Partnert = 0 0.05 Atomistic*Partnert ≥30 0.00
[0.09] [0.08]
Altruistic*Partnert = 0 0.28*** Altruistic*Partnert ≥30 0.30***
[0.08] [0.06]
Cooperative/
Competitive *Partnert = 0
0.18* Cooperative/
Competitive *Partnert ≥30
0.11
[0.07] [0.07]
Partnert-1 = 0 (binary) -0.00 Partnert-1≥ 30 (binary) 0.03
[0.05] [0.06]
Atomistic*Partnert-1 =  0 0.05 Atomistic*Partnert-1 ≥30 0.03
[0.10] [0.10]
Altruistic*Partnert-1 = 0 0.17* Altruistic*Partnert-1 ≥30 0.32***
[0.08] [0.07]
Cooperative/
Competitive *Partnert-1 = 0
0.08 Cooperative/
Competitive *Partnert-1 ≥30
0.15
[0.07] [0.08]
Constant
(Control)
0.36*** Constant
(Control)
0.11***
[0.06] [0.03]
Observations 13,104 Observations 13,104
R-squared 0.07 R-squared 0.33
Notes:
1. This table examines positive and negative reciprocity between partners [pairs in the cooperative/competitive
condition] in each of the experimental conditions. Column [1] reports the results of a linear probability model
regressing an indicator for whether an individual completes zero exercises on indicators for experimental
condition, an indicator for whether their partner completed zero exercises that day and whether their partner
completed zero exercises the previous day, and those indicators interacted with each experimental treatment.
Column [2] has the same general design but studies the probability of completing at least 30 exercises.
2. The unit of observation is the participant-day.
3. Standard errors clustered at the level of the pair for all experimental groups except Cooperative/Competitive
which is clustered at the level of the group.
4. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level.137
Figure 3.5
Conditional Correlations Between Partners
Figure 3.6
Between Partner Correlation in Exercises Completed138
Figure 3.6, which displays the between-partner correlation in daily exercises by study week shows that
these reciprocity effects grew stronger over the course of the six week intervention period in the altruistic
and cooperative/competitive conditions in which payoffs were interdependent. In contrast, the correlation
between partners’ play declined over time in the control condition and remained fairly stable, but low, in
the atomistic treatment condition.
3.3.2 Performance on Cognitive Exercises
Participants in all experimental treatments significantly improved their performance on all but
one of the eleven cognitive exercises included in the software. These improvements were substantial in
magnitude,  typically  between  ¾  and  1  standard  deviation. The doubling  of exercises  completed by
individuals in the treatment groups also led to differential improvement in those groups relative to the
Control  group  on  approximately  half  of  the 11 exercises (See  Table 3.6 Panel  A  for  changes  in
performance on each of the 11 exercises and Figure 3.7 for changes in performance when grouping
exercises by cognitive domain. Table 3.6 also indicates which exercises, numbered from 1 to 11, target
each  of  the  cognitive  domains.  Exercise  2  is  co-categorized  in  both  Reaction  Time  and  Spatial
Reasoning). In particular, the differential gains were largest in exercises focusing on executive function,
speed/reaction  time,  and  spatial  orientation, on  which participants  in  the incentive treatment groups
improved approximately ¼ to ½ of a standard deviation beyond the improvements in the control group on
average.  Although  these  estimates  suggest  decreasing  marginal  returns  to  additional  exercises,  the
differential gains still represent substantial improvements on these exercises.
The improvements in scores on the exercises appear to be mediated by the increase in the number
of exercises completed (See Table 3.6, Panel B). Each additional 100 exercises is associated with a gain
of approximately 0.05 to 0.2 standard deviations. However, congruent with the results presented in Panel
A, the negative coefficients on the squared terms indicated diminishing marginal returns.139
Figure 3.7
Mean Normalized Gains In Exercise Scores By Cognitive Domain
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Given that the number of exercises (i.e. quantity) is incentivized rather than the scores on the
exercises (i.e. quality), it is possible the design of the incentives could crowd out the “quality” of the
engagement and encourage participants to hurry through with little thought. Table 3.6 Panel B allows us
to examine whether this occurred by testing whether receiving financial incentives impacts scores on the
exercises, conditional on the number of exercises completed. To be explicit, because improvements in
scores are a function of both practice (the number of exercises completed) and “quality” or concentration
per exercise, if treated individuals exerted less cognitive effort per exercise we would expect treated
individuals to obtain lower scores conditional on the amount of practice (number of exercises). Hence, if
motivational crowd out in the quality of cognitive effort occurs we would expect that the regression
coefficients on the Treatment indicator to be negative.Table 3.6: Changes In Normalized Scores On Cognitive Exercises
Cognitive Domain Spatial Executive Function Memory Problem Solving
Reaction Time
Exercise Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
P
a
n
e
l
 
A
Treated 0.26* 0.45*** 0.31** 0.39*** 0.37*** 0.30*** 0.07 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.28*
[0.14] [0.12] [0.13] [0.13] [0.14] [0.10] [0.14] [0.16] [0.09] [0.12] [0.14]
Constant
(Control)
1.08*** 0.96*** 0.81*** 1.06*** 1.13*** 0.74*** 0.07 0.42*** 0.75*** 0.75*** 0.79***
[0.12] [0.10] [0.11] [0.12] [0.12] [0.07] [0.11] [0.14] [0.07] [0.11] [0.12]
Observations 294 293 294 294 293 294 293 293 293 294 292
R-squared 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0 0 0 0 0.01
Treated -0.02 0.06 -0.08 -0.03 -0.12 0.00 -0.05 -0.13 -0.21** -0.26** -0.11
P
a
n
e
l
 
B
[0.15] [0.12] [0.13] [0.13] [0.14] [0.10] [0.17] [0.19] [0.09] [0.13] [0.14]
Total Exercises
(00s)
0.09*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.17*** 0.10*** 0.06** 0.08*** 0.05** 0.06*** 0.11***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03]
Total Exercises
(00s) Squared
-0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** 0.001 -0.001** 0.002
[0.001] [0.001] [.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Constant
(Control)
0.71*** 0.44*** 0.29*** 0.50*** 0.44*** 0.34*** -0.15 0.16 0.54*** 0.46*** 0.28***
[0.15] [0.12] [0.11] [0.12] [0.12] [0.10] [0.14] [0.17] [0.10] [0.11] [0.14]
Observations 294 293 294 294 293 294 293 293 293 294 292
R-squared 0.06 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.21 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.12
Notes:
1. Panel A reports results of OLS regressions of changes in scores on each cognitive exercise, as defined below, on an indicator for “Treatment” which includes
all individuals in the Atomistic, Altruistic, and Cooperative/Competitive conditions. Panel B contains the results of OLS regressions of the same dependent
variable on an indicator for treatment, the total exercises completed by each participant over the experimental period, and the square of that total.
2. Scores for each exercise are normalized to a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. Changes are defined as the last score – first score, conditional on
having completed an exercise at least twice during the experimental period. Results are qualitative similar using averages of the last three scores – first three
scores. Results are also similar examining indicators for each treatment rather than grouping all treatments together.
3. Exercises are categorized into cognitive domains as indicated by Lumosity, the company providing the software. Exercise number 2 has both spatial
reasoning and reaction time components and hence is included in both of those categories.
4. The unit of observation is the participant-day. Standard errors clustered at the level of the pair for all experimental groups except Cooperative/Competitive
which is clustered at the level of the group. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level.
#
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However, as can be seen in Table 3.6 Panel B, nine of the eleven coefficients on the Treated
variable are insignificant. Interestingly, the two coefficients (columns (9) and (10)) that are statistically
significant are in exercises in which the duration of the exercise increases significantly with improved
performance with a range of approximately three to ten minutes. Hence, in circumstances in which the
exercises become much more taxing as participants improve, there is some slight evidence of “quality”
crowdout, however, quality crowdout appears to have been minimal overall.
3.3.3 Performance on Cognitive Testing Battery
Although individuals in the treatment groups typically had greater improvement on scores on the
training exercises, individuals in the incentive conditions did not show greater improvement on scores on
the cognitive testing battery over the course of the six-week study as compared with the control group
(See Table 3.7 Panel A).
There  are  universal  improvements,  defined  below  as  the difference  between  exit score and
baseline  score,  across  all  experimental  groups  in  the  cognitive  testing  battery.6 However,  these
improvements may be at least partially due to a test-retest effect. As can be seen in Table 3.7 Panel B,
while Processing Speed is significantly correlated with the number of exercises completed even after a
Bonferroni correction, there is no significant relationship between the number of exercises completed and
improvements on the cognitive testing battery for the overall cognitive score or three of the four cognitive
domains7.
Alternatively, it is possible that the large positive constants in these regressions suggest that even
the lower levels of training done by the control group can be highly efficacious in increasing scores on
this testing battery. However, the improvement of those individuals in the bottom decile of exercises per
6 The Neurotrax Mindstreams software generates normalized scores for each of four domains as well as an overall
“global” score based on a series of underlying tests such as Stroop, Go/No-go, and delayed recall tests.
7 Results of two stage least squares regression using treatment as an instrument for the number of exercises
completed provide similar results.142
day (approximately 4 or fewer exercises per day, or less than one exercise per day in each domain) is
statistically indistinguishable from that of individuals in the top decile of exercises per day (more than 31
exercises per day). Hence, the improvements from the training would need to be highly non-linear (i.e. all
of  the  benefits  accrue  from  the  completing  the  first  exercise  or  two)  for  this  explanation  to  hold,
suggesting that a test-retest effect is the more likely explanation of the majority of the results in this table.
Table 3.7: Changes in Mindstreams Cognitive Testing Scores By Domain
Cognitive
Domain
Global Memory Executive
Function
Attention Processing
Speed
P
a
n
e
l
 
A
Treated 0.03 -0.38 0.13 0.02 0.31
[0.76] [0.95] [1.38] [0.99] [1.35]
Constant 4.29*** 2.38*** 2.80** 2.73*** 9.22***
(Control) [0.70] [0.83] [1.24] [0.91] [1.22]
Observations 310 310 310 310 308
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P
a
n
e
l
 
B
Total Exercises 0.06 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.25***
(00s) [0.05] [0.08] [0.09] [0.08] [0.10]
Constant 3.81*** 2.16*** 2.78*** 2.81*** 7.16***
[0.62] [0.81] [1.02] [0.82] [1.01]
Observations 310 310 310 310 308
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Notes:
1. This table reports on changes in the cognitive testing scores from enrollment to the end of the
active experimental period. Each column in Panel A is an OLS regression of the change in
score within the cognitive domain indicated at the top of each column on an indicator [Treated]
for belonging to Atomistic, Altruistic, or Competitive/Cooperative condition. The change in
score is defined as the normalized score at the end of the active experimental period score
minus the normalized enrollment score. Panel B includes OLS regressions of the change in
score on the total number of exercises completed by the participant during the active
experimental period.
2. The aggregate domain scores are calculated by the Mindstreams test from underlying tests
(e.g. Stroop, Go/No-go) in each area of cognitive function. The “Global” score aggregates
across all domains tested. More information on the tests used and the scores is available on the
Mindstreams website: http://www.neurotrax.com.
3. Standard errors clustered at the level of the pair for all experimental groups except
Cooperative/Competitive which is clustered at the level of the group.
4. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at
the 10 percent level.143
While these results are consistent with a large number of other studies which point to limited or
no improvement on general cognitive tasks which are not specifically trained (Jaeggi et al. 2008), it is
also possible that this particular cognitive assessment failed to capture changes generated by the training
or that additional training is necessary to detect effects on this test.
3.3.4 Time Trends
One of the most significant challenges in changing health related behaviors is to maintain the
behavior  changes over  time.  During  the  six  weeks  of  the active study period there was a small but
statistically significant decline in the number of exercises completed in Control, Atomistic, and Altruistic
conditions. The effect amounted to a decline of approximately 3.3 exercises per day over the course of six
weeks, in a fairly linear trend of approximately 0.5 exercise per week. There was no similar decline in
engagement in the Cooperative/Competitive treatment (See Figure 3.8).
At the conclusion of the six-week experimental period, participants were given continued access
to the software; however the monetary rewards and daily information about their own and their partner’s
engagement  with  the  software  ceased.  In  contrast  to  the  moderate  decline  in  engagement  with  the
software  during  the  six-week  experimental  period  (except  in  the  Cooperative/Competitive  treatment)
there was a large and immediate decline in all experimental conditions at the conclusion of the study. In
fact,  the  average total  number  of  exercises  completed  per  participant  in  five  months  following  the
completion of the study was only 84, or approximately ½ exercise per day. This low level of engagement
is  in  sharp  contrast  to  the  previous  overall  average  of  21.6  exercises  per  day  during  the  active
experimental period.144
Figure 3.8
Mean Exercises Per Day By Treatment Group
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However, a  post-hoc  analysis  comparing the  average  number  of  exercises between  socially
oriented and individually oriented treatments reveals that individuals in the socially oriented incentive
conditions completed  nearly  twice as  many exercises  (103 in  Cooperative/Competitive  and  98 in
Altruistic) as individuals in the individually oriented conditions (58 in Control and 57 in Atomistic). The
difference between the Cooperative/Competitive and Altruistic treatments and the Atomistic and Control
treatments is marginally significant (p = 0.06) during the first month, but becomes insignificant as the
treatments converge over time (See Figure 3.9).
The  large  standard  errors  on  these  estimates  are  due  to  substantial  variation  in  the  level  of
software utilization during this period. The fraction of individuals who never log onto the software again
after the end of the experimental period is relatively constant across experimental conditions, ranging
from 39 percent to 42 percent. However, approximately 7 percent of individuals continue to engage at145
meaningful  levels  (>5  exercises  per  day  on  average)  for  at  least  a  month,  and  77  percent  of  these
individuals  are in  the  Cooperative/Competitive  and  Altruistic treatments, a  pattern  of  difference  that
persists, albeit more weakly, after the first month. Hence, these results suggest that the more socially
oriented  treatments,  as  compared  with  more  individualistically oriented  treatments,  enhance  intrinsic
motivation, at least for some subset of the population.
Figure 3.9
Post Experimental Period Exercises
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3.4 Discussion
In this experiment, all three types of monetary incentives, whether direct or socially motivated,
approximately doubled engagement with the cognitive training exercises. Strikingly, the altruistically
motivated incentives and the cooperative/competitive incentives (both of which had much lower average
marginal benefit per exercise to the individual engaging in the exercise) generated gains in the number of146
exercises completed that are statistically indistinguishable from the direct monetary incentives in the
Atomistic condition. The dramatic increase in the average number of exercises completed each day was
the result of gains on both the extensive and intensive margins, with individuals in the treatments logging
in on a larger fraction of the days and completing more exercises conditional on logging in.
Despite the fact that the gains in utilization of the software were statistically indistinguishable
across  the  incentivized  treatments,  the  patterns  of  engagement  with  the  software  among paired
participants were strikingly different across the experimental treatments. While pairs of participants in the
Control and  Atomistic  treatments exhibited  modest  correlations  in  exercises  completed  each  day,
suggesting the existence of spillovers purely from the information provided about the partner’s use of the
software, the correlation between partners in the Altruistic and Cooperative/Competitive conditions was
both much higher and increasing over time.
Utilization of the software led to substantial improvements on the majority of the incentivized
exercises; these gains were typically 0.75 to 1 standard deviation in the Control group and 1 to 1.5
standard deviations in the Treatment groups. Although there were also substantial gains on a cognitive
testing battery administered at enrollment and again at week six, the gains appear likely to be driven
primarily  by a  test-retest  effect and  did  not  differ  between  control  and  treatment  groups,  despite
substantial differences in the numbers of exercises completed. This finding, which is suggestive of limited
generalizability of cognitive changes, is consistent with a wide range of previous studies examining the
impact of ‘brain exercises’ on generalized cognitive function (Jaeggi et al. 2008).
Following  the  conclusion  of  the  experimental  period,  utilization  of  the  software  declined
dramatically across all experimental groups. However, the decline was attenuated in the Altruistic and
Cooperative/Competitive  conditions.  Individuals  in  these  groups  completed  nearly  twice  as  many
exercises in the first month following the cessation of the intervention as individuals in the Control or
Atomistic treatments, pointing to the possibility that the social forces generated by those treatments led to
less crowding out, or more crowding in, of intrinsic motivation. These differences between conditions in147
post-incentive engagement, however, disappeared by the end of the second month following the removal
of incentives.
The high levels of utilization of the cognitive training software during this study were striking.
While the  population  was  likely  to  be  particularly motivated,  a fact demonstrated  by  the  substantial
utilization even among the control group, financial and social incentives still resulted in large increases in
the number of exercises completed. Although the high initial motivation of the participants may reduce
generalizability  of  the  magnitude  of  the  effects,  the  fact  that  incentives  improved  engagement  from
already high levels suggests that these types of socially oriented monetary incentives could potentially
have broad applicability.
The  scalability  of  the  online  platform  complements  the  scope  of  the  socially  oriented
interventions,  both  in  terms  of  facilitating  further  research  and  in  terms  of  possible  use  in  wellness
programs or other contexts in which healthy behavior changes are promoted. From the perspective of
study  participants  or  individuals  considering  whether  or  not  to  join  a  wellness  program,  web-based
platforms have the potential to greatly reduce costs.
Further, in terms of future research, the online platform, and in particular the cognitive training
exercises, offer a unique opportunity to gather accurate high frequency data with minimal experimental
demand. This feature is important because, although prior research examining the impact of monetary
incentives on other health-related behaviors has yielded a number of interesting findings, this research has
often  been  stymied  by  poor  measures  of  incentivized  behaviors.  For  example,  in  studies  examining
monetary incentives for gym attendance, attendance has been measured by card-swipes (e.g. Acland and
Levy 2010; Charness and Gneezy 2009). However, it is unclear whether the individual actually completed
any  exercise  or  simply  swiped  the  card  to  receive  the  promised  rewards.  A  variety  of  other  health
behaviors such as medication adherence face similar challenges. Some studies have addressed behaviors
with more directly verifiable outcomes such as weight loss or smoking cessation, but it is usually difficult
to measure these behaviors with high frequency and accuracy in many settings, both limitations that likely148
diminish the effectiveness of incentives. Online cognitive training address these concerns by accurately
capturing exactly how much exercise was completed and providing high frequency data that can be used
to provide rapid accurate feedback and incentives.
Although  the  platform  offers  the  benefits  of  scalability  in  a  wide  variety  of  domains, the
differential effects on patterns of engagement suggest that the various incentive designs may be more or
less appropriate for different health related behaviors. For example, in activities where individuals can
“fall off the bandwagon” easily, altruistic designs may provide discouraging results because when one
team member fails and is unable to get back on track there are likely to be spillovers to the other team
member. The same is true of the competitive/cooperative condition. The higher correlation in behaviors
between pairs in the two conditions involving social incentives is, thus, a kind of double-edged sword.
On  the  one  hand,  each  of  these  conditions  may  have  been  successful  in  channeling  powerful social
motives to the goal of motivating people to engage in cognitive exercises. On the other hand, the same
connectedness between the players also introduces hazards in terms of likely non-engagement if one of
the players drops out. This could happen for reasons that have nothing to do with lack of motivation, such
as vacations, work, or lack of internet access but nevertheless effectively demotivate the other member of
the pair. These are important factors to take into account when deciding what types of incentives to
introduce in a particular setting.
The title of a recent important paper on motivational crowding out was “pay enough or don’t pay
at all.” While not contradicting the findings of that paper, since our study focused on different issues and
involved fairly substantial payments, the equivalent title for this paper could have been “pay enough, and
it doesn’t matter who or how.”149
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Appendix 3A153
Table 3A.1: Mean Daily Exercises As a Function Of Partner’s Lagged Exercises
Atomistic 10.62**
[3.82]
Altruistic 2.64
[4.38]
Cooperative/Competitive 8.73*
[3.56]
Partner's exercises today (pt) 0.01
[0.05]
Atomistic* pt 0.03
[0.07]
Altruistic* pt 0.13*
[0.06]
Cooperative/Competitive* pt 0.06
[0.06]
Partner’s exercises t-1 (pt-1) 0.06
[0.03]
Atomistic*pt-1 -0.05
[0.05]
Altruistic*pt-1 0.10
[0.06]
Cooperative/Competitive* pt-1 0.05
[0.04]
Partner’s exercises t-2 (pt-2) 0.06*
[0.03]
Atomistic* pt-2 0.003
[0.05]
Altruistic* pt-2 0.02
[0.05]
Cooperative/Competitive* pt-2 0.008
[0.04]
Partner’s exercises t-3 (pt-3) 0.091*
[0.04]
Atomistic* pt-3 -0.06
[0.05]
Altruistic* pt-3 0.00
[0.05]
Cooperative/Competitive* pt-3 -0.03
[0.05]
Constant 9.01***
[1.68]154
Table 3A.1 (Continued): Mean Daily Exercises As a Function Of Partner’s Lagged
Exercises
Observations 12,168
R-squared 0.19
Notes:
1. This table examines how an individual’s exercise completion relates to the current and
previous exercise completion of their partner (other pair in the cooperative/competitive
treatment). The table reports results of an OLS regression of exercises completed on indicators
for experimental condition, the number of exercises completed by the individual’s partner on
the current day and three previous days, and interactions between the treatments and the lagged
exercise completion.
2. The unit of observation is the participant-day.
3. Standard errors clustered at the level of the pair for all experimental groups except
Cooperative/Competitive which is clustered at the level of the group.
4. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at
the 10 percent level.